Constitutionalism in East Africa:Progress, Challenges and Prospects in 2007 by Kioko, Wanza
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EAST AFRICA 
Books in the Series
Constitutionalism in East Africa: Progress, Challenges and Prospects in 1999 
Frederick W. Jjuuko
Constitutional Development in East Africa for Year 2000
Issa G. Shivji
Constitutional Development in East Africa for Year 2001 
J. Oloka Onyango
Constitutionalism in East Africa: Progress, Challenges and Prospects in 2002 
Frederick W. Jjuuko
Constitutionalism in East Africa : Progress, Challenges and Prospects in 2003 
Benson Tusasirwe
Constitutionalism in East Africa: Progress, Challenges and Prospects in 2004 
Lawrence Mute
Constitutionalism in East Africa 
Progress, Challenges and Prospects in 2007 
Editor 
Wanza Kioko
  KITUO CHA KATIBA
Kampala
FOUNTAIN PUBLISHERS
Kampala
Fountain Publishers
P.O. Box  488
Kampala
E-mail:  sales@fountainpublishers.co.ug
 publishing@fountainpublishers.co.ug
Website:www.fountainpublishers.co.ug
On behalf of
Kituo  cha Katiba: Eastern African Centre for Constitutional Development
P.O. Box 3277,  Plot 7, Estate Link Road, Off Lugogo by-pass
Kampala, Uganda
Tel: +256-414-533295
Fax: +256-414-541028
Email: kituo@kituochakatiba.co.ug
Website: www.kituochakatiba.co.ug
Distributed in Europe and Commonwealth countries outside Africa by: 
African Books Collective Ltd,
P.O. Box 721, 
Oxford OX1 9EN, UK.
Tel/Fax: +44(0) 1869 349110
E-mail: orders@africanbookscollective.com 
Website: www.africanbookscollective.com
© Kituo cha Katiba 2009 
First published 2009
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored 
in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, 
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written 
permission of the publisher.
ISBN  978-9970-02-969-3
vContents
1  Introduction   1
2 The State of Constitutionalism in East Africa: 
The Role of the East African Community – 2007  6
 Philip Kasaija  
Introduction  6
Theorising Constitutionalism and Constitutional 
Development  7
A  Brief History of the East African Integration  9
Institutions under the Current EAC and the Promotion 
of Constitutionalism 10
The Movement towards a Political Federation 20
The East African Bill of Rights and the Role of the 
Civil Society 23
Conclusion 25
3 The State of Constitutionalism in Uganda – 2007 27
 Isaac Bakayana  
Introduction 27
Violation of the Right to a Fair Trial  28
Independence of the Judiciary 33
Democratic Participation 38
Freedom of Assembly and Expression 40
Peace Process in Northern Uganda 44
Xenophobia, Ethnicity and Racism 47
Conclusion 50
vi Annual State of Constitutionalism in East Africa
4 The State of Constitutionalism in Kenya – 2007 51
 John Ambani Osogo 
 Introduction 51
Conceptual Framework 53
Constitutionalism 2007: The Unequal Tripartite? 56
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 58
The State of Autochthonous Oversight Bodies  67
In Lieu of a Conclusion 74
5 One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards: The State 
of Constitutionalism in Zanzibar – 2007 75
 Abdul Sheriff and Ismail Jussa
 Introduction 75
The Fresh Dialogue between CCM and CUF 75
The Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 92
Other Human Rights Issues 94
Corruption 97
Conclusion 97
6  The State of Constitutionalism in Rwanda – 2007 99
 Felix Zigirinshuti  
Introduction 99
Advancing the Cause of Justice:  Gacaca Trials and 
The Fight against Genocide Ideology 100
National Security and the Security of the People 107
The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms  109
Political Parties’ Grass-roots Elections 117
The Rule of Law and the Independence of the  Judiciary  118
Conclusion 121
Bibliography 123
vii
Acronyms
ACECCA Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act
AG    Auditor General
AU    African Union
CBD  Central Business District
CCM  Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CCPR  Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
CHA  Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
CRC  Constitutional Review Commission
CSO(s)  Civil Society Organisation(s)
CUF  Civic United Front
DO    District Offi cer
DP    Democratic Party
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC  East African Community
EACA  East Africa Court of Appeal
EACJ  East African Court of Justice
EACSO East African Common Services     
   Organisation
EALA  East African Legislative Assembly
EAF   East African Federation
EAPF  East African Polical Federation
ECK  Electoral Commission of Kenya
EMB  Electoral Management Body
FDC  Forum for Democratic Change
FDLR Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda
FIFA  Federation for International Football    
   Association
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodefi ciency Virus/Aquired Immune
 Defi ciency Syndrome
viii Annual State of Constitutionalism in East Africa
ICC    International Criminal Court
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and    
   Political Rights
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IDPC  Internally Displaced People’s Camps
IPPG  Inter Parliamentary Parties Group
JKU Economy Building Brigade [Jeshi la Kujenga
 Uchumi]
JPSC  Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission
KACC  Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
KACITA Kampala City Traders’ Association
KANU  Kenya African National Union
KICC  Kenyatta International Conference Centre
KMKM Anti-smuggling Squad [Kikosi Maalum cha Kuzuia
 Magendo]
KNCHR Kenya National Commission on Human   
   Rights
KRA  Kenya Revenue Authority
LHRC  Legal and Human Rights Centre
LP    Labour Party
LRA   Lords Resistance Army 
MP    Member of Parliament
NARC  National Rainbow Coalition
NCC  National Consultative Commission
NCHR  National Commission for Human Rights
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NHRI(s) National Human Rights Institution(s)
ODM  Orange Democratic Movement
PAP    Pan African Parliament
PNU  Party of National Unity
PRA   Peoples’ Redemption Army
Acronyms ix
RBoR  Regional Bill of Rights
RMLF  Roads Maintenance Levy Fund
RPA   Rwanda Patriotic Army
RPF    Rwanda Patriotic Front
SG    Secretary General
SMZ Zanzibar Government Special Forces [Serikali ya
 Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar]
UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UEC  Uganda Electoral Commission
UHCR  Uganda Human Rights Commission
UNHCHR United Nations High Commission for    
   Human Rights
UN    United Nations
UPF  Uganda Police Force
ZEC  Zanzibar Electoral Commission
ZFA   Zanzibar Football Association
ZLSC  Zanzibar Legal Service Centre

11 
Introduction 
The East African Community (EAC), now encompassing fi ve states 
after Rwanda and Burundi joined in 2007 expressed a commitment to 
the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights under 
article 6(d) of the East African Treaty of 2000. The article sets out 
the fundamental principles that shall govern the relationship between 
members of the Community. Based on this principles, East Africans 
have committed themselves to enhance constitutionalism in the region 
in order to improve the manner in which the region is governed. 
Enhancing constitutionalism and the rule of law is key to achieving 
Objective 1 under Article 5 of the Treaty which is the attainment 
of greater economic prosperity of the region, regional security and 
political stability. 
In Chapter One Philip Kasaija examines the role of the EAC in 
the promotion of the rule of law and constitutionalism in the region 
in the year 2007. As noted earlier, in 2007 the EAC expanded to 
include Rwanda and Burundi. In addition, in the same year, the issue 
of the establishment of the East African Political Federation became 
an important political concern for the original three Partner States of 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The three states engaged in a consultative 
process in which they, through country-specifi c commissions, sought 
to gauge their people’s support for the fast tracking of the East African 
political federation. The consultations resulted in the slowing down 
of the process as the people of Tanzania categorically objected to 
the fast tracking of political federation. This should give the region 
the opportunity to deepen economic integration before the political 
federation can be realized.
With regard to the promotion of the rule of law and 
constitutionalism, Philip Kasaija argues that the East African Court of 
Justice (EACJ) has taken the lead in this area. In the year under review, 
the court took a bold step by fi ghting against a member state for having 
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violated Article 6 (d) of the EAC Treaty, although it never made any 
binding orders on that state. The Court ordered the Secretary General 
of the EAC to put in place a framework to monitor what is going on 
in the fi ve member states of the Community in the areas of the rule of 
law and constitutionalism. 
On the down side, the court failed to fi ne the governments of 
partner states who amended the treaty without public consultations 
and participation. In pronouncing itself, the court noted that the 
amendments had already come into effect and so there was no need to 
grant an injunction to halt them. Kasaija argues that if the EAC is meant 
to be a people-centred institution, then the people must be consulted 
at every signifi cant stage of the integration process, including the 
amendment of the treaty. Thus by allowing the amendments to stand, 
we think, court missed an opportunity to remind the governments 
that the people are at the centre of the new EAC as per Article 7(1) 
(a) of the EAC Treaty.      
The paper considers that the East African Legislative Assembly 
(EALA) has not demonstrated capacity to make optimal contribution 
to enhancing constitutionalism in the region due to; among other 
reasons, its short period of existence, the economic focus of its 
legislation, the unclear standing of the assembly and its legislation viz-
a-viz that of   the national assemblies of member states.
In Chapter Two, Isaac Bakayana analyses the state of 
constitutionalism in Uganda in 2007. His paper argues that Uganda 
is facing a crisis occasioned by the lack of an independent judiciary 
that has been continuously under attack. In this respect, he points out 
certain instances in which the independence of the Judiciary is not 
upheld by other authorities and particularly the Executive. The courts 
have been continuously defi ed by government, law enforcement 
offi cers including the Attorney General, all of whom, are taking cue 
from an overbearing Executive. He further argues that the Amnesty 
Act of 2000 enacted to deal with the political problem of rebellion 
seems to exacerbate the problem because of the manner in which it 
has been enforced which seems to facilitate the denial of the right to 
be presumed innocent under the constitution. 
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In 2007 the Judiciary was unable to uphold the rights of accused 
persons most specially the presumption of innocence. Bakayana 
points out that in some instances, either due to loopholes in the 
law or interference of the Executive with the work of the Judiciary, 
presumption of innocence has been violated by the Ugandan 
authorities. For instance, the law relating to criminal offences requires 
that a suspect must be produced in court within 48 hours of their arrest. 
Where the crime committed is of a capital nature, there is discretion 
on the part of the police to hold the suspect for up to six months. 
Bakayana points out specifi c instances (for example the trial of the 
alleged Peoples Redemption Army (PRA) in which this discretion was 
abused by the authorities to detain the PRA suspects for a longer time 
than is constitutionally allowed. 
In 2007, Uganda witnessed a growth in ethnic and racial tensions 
especially with regard to access to land that culminated in violent 
protests against government allocation of forest land to investors 
of Asian descent.  The government’s response to the Mabira Forest 
demonstrations, for example, served as a reminder that in the absence 
of greater vigilance civil liberties are threatened and the government 
cannot be trusted to promote and respect fundamental rights and 
freedoms.
On a more positive note, his paper argues that the peace process 
relating to the confl ict in northern Uganda is likely to yield gains 
for constitutional governance in Uganda if provisions that relate to 
human rights violations during the war are implemented. 
In chapter three, John Ambani Osogo argues that although Kenya 
has a fairly developed infrastructure for enhancing constitutionalism, 
the institutions are tested to the limit and most of them are 
underperforming. This, he says was illustrated by the December 2007 
general election and its aftermath. All the institutions involved fell short 
of meeting acceptable standards in a constitutional state. He argues that 
the Executive, out of the three traditional institutions of government 
that are vested with the mandate to foster constitutionalism,  is 
overbearing on the other two institutions – Parliament and the Judiciary. 
This has had the unfortunate result of eroding the confi dence of the 
4 Annual State of Constitutionalism in East Africa
Kenyans in the two institutions. He further argues that other oversight 
institutions such as the Kenya  National Commission on Human 
Rights (KNCHR), the Electoral Commission of Kenya(ECK) and the 
Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) have a  role to play in 
advancing constitutionalism in Kenya. But they have underperformed 
and in some instances impeded the growth of constitutionalism in 
Kenya especially due to institutional weaknesses that have to do with 
their relationship with the Executive. 
In Chapter Four, Prof Sheriff and Ismail Jussa analyse the 
constitutional development in Zanzibar in 2007. They demonstrate 
the desire by the people of Zanzibar to continue examining their 
relationship with mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika). The response 
of the people of Zanzibar to the Wangwe Commission  that was 
established to consult the people on fast tracking the East African 
Political Federation (EAPF) went further to demonstrate that the 
people of Zanzibar continue to engage with their relationship with 
the Tanzanian Union is ambigious. 
 The publication of the fi rst Zanzibar Human Rights Report by 
a Zanzibar-based Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) may 
be another sign of the maturation of the political awareness and 
determination of the people of Zanzibar not to be silenced. Their 
discussion makes the point that despite these positive developments, 
Zanzibar is yet to outgrow one-partyism and the suppression of basic 
rights and freedoms. There have been attempts to muzzle the press by 
restricting their reporting of the affairs of the House of Representatives. 
The Zanzibar government has also failed to establish an anti-corruption 
agency even when there is offi cial acknowledgement that corruption is 
a big issue in Zanzibar. The purported fl oundering of the latest Accord 
between Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front 
(CUF), if it is not reversed quickly, exposes these Islands to another 
prolonged period of uncertainty and potential breakdown of law and 
order. 
Lastly, in Chapter Five, Felix Zigirinshuti of Rwanda discusses 
various aspects of constitutionalism in the Republic of Rwanda with 
specifi c focus on the progress made in the year 2007. The chapter opens 
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with acknowledging the constitution as the supreme law of Rwanda 
to which all the other laws are subordinate. It sets out the various 
fundamental principles which are embedded in the constitution 
and proceeds to evaluate the application of these principles in light 
of various practices, events and occurrences both by government in 
particular and the Rwandan people in general. 
The various principles discussed include the fi ght against genocide 
ideology, power-sharing, rule of law, democratic government, equality, 
non- discrimination and the quest for solutions through dialogue 
and consensus. Some of these issues include the commitment of the 
government to prosecuting and penalising the perpetrators of the 1994 
genocide in the most effective manner possible, the fi ght against the 
genocide ideology, protection of human rights and the government’s 
support of, among others, the right to life, right to property, right 
of defence, right to own property as well as press freedom within 
appropriate limits. 
It concludes that although Rwanda faced various challenges in 
2007 its commitment to uphold constitutionalism, has made it a 
country that is committed to its Constitution. Some of the challenges 
faced in 2007 are the conclusion of genocide trials that are still pending 
in both Gacaca and ordinary courts. The analysis acknowledges that 
Rwanda needs to align Rwandan laws with the regional principles 
observed by the EAC into which Rwanda was admitted in 2007.
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The State of Constitutionalism in East Africa: 
The Role of the East African Community 
(EAC) – 2007
 
Philip Kasaija
Introduction
On 19 June 2007, Rwanda and Burundi acceded to the East African 
Community Treaty, thus expanding the East African integration area 
to fi ve countries. Subsequently, the two countries became full members 
of the Community on 1 July 2007. The National Consultative 
Committees (NCC) on Fast Tracking the East African Federation 
(hereinafter NCCs-EAF) had also fi nalized their reports. It should be 
recalled that on 13 October 2006 the presidents of Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania simultaneously launched, in their respective capitals, 
committees to gather views on Fast Tracking the East African Political 
Federation (EAPF). The idea of fast tracking the regional integration 
of East Africa had been arrived at during a meeting of the three heads 
of state in Nairobi in August 2004. At that meeting, they had reviewed 
the pace of integration and had come to the conclusion that it was 
slow. As a result, they agreed to establish a committee “to examine 
ways and means to expedite and compress the process of integration, 
so that the ultimate goal of a Political Federation is achieved through 
a fast track mechanism.”1
Following the August 2004 heads of state meeting, a committee 
to gather views on Fast Tracking the EAPF was established and given 
three months to report its fi ndings to the 6th regular summit of the 
heads of state.2 The Wako Committee (named after its chairman) 
1 See Letter of Transmittal, Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation.
2  The Committee was chaired by Amos Wako, Attorney General of Kenya; Professor 
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traversed the region gathering views from different stakeholders from 
September 2004 and presented its report in November 2004. In the 
end, it concluded that the integration process of the East African 
region should be expedited. In this regard, it recommended that the 
political federation of East Africa should be achieved in the year 2013, 
with the election of a single president for East Africa. After receiving 
the Wako Committee’s recommendations, the heads of state deemed 
it imperative to carry out further consultations. In this regard, they 
agreed to establish committees in their respective countries to gather 
further views on the project. This resulted in the governments of 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania establishing the National Consultative 
Committees on Fast Tracking (NCCS1–EAPF) chaired by Njuguna 
Ngunjiri (Kenya), Besweri Akabway (Uganda) and Samuel Mwita 
Wangwe (Tanzania).
The Treaty of EAC sets out as its fundamental principles among 
others, the promotion of “good governance including, the rule of law, 
accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportunities, gender 
equality as well as the recognition, promotion and protection of human 
and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights.”3 It can be argued that these principles form the 
basis of constitutionalism under the Treaty regime. This paper aims 
at reviewing the role played by the EAC (as an institution) in the 
advancement and achievement of constitutionalism in the region in 
the year 2007. It seeks to examine the impact of the activities and 
decisions made by the EAC through its organs and institutions, on the 
Partner States in light of their respective constitutional developments 
during the period under review.
Theorising Constitutionalism and Constitutional 
Development
Constitutionalism is an idea often associated with the political theories 
of English philosopher John Locke who opined that a government can 
Haidan Amani, Vice Chairman (Tanzania); Dr. Ezra Suruma, Secretary (Uganda); 
and Associate members were: Professor Sam Tulya-Muhika (Uganda), Ms Margaret 
Chemengich (Kenya) and Mr. Mohamed Fakih Mohamed (Tanzania).
3 Article 6(d) 
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and should be limited in its powers by a fundamental law or set of 
laws, beyond the reach of an individual government to amend them; 
and that a government’s authority depends on its observing of these 
limitations.4 Constitutionalism means that political authority is to 
be exercised according to the law; that state and civic institutions, 
executive and legislative powers have their source in a constitution 
which is to be obeyed and not departed from at the whim of the 
government of the day; in short government of law and not of men.5 
Institutions in constitutional theory offer rules that bind both the 
persons in authority as well as the organs or bodies that exercise 
political power.
There are three central components of constitutionalism: the 
observance of human rights; separation of powers in government; 
and restrictions that derive from international law and its obligations 
on the state.6 The two ideas that form the core of constitutionalism 
are: the limitation of the state versus society in form of respect for a 
set of human rights covering not only civic rights but also economic 
and cultural rights; and the implementation of separation of powers 
within the state.7 While the fi rst principle is an external one, confi ning 
state powers in relation to civil society, the second principle is an 
internal one, making sure that no state body, organ or person can 
prevail within the state.
Through constitutions, governments express their commitment to 
creating an enabling environment for the effective participation in the 
affairs of nations by the people. Changes within the government or 
policies that have a bearing on the rules as contained in the constitution 
for better or worse, are referred to as constitutional development.8 In 
the context of integration, some of the changes originate within the 
4  Benson Tusasirwe, “Constitutionalism in East Africa: Progress, Challenges and 
Prospects in 2003,” Cited in John E. Ruhangisa, The State of Constitutional 
Development in East Africa: The Role of the EAC-2003, edited by John E. Ruhangisa: 
Fountain Publishers, Kampala p 106. 
5  Encyclopaedia Britannica (vol. 6) (1972), William Berton, Chicago, at 398.
6  Jan-Erik Lane (1996), Constitutions and Political Theory, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester p 19. 
7  Ibid. p 25.
8  Ruhangisa, op. cit. p 106.
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respective partner states, while others have to be adopted following 
the countries membership or commitment to various regional and 
international organisations, such as the EAC. In the sections that 
follow, we examine the role of the EAC as an institution in the process 
of constitutional development in the East African region. But fi rst, we 
look at a short history of the East African integration.
A  Brief History of the East African Integration
According to M. Abir, “since 1895, in the case of Kenya, Uganda 
and Zanzibar, and since 1919 in the case of Tanganyika territory, 
politicians and scholars have been toying with the idea of an East 
African federation.”9 As we have noted somewhere else, attempts at 
integrating the East African region have gone through fi ve states.10 
The fi rst stage was marked by the building of the Uganda Railway. 
Subsequently, between 1900 up to early 1960s (the second phase), 
there was the establishment of the East African Common Market, 
the introduction of a single currency and the establishment of an East 
African High Commission. According to some writers, this was “the 
golden age of cooperation”  in the region.11 
The third phase began in 1961 with the formation of the East 
African Common Services Organization (EACSO). In this stage, 
there were calls for the three countries of the region to politically 
federate. A working committee was even set up to draft the federation 
constitution, after Mwalimu Julius Nyerere had declared that he was 
ready to delay the independence of Tanganyika for at least a year so 
that the countries of the region could become independent at the 
9  M. Abir, “Closer Union in East Africa,” The Journal of African History, Vol. 10 
No. 3, 1969 p. 514. See also David Hamilton, An East African Federation, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 11 No. 3, 1963 at 407 (observing that “the 
issue of federation has been raised from time to time ever since 1899 when Sir 
Harry Johnston was instructed to consider the merits of some form of union or 
amalgamation of the East Africa (Kenya) and Uganda Protectorates and to fi nd a 
suitable site suitable for a federal capital …”).
10  Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, “Fast Tracking East Africa Federation: Asking the Diffi cult 
Questions,” The Uganda Living Law Journal, Vol. 4 No. 2, 2006 p 171.
11  Ibid. p 172.
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same time – in a federation. This phase ended with the establishment 
of the EAC in 1967.
From 1967 to 1977, the three countries of the region operated within 
the EAC which was the fourth attempt at regional integration.  The 
EAC Treaty was anchored on three broad categories: harmonization of 
economic policy; common institutions and a common market.12 This 
attempt at integration collapsed in 1977 for various reasons.13 The last 
attempt (fi fth) at integration of the region is the one which is underway, 
as we write this book. It began in 1984 when the three countries of 
the region signed the ‘Mediation Agreement for the Division of Assets 
and Liabilities of the former Community.’ Under the agreement, the 
parties agreed to explore areas of future cooperation and to work out 
concrete arrangements for such cooperation.14 Subsequently, between 
1991 and 1999 agreements were reached to revive the defunct EAC. 
In July 2000, a new EAC was born after the ratifi cation of the new 
EAC Treaty.
Institutions under the Current EAC and the 
Promotion of Constitutionalism
The EAC Treaty which according to Ruhangisa can be regarded as the 
Constitution of the Community15 establishes a number of institutions. 
These include: the Summit of the Heads of State and Government; 
the Council of Ministers; the Coordination Committee of Permanent 
Secretaries; the EACJ; the EALA; and the Secretariat. These institutions 
are meant to strengthen ties in the areas of cooperation identifi ed as: 
12  Mohabe Nyirabu (a), “Lessons from the East African Community of 1967-1977,” 
in Ahmed Mohiddin (ed.), (2005), Deepening Regional Integration of The East 
African Community, DPMF Book Series, Addis Ababa p  26.
13  Reasons for the collapse include among others: the economic war waged by Idi 
Amin resulting into a divergence of currencies; the worsening relations between 
Uganda and Tanzania due to the latter’s giving political asylum to Milton Obote; 
the worsening of relations between Uganda and Kenya following the Israeli raid on 
Entebbe in 1976;  the disparity between the three currencies and the divergences in 
their economic policies. See Kasaija, op. cit. p 175. See also O. Oro et al., (1990), 
African International Relations, Longman, London.
14  Article 14.02 EAC Mediation Agreement (1984).
15  Ruhangisa, op. cit. p 107.
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political, economic, social and cultural fi elds, research, technology, 
defence, security and legal affairs.
The Summit, Council of Ministers and the Coordination 
Committee of Permanent Secretaries has a pre-determined 
membership. Presidents, ministers in charge of Regional Cooperation 
and permanent secretaries responsible for regional cooperation 
automatically make up these institutions. The EACJ, EALA and the 
Secretariat have periodically been reconstituted. The EACJ and EALA 
were fi rst inaugurated in 2001.16 Our focus in this paper to a great 
extent will be on the work of the institution of the EACJ, which we 
think has had a profound effect on constitutional development in the 
region, and to a less extent on the work of EALA, in the period under 
review.
The East African Court of Justice  
The EACJ is an organ of the Community established under Article 9(1) 
(e) of the EAC Treaty. The Court’s role is to “ensure the adherence to 
the law in the interpretation, application of and compliance with the 
Treaty.”17 The Court’s jurisdiction extends to adjudication of disputes 
between the EAC and its employees arising from the terms and 
conditions of service of the latter or the application and interpretation 
of staff rules, regulations and terms and conditions of the EAC.18 
The Court may also adjudicate on any matter submitted to it on the 
basis of an arbitration agreement, being either an arbitration clause 
contained in an agreement or where state parties concerned agree to 
submit a dispute between them to this court.19
In the period under review, the jurisdiction of the court was 
widened. This was in accordance to the Treaty which stated that 
“the Court shall have such original, appellate, human rights and 
other jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council at a suitable 
16  Benson Tusasirwe, “Constitutional Development in East African Community 
(EAC) in 2002,” in Fredrick W. Jjuuko, (ed.), (2005), Constitutionalism in East 
Africa: Progress, Challenges and Prospects in 2002, Fountain Publishers, Kampala p 
136. 
17  Article 23 of the EAC Treaty.
18  Tusasirwe, op. cit. p 139.
19  Ibid.
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subsequent date.”20  At their 8th Ordinary Summit held in November 
2006, the Heads of State took a decision to reconstitute the EACJ 
by establishing two divisions namely: a Court of First Instance with 
jurisdiction as per the present Article 23 of the Treaty, and an Appellate 
Division with appellate powers over the Court of First Instance.21 The 
Council of Ministers in fulfi lling its mandate made proposals aimed at 
amending the Treaty for the purpose of expanding the jurisdiction of 
the court which were adopted by the Summit at its 4th Extraordinary 
Meeting in December 2006.22 In March 2007, the amendments came 
into effect upon the completion of the ratifi cation process. The re-
constituted Court became operational on 1 July 2007. In the interim 
period pending its full establishment, the court will have fi ve judges in 
each division. Each Partner State has been asked to re-designate one of 
its current judges of the EACJ to the Appellate Division.23  
According to Ruhangisa, the EACJ has a crucial role to play in 
confl ict resolution and confi dence building in the region.24 In playing 
this role, “it should enhance the observance of and upholding of human 
rights through good governance and democratic institutions.”25 Irene 
Ovonji a former member of EALA sees the Court as the “main body 
to play the role of constitutional development in the region.”26 In the 
period under review, the Court was seized with a number of issues that 
touch upon the promotion of good governance and constitutionalism. 
To these we now turn.
Continued  Interference  with the Independence of the Judiciary 
in Uganda: The People’s Redemption Army (PRA) Suspects Case
On 1 March 2007, Ugandan security forces invaded the High Court 
in Kampala in an attempt to re-arrest suspects who were about to be 
20  Article 27(2).
21  EAC Secretariat, Communique of The 5th Extra-ordinary Summit of EAC Heads 
of State, Kampala, 18 June 2007 p 4.
22  Note that the proposals were a subject of a legal challenge in the EACJ, which 
challenge was dismissed.
23  Ibid. 
24  Ruhangisa, op. cit. at 108.
25  Ibid.
26  Personal Interview with Ovonji in Kampala, 27 November 2007.
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granted bail.27 It should be recalled that this was the second time the 
security forces were doing that, the fi rst time having been 16 November 
2005.28 The accused who the security forces sought to re-arrest were 
suspected rebels belonging to the shadowy People’s Redemption Army 
(PRA). They had been arrested in Eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and West Nile in Uganda at various times between 
2003 and 2004. The second siege of the High Court led to the judiciary 
going on strike for the fi rst time since Uganda became independent. 
The judiciary accused the executive of “gross infringement on its 
independence.”29
 In their justifi cation for going on strike the judiciary cited “the 
repeated violation of the sanctity of the court premises, disobedience 
of court orders with impunity and the constant threats and attacks on 
the safety and independence of the judiciary and judicial offi cers.”30 
Other grounds that the judiciary cited for going on strike include, 
“the savage violence exhibited by security personnel within the court 
premises, the total failure by all organs and agencies of the state to 
give the courts assistance as required to ensure effectiveness, and 
the recognition that judicial power is derived from the people, to be 
exercised by the courts on behalf of the people in conformity with the 
law, the values, norms and aspiration of the people of Uganda.”31
The invasion of the courts by security men provoked condemnations 
from within and outside Uganda. It evoked memories when the 
government of Idi Amin invaded the courts and dragged the then 
Chief Justice of Uganda Benedicto Kiwanuka from his chambers 
and murdered him. According to the Principal Judge, James Ogoola, 
“the siege constituted a very grave and heinous violation of the twin 
principles of the rule of law and judicial independence.”32 He added, 
27  See Monitor Team, “Judges on strike over court siege,” Daily Monitor, 2 March 
2007 p 1.
28  See Solomon Muyita et al., “Armed Men Disrupt Besigye Court Case,” Daily 
Monitor, 17 November 2005 at 1; Emmanuel Mulondo et al., “Besigye: Chief 
Justice Condemns Court Siege,” Daily Monitor, 18 November 2005 p 1.
29  Monitor Team, “Judges on strike over court siege,” op. cit. 
30  Ibid.
31  Ibid.
32  Ibid.
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“it sent a chilling feeling down the spine of the judiciary, and left 
the legal fraternity and the general public agape with disbelief and 
wonderment.”33 
Commenting on the incident, Supreme Court Justice George 
Kanyeihamba noted that “this regrettable episode in the history of 
Uganda should never have occurred if the actors in the other two arms 
of government had interpreted their respective roles correctly, and in the 
spirit of give and take and reconciliation, acted, guided by the doctrine 
of separation of powers, the rule of law and constitutionalism.”34 He 
added that the episode, “depict[ted] an Executive that is bent on 
ignoring what it knows to be the right course both in national and 
international law and culture but instead embarks on the principle that 
‘might is right’ and majoritism is always the answer to every possible 
social, legal and political problem.”35 He concluded by observing that, 
“[the Museveni] administration … is driven by what it perceives as 
victory through political power regardless of what the constitution, 
laws or fi nal decisions of the courts or indeed the citizens of Uganda 
think.”36
Arising from the November 2005 court siege, lawyers of the PRA 
suspects petitioned the EACJ praying that the court should fi nd 
Uganda guilty of violating Article 6(d) of the EAC Treaty. The lawyers 
also accused the Secretary General (SG) of the EAC of failing to ensure 
that a member state (Uganda) complies with the EAC Treaty. The court 
in late 2007 pronounced itself on this petition. The Court held that 
“Uganda had violated the rule of law and the rights of its citizens by 
allowing its military to repeatedly interfere with the court processes.”37 
Whilst the Court did not fi nd evidence against the Secretary General 
on the ground that he did not know what was happening in Uganda. 
However, it asked him “to be more pro-active and not sit back.”38 The 
33  Ibid.
34  G.W. Kanyeihamba, “The Culture of Constitutionalism and The Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers,” Public Lecture, Makerere University Faculty of Law, 15 
March 2007.
35  Ibid.
36  Ibid.
37  Cited in Solomon Muyita, “Uganda violated rule of law, says EAC Court,” Daily 
Monitor, 26 October 2007 p 3.
38  Ibid.
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Court directed the SG “to put in place a framework to know what 
would be happening in the fi ve member states of the community.”39 
Unfortunately, the court did not make any orders against Uganda 
because of the absence of an enabling protocol.
In the promotion of constitutionalism in the region, the EACJ has 
taken a bold step by holding that a member state violated the rule of 
law and rights of its citizens. But the failure to make any orders is a 
step backwards. According to Yona Kanyomozi, a former member of 
the EALA, the lack of penalties for Article 6(d) violations makes the 
Treaty hollow.40 To him the current EACJ is just engaged in “public 
rhetoric.”41 Kanyomozi avers that the operating principles in Article 
7(2)42 must be translated into legally binding ones and above all the 
violators of these principles must be sanctioned. In conclusion to this 
point, we can however observe that notwithstanding the lack of power 
to make binding declarations regarding issues of the rule of law and 
constitutionalism, the EACJ has interpreted the Treaty robustly in its 
jurisprudence.
The Jurisprudence of the EACJ
In the period under review, the EACJ was seized with a number 
of cases which concerned the interpretation of the Treaty, but also 
having a bearing on the principles of constitutionalism and the rule 
of law.43 Among the cases decided include:  Application No. 5 of 
2007 concerning the matter of Kenya representatives to the EALA; 
Application No. 8 of 2007 concerning judicial review; and Application 
No. 944 challenging the amendments to the EAC Treaty made by 
39  Ibid.
40  Personal Interview Kampala, 13 November 2007.
41  Ibid.
42  It states: “The Partner States undertake to abide by the principles of good 
governance, including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, 
social justice and the maintenance of universally accepted standards of human 
rights.”
43  In accordance with Article 27(1) of the EAC Treaty.
44  These amendments concerned among others Article 23 dealing with the Role of 
the EACJ;    Article 24 dealing with the appointment of Judges of the Court; and, 
Article 26 which deals with the Removal from Offi ce and Temporary Membership 
of the Court The amendment of these provisions led to the creation of two divisions 
of the East African Court of Justice i.e. the Court of First Instance and an Appellate 
Division. 
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Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.44 We will make comments on these 
applications later.
In Application No. 5, the Attorney General of Kenya sought the 
setting aside of the EACJ ruling in Reference No.1 of 2006. In the 
latter case the EACJ had ruled that the manner in which the Kenyan 
government had ‘elected’ its representatives of EALA contravened 
the EAC Treaty. As a result, the ‘elected’ members were barred from 
taking up offi ce at Arusha. In Application 5, the court was asked to set 
aside its ruling in Reference No. 1 of 2006 because some members of 
the bench were suspected of having been biased. The Court took the 
opportunity to expound on the principle of judicial impartiality and 
the rules relating to recusal of judges. In dismissing the application, 
the court reminded member states that respect for court decisions is 
part and parcel of the rule of law, a fundamental objective principle of 
the Community, which is clearly set out in Article 6 (d) of the EAC 
Treaty. 
 Application No. 8, concerned a claim made by a Tanzanian 
national, Christopher Mtikila with regard to Tanzanian representatives 
to EALA. The court dismissed the claim with costs, having found 
that the claimant should have fi rst sought redress in Tanzania’s courts 
before appealing to the EACJ. In this application the court discussed 
at length the principle of judicial review, which has an import on the 
rule of law and constitutionalism.
In Application No. 9, the law societies of Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanganyika, Zanzibar and East Africa sued the Attorneys General 
of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and the Secretary General of the EAC 
over the amendments which the respondents made to the Treaty. The 
amendments concerned two issues: the reconstitution of the EACJ by 
establishing two divisions of Court of First Instance and an Appellate 
Division; and, a review of the procedure for the removal of Judges 
from offi ce to include all possible reasons for removal other than those 
initially provided for in the Treaty. 
When the amendments were fi rst announced, the legal fraternity 
in the region registered deep concern. The legal societies of East Africa 
petitioned the EACJ to stop their implementation. The applicants 
contended that the amendments were made in violation of Treaty 
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provisions. The violation, it was opined offended the spirit of the 
EAC Treaty which called for ‘public consultation’ and ‘participation’ 
in the making and amending of the supreme law of East African 
integration.45 In the instant case, no public consultations had been 
done on the amendments.
The court dismissed the application noting that most of the 
amendments had already been implemented anyway. Nevertheless, the 
court took the opportunity to expound on the principles of locus standi, 
granting of interlocutory injunctions and public interest litigation. 
These, we think, will contribute signifi cantly to the principle of stare 
decisis and thus advance the rule of law and constitutionalism.
It must be stated that the amendments themselves were not bad 
per se. As already noted, the creation of an appellate tier of the EACJ is 
contemplated by Article 27(2) of the Treaty. Nevertheless, there have 
been those who have been calling for the establishment of an East 
African Court of Appeal (EACA).46 The EACA would be the supreme 
court of the region. It would receive appeals from member states 
on any issue. By creating an appeals chamber for the current EACJ 
through amending the Treaty, moreover without public consultations 
and participation, the partner states seem to have ‘killed’ the EACA 
idea. 
The East African Legislative Assembly  
Like the EACJ, the EALA is one of the principal organs of the EAC.47 
It is composed of 32 directly and indirectly elected members.48 Each 
Partner State elects 9 representatives to the Assembly. The EALA 
is set to expand with the admission of Burundi and Rwanda in the 
Community. The EALA is the legislative arm of the Community. The 
fi rst EALA was inaugurated in 2001 and existed up to 2006. The 
second EALA was meant to be inaugurated in November 2006 but 
it ran into problems as a result of a legal challenge that was mounted 
45  Article 150 of the EAC Treaty.
46  In an interview with Hon. Kanyomozi (see above), he strongly called for the 
establishment of the EACA.
47  Article 9(1) (f ).
48  Article 48(1) of the EAC Treaty.
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against the Assembly members from Kenya.49 The result of the delay 
has meant that the term of the Second Assembly will now run from 5 
June 2007 to 4 June 2012.50 
In the life of the EAC, the EALA, in addition to providing 
a democratic forum for debate also serves as a watchdog.51 The 
Assembly is mandated inter alia to: debate and approve the budget 
of the Community; debate annual reports on the activities of the 
community prepared by the Council of Ministers; debate the annual 
audit report prepared by the Audit Commission; debate all matters 
pertaining to the Community and make recommendations to the 
Council of Ministers; debate any other reports referred to it by the 
Council of Ministers; and liase with the parliaments of the Partner 
States on matters relating to the Community.52 As can be seen, whilst 
the Assembly is not explicitly mandated to deal with issues of the rule 
of law and constitutionalism, it could use its mandate of “debating all 
matters pertaining to the community” to do so.
In the period under review, the second EALA has minimally (if at 
all) impacted on the areas of the rule of law and constitutionalism in 
the region. This could partly be explained by the fact that it has been 
in existence for a short time, as it started its work in July 2007. Time 
of existence notwithstanding, it must also be noted that the EAC 
generally and EALA in particular, have been saddled with inter alia 
the problem of sovereignty. Whilst the Treaty clearly states that the 
Community organs, institutions and laws shall take precedence over 
similar national ones on matters pertaining to the implementation of 
the Treaty, partner states sometimes enact new laws without regard 
to the regional body and its institutions.53 The problem is further 
compounded by the fact that the EAC does not have a clear mandate 
49  For details see Anyang N’yongo et al v. AG of Kenya et al , (EACJ) Reference Case 
No. 1 of 2006.
50  EAC Secretariat, COMMUNIQUE OF THE 5TH EXTRA-ORDINARY 
SUMMIT OF EAC HEADS OF STATE, Kampala, 18 June  2007 p 5.
51  Yasin Olum, Election of Members of the EALA: The Case of Uganda, THE 
UGANDA LIVING LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 4 No. 2, 2006 p 139. For other 
functions of the EALA see Article 49 of the EAC Treaty.
52  Article 49 of EAC Treaty.
53  Wilbert T. K. Kaahwa, The State of Harmonisation of Municipal Laws in the 
East African Community Context, in Maria Nassali (ed.) (2008), REFORMING 
JUSTICE IN EAST AFRICA, Fountain Publishers, Kampala p 13-37.
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to police enforcement of its decisions by partner states. On the 
problems facing EALA, Deya has succinctly opined that “it [EALA] 
has been under-funded and under-staffed. The national governments 
are content to grant suffi cient resources to pay salaries and other 
emoluments, hold the formal sessions and perhaps for some regional 
travel, but not suffi cient to cover the research, documentation for 
enabling the legislators to translate their intentions into tangible laws 
and policies that reap positive and practical benefi ts for the people of 
East Africa.”54 We think this summarizes the weakness of EALA in the 
areas of constitutionalism and good governance. 
As we write, EALA has just concluded its 4th meeting at Zanzibar. 
Nevertheless, a look at its legislation agenda for the year 2007-8, one 
can conclude that it has its hands full. The Assembly will consider the 
following Bills: the Lake Victoria Transport Bill, 2007; Lake Victoria 
Basin Commission Bill, 2007; Summit (Delegation of Powers and 
Functions) Bill, 2007; EAC Customs Management Act (Amendment) 
Bill, 2007; EAC Appropriations Bill, 2007; EAC Supplementary 
Appropriations Bill, 2007; East African Science and Technology 
Commission Bill, 2007; East African Civil Aviation Safety and 
Oversight Agency Bill, 2007; East African Kiswahili Commission Bill, 
2007; and East African Health Research Commission Bill, 2007.55 In 
addition the Assembly might consider in the period a bill to combat 
counterfeit practices in the region; and a bill to regulate the elections 
of the members of EALA.56
From the list of bills that are to be considered by EALA, one 
clearly notices the absence of bills relating to issues of constitutional 
development. This absence can partly be explained by the fact that 
such issues are considered to be fi rmly under the ambit of the member 
states. Even those bills that the Assembly has passed in the past have 
had little or nothing to do with constitutional development and the 
54  Donald Deya, “Constitutionalism and the East African Community in 2004,” in 
Lawrence Mute (ed.), (2007), Constitutionalism in East Africa: Progress, Challenges 
and Prospects in 2004, Fountain Publishers, Kampala at p 124.
55  EAC Secretariat, op. cit. p  6.
56  Ibid.
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promotion of the rule of law.57 There should be regional laws and 
programmes for the promotion of constitutional development so that 
comparisons can be made. As of now, every member state is pursuing 
its own agenda while EALA seems to be un-interested in constitutional 
development issues.58
The EALA is also expected to play a big role in the implementation 
of the Third EAC Development Strategy (2006-2010), which sets out 
the strategic goals of the EAC and time-bound targets to be achieved. 
As the life of this Assembly is slated to end in 2012, it will therefore 
play a vital role in the establishment of the Political Federation. 
The Movement towards a Political Federation
In the EAC Treaty, the Partner States declare that they will undertake 
to establish among themselves a Customs Union, a Common 
Market, a Monetary Union, and ultimately a Political Federation.59 
The purpose of this unique experiment is, as it has been noted, “to 
strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial, infrastructural, 
cultural, social, political and other relations of the Partner States 
so that there is accelerated, harmonious and balanced development 
with sustained expansion of economic activities that will be shared 
equitably.”60  Again, as Kamanyi has observed, “whereas Article 5(2) 
clearly provides for the establishment of political federation, there 
is no subsequent article that elaborates on the establishment of a 
57  For a list of these acts see Deya, op. cit. p 122.
58  It should be noted that no member of EALA has ever brought an individual 
member’s bill on constitutional issues for debate. Nevertheless, individual members 
have been happy to bring bills such as: The Inter-University Council for East 
Africa Bill, 2004; The East Africa Trade Negotiations Bill; and the East African 
Community Immunities and Privileges Bill. However, these were subsequently 
appropriated by the Secretariat. EALA is made up of members representing 
different political party interests in Member States. One would have expected that 
those members representing the opposition parties would put constitutional and 
good governance issues on the EALA agenda, but they have not. It could be that 
their parties have not given them a green-light to engage in these areas yet.   
59  Article 5(2).
60  Judy Kamanyi, Political Federation in East African Progress, Challenges and 
Prospects for Constitutional Development, East African Journal of Peace and Human 
Rights Vol. 13 No. 1, 2007 at 127.
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political federation.”61 Having realised this lacunae, the Partner States 
in 2004 moved to institute mechanisms to operationalize the political 
federation.62 As we mentioned in the introduction, the heads of state of 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in 2004 met in Nairobi and decided to 
fast track the movement towards political federation. They established 
a committee headed by the Attorney General of Kenya Amos Wako, 
to study the issue and make recommendations. 
The Wako Committee identifi ed two arguments for fast tracking 
the East Africa Federation, these are: peace, political stability and 
security; and second, economic integration. The fi rst argument has 
three strands. First, when societies merge to form one large economic 
and political entity, issues of tribalism, religious and social – cultural 
problems tend to disappear–this has proven diffi cult under each 
separate country. Secondly, under a Federation, people will identify 
themselves as East African (Kenyan), East African (Ugandan) or 
East African (Tanzanian). Reference to tribal associations will be 
marginalized and will disappear eventually. This is a major pillar for 
peace, stability and security as the Federation is a solution to any 
real or potential problem of internal disintegration. Thirdly, that the 
Federation will remove any possibilities of Partner States fi ghting 
each other and as more countries join, such as Rwanda and Burundi, 
political stability of the region will be further entrenched.
The bane of the second argument is that the desire for economic 
integration can only be satisfi ed if there is political will and support. 
The imperative in this global environment is that for a people to survive 
there must be an environment that enables them to participate in an 
accelerated economic development process.  Economic development 
can be made faster within a political federation than when it is done 
under totally separate governments. The underlying assumption is 
that effective economic integration buffeted by a political federation 
is an imperative.
61  Ibid. at 128. 
62  In accordance with Article 123(6) of the EAC Treaty which states, “The Summit 
shall initiate a process towards the establishment of a Political Federation of the 
Partner States by directing the Council to undertake the process.” 
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Having identifi ed the above two arguments and having studied 
various options to fast track the Federation, the Wako Committee 
among other recommendations suggested that the process of fast 
tracking take the form of overlapped and parallel stages of integration 
(involving the retention of the timeframe for the Customs Union of 
fi ve years effective January 1, 2005; overlapping of the four stages 
of integration to allow the undertaking of parallel activities at each 
stage to ensure that the basic minimum requirements at each stage 
of the federation are achieved within fi ve years effective from January 
1, 2005. A consolidated and planned approach, in the form of 
negotiating templates, should be used in order to hasten the process of 
integration).63 The timetable (roadmap) towards political federation 
was suggested to be in three phases: a preparatory phase, a transitional 
phase to a federation, and a consolidation phase leading to a fully-
fl edged federation with appropriate institutions, including an elected 
Executive Organ and Legislature and a dully constituted Federal 
Judiciary.64  
Following the recommendations of the Wako Committee, the 
partner states established the NCCs-EAF to study the issue of fast 
tracking the political federation in the respective countries and then 
make recommendations. As we write the NCCs-EAF reports are now 
part of public records. In Uganda, the idea of fast tracking the East 
African Political Federation by 2013 was supported by 75.21%; in 
Kenya by 65% and in Tanzania by 20.8%.65 Clearly the majority of 
the Tanzanians were not in favour of fast tracking the federation.66 
63  EAC, Report of The Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation, Arusha 
Tanzania, 2004, para. 320.
64  In terms of time, the Preparatory Phase would run from December 2004 to 
December 2005; the Transition Phase would run from January 2005 to December 
2009; and the Consolidation Phase would run from January 2010 to March 2013.
65  Report of the National Consultative Committee on Fast-Tracking the East African 
Federation-Uganda, June 2007; Report of the National Consultative Committee 
on Fast-Tracking the East African Federation-Kenya, June 2007; and Report of the 
National Committee for Gathering Views on Fast-Tracking the Formation of East 
African Political Federation-United Republic of Tanzania, June 2007.  
66  Report of the National Committee for Gathering Views on Fast-Tracking the 
Formation of East African Political Federation-United Republic of Tanzania, June 
2007 p  4.
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Nevertheless, the idea of an East African Political Federation was 
supported by 69% of Kenyans; 74% of Tanzanians and 77% of 
Ugandans. As a result of Tanzania’s position on fast tracking, the 
process has been slowed down. The Partner States have realized that 
there is need to deepen economic integration to underpin the political 
federation. Negotiations are in advanced stages to sign the Common 
Market Protocol, which market should come into operation by 2010 
and the Monetary Union is expected to be in place by 2012. This is of 
course in addition to the Customs Union which came into operation 
in 2005.
During the national consultations on Fast Tracking the Political 
Federation, a number of issues concerning political governance and 
constitutionalism were brought to the fore by the public in the three 
Partner States. The issues raised include among others: disparity 
in national constitutions and other laws and practices related to 
governance, corruption and human rights; loss of sovereignty in 
national decision making and national identity; and clarity on electoral 
processes at both national and regional levels.67 The argument of the 
people was that these issues should fi rst be ironed out by national 
governments before they can embark on the political federation of 
the region. As we write, the three Partner States have decided to 
concentrate on deepening the economic integration as a prelude to 
the establishment of the political federation.  
The East African Bill of Rights and the Role of the 
Civil Society
The Treaty of the EAC recognises the importance of the civil society 
in the integration process, and thus calls on the Partner States to create 
an enabling environment for it to participate in the EAC activities.68 
According to Ssali Simba, civil society has several roles to play in the 
integration process.69 First, for any stage of regional integration to 
67  Beatrice Kiraso, “Towards the East African Political Federation,” October 2007 at 
http://www.eac.int/news_kiraso_Article_PF.htm (visited on 28 December 2007).  
68  Article 217(3) 
69  S. K. Simba, “The Role of Civil Society in Regional Integration,” paper presented 
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be successful, it must incorporate full ownership and participation of 
the people, especially through their institutions of choice. Secondly, 
Civil Society Organizations (CSOS) have a role in order to ensure 
that the previous mistakes of the community are not repeated. 
Lastly, the active participation of civil society in the activities of the 
community will provide the necessary impetus in the development of 
the Community.
The civil society has been vocal in advocating for the Partner States 
of the EAC to stick to the fundamental and operating principles as 
stated in Articles 6 (d) and 7 (2) of the EAC Treaty. In this regard, 
the civil society has been pushing the EAC to enact a Regional Bill 
of Rights (RBoR). It must be mentioned that Kituo Cha Katiba has 
been at the vanguard of this call. The demand for an East African 
Bill of Rights comes at a time when the jurisdiction of the EACJ has 
been expanded. The RBoR would complement existing national Bill 
of Rights and international human rights instruments, including the 
various United Nations and African Union Protocols and Covenants 
on Human Rights.70 The envisaged RBoR would include provisions 
for economic, social and cultural rights. In addition, it would provide 
for issues such as equality before the law; personal liberty; access to 
information; access to justice; freedom of movement; right to work, 
reside and own property within the EAC region; sexual reproductive 
rights; rights of refugees and internally displaced persons, and on the 
whole, the recognition of the principle that rights are to be limited 
by law where such limitations are acceptable and ascribed within 
at the Induction Workshop for New Members of the East African Legislative 
Assembly (EALA) and Members of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), Entebbe, 
November 2006. See also Mohabe Nyirabu (b), “Democratic Governance and 
Deepening Political Integration of the East African Community: The Case of 
Tanzania,”  in Ahmed Mohiddin (ed.), (2005), Deepening Regional Integration of 
The East African Community, DPMF Book Series, Addis Ababa p 253 (arguing 
that for successful integration, there is a need to involve the civil society and 
galvanise and tap people’s energy. Integration of policies without the people’s active 
involvement is likely to be unsuccessful). 
70  “EAC, EAC Turns Attention to Regional Bill of Rights,” Press Release, Arusha, 18 
September 2007. On the imperatives of having a RBoR see Donald Deya, op. cit., 
pp  117-121.
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the bounds of a democratic society. The proposal to enact the RBoR 
was scheduled to be considered by the EAC Council of Ministers in 
November 2007. The enactment of the Bill will go a long way in 
enhancing the rule of law and promoting constitutionalism in the 
region.
Conclusion
We set out to examine the role of the EAC in the promotion of the 
rule of law and constitutionalism in the region in the year of 2007. We 
have noted that in 2007 the EAC expanded to include the countries 
of Rwanda and Burundi. In addition, in the year under examination, 
the issue of the establishment of the East African Political Federation 
was fi rmly put on the agenda of the original three Partner States 
of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, by way of the three carrying out 
national consultation on the matter. The consultations resulted in 
the slowing down of the process as the people of Tanzania expressed 
a strong desire to fi rst deepen the economic integration before the 
political federation can be instituted.
In addition, in the year under review, the Second EALA was fi nally 
constituted. There had been a delay in its constitution because the 
Kenyan representatives had been illegally ‘elected.’ The matter was 
referred to the EACJ which ordered for fresh elections, which were 
duly conducted resulting in the election of the current members of 
EALA from Kenya.   
In the promotion of the rule of law and constitutionalism, we 
noted that the EACJ has taken the lead in this area. In the year under 
review, the court took a bold step by fi ghting against a member state 
for having violated Article 6 (d) of the EAC Treaty, although it never 
made any binding orders on that state. Court ordered the Secretary 
General of the EAC to put in place a framework to monitor what was 
going on in the fi ve member states of the Community in the areas of 
the rule of law and constitutionalism.71 
71  According to Mike Sebalu a member of EALA from Uganda, no framework has 
been put in place so far. The possible reason could be that the areas of the rule of 
law and constitutionalism fall within the sovereignty of Member States. Interview  
on 7 May 2008 Kampala.
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On the down side, Court failed to fi ne the governments of 
Partner States who amended the Treaty without public consultations 
and participation. In pronouncing itself, the Court noted that the 
amendments had already come into effect and so there was no need to 
grant an injunction to halt them. If the EAC is meant to be a people-
centred institution, then the people must be consulted at every stage 
of the integration process, including the amendment of the Treaty. 
By allowing the amendments to stand, we think, the court missed 
an opportunity to remind the governments that the people are at the 
centre of the new EAC as per Article 7(1) (a) of the EAC Treaty.     
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The State of Constitutionalism in 
Uganda – 2007
 Isaac Bakayana
Introduction
In the recent past, the Parliament of Uganda has adopted three 
amendments to the 1995 Constitution.72   Though the amendments 
were designed to achieve particular objectives, they most importantly 
demonstrated that the constitution was alive to the various 
political, economic and social changes within Uganda.  The current 
constitution is a result of the various constitutional pronouncements 
and the fi ndings and recommendations of the Constitutional Review 
Commission (CRC) established by Legal Notice 1/2001. 73
It is against the above background that an evaluation of the state 
of constitutionalism in Uganda should be made.  Several events were 
witnessed during 2007 which have a direct bearing on the principles 
of constitutionalism in the country.  During the year, judges went 
on strike, suspects were granted bail on terms that undermined the 
principle of presumption of innocence, the freedoms of expression, 
association and assembly were continuously abused, and the 
Inspectorate of Government intensifi ed its fi ght against corruption.    
Furthermore during 2007, the Uganda Electoral Commission 
conducted by-elections, there were attempts by government to lease 
portions of forestland to investors, and, several positive strides were 
taken in the ongoing peace process between the Government of 
Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).   It is not my intention 
to reproduce the above events in this paper, however, these events will 
72  Act No. 13 of 2000, Act No. 11 of 2005 and Act No. 21 of 2005.
73  Paul K. Ssemogerere, Zachary Olum and Juliet Rainer Kafi re v. Attorney General, 
Supreme Court Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2002.
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be used as a basis to analyze the state of constitutionalism in Uganda 
during 2007. 
Notwithstanding article 2 (1) of the Constitution of Uganda, 
which affi rms the supremacy of the Constitution, several acts were 
witnessed during 2007, which were contrary to the general principles 
of the constitution and its provisions.
Violation of the Right to a Fair Trial 
The Presumption of Innocence
The arrest, detention and trial of suspects in Uganda has been conducted 
in a manner that contravenes the right to a fair hearing.74  This right 
requires that an accused person is presumed innocent until convicted 
by a court of competent jurisdiction,75  hence the presumption of 
innocence must be upheld at all times prior to a conviction. This 
notwithstanding, suspects were treated in such a manner that implied 
a presumption of guilt.   
The above may be attributed to the loopholes within the law 
and the persistent interference by the Executive with the work of the 
Judiciary. Although article 23 (4) of the constitution provides that a 
suspect should be produced before a court of law within 48 hours, 
the law creates a six months period within which a person charged 
with a capital offence can “legally” be held in custody even when they 
are presumed innocent. The discretion under article 23 (6) (a) has 
not been suffi cient to remedy the abuse that has been occasioned to 
presumably innocent suspects.  
The implication therein is that a person can be arrested on a 
groundless suspicion of committing a capital offence, formally 
charged before a court and remanded for at least six months within 
the provisions of the law.  Though the law requires that a person be 
produced before a court within 48 hours, it does not require the court 
74  See also Bakayana Isaac, (2006), “From Protection to Violation? Analyzing The 
Right to a Speedy Trial at The Uganda Human Rights Commission” HURIPEC 
Working Paper No. 2, Kampala.
75  Articles 28 (3) (a) and 44 of the revised Constitution.
The State of Constitutionalism in Uganda (2007) 29
to do more than read the charges to the accused at such a preliminary 
stage.  In addition, it does not require the police or prosecutors to 
produce some prima facie proof to justify his detention.   Indeed one 
may rightly argue that the underlying justifi cation for the period of 
remand has been to enable police investigate its cases, that is, charge 
fi rst, investigate later and make a decision on whether or not to 
prosecute thereafter.
The above legal loopholes were evident during the trial of people 
alleged to be members of the Peoples Redemption Army (PRA). 
Although some PRA suspects were arrested in 2002 and others in 
2003 and 2004, most of them were detained and only regained their 
“freedom” when they ‘opted’ to ‘apply’ for amnesty under the Amnesty 
Act (2000).   The manner in which the police handled these suspects 
seemed to imply their guilt, a position that was further affi rmed by 
President Yoweri Museveni.  President Museveni asserted that “the 
original mistake…was for the court to release people on bail who were 
facing very grave criminal charges...”76. 
The president’s statement implied that persons accused of 
committing very grave offences were guilty until otherwise proved; 
that the burden of proof shifted to accused persons and the onus of 
proving their innocence lay with the accused persons. In order to 
avoid the consequent release on bail of the PRA suspects the state 
brought against them fresh charges of capital offences, which meant 
another six months on remand!77  In effect, though the accused’s trial 
had failed to take off after 6 months in detention, they could not be 
released as new charges of capital offences were fi led against them and 
therefore could not be released on bail.
When the above events are considered in light of the right to a fair 
trial in general and the presumption of innocence in particular, one may 
infer a radical shift from a presumption of innocence to that of guilt 
being adopted in the case of persons within political opposition.  The 
arrest, arraignment and detention of a suspect should be conducted in 
76  Museveni Yoweri Kaguta “Museveni writes to Chief Justice over High Court siege.” 
The Daily Monitor, 12 March 2007 pp. 4.
77  Museveni Yoweri Kaguta, “Museveni speaks out on High Court scuffl e.” The New 
Vision, 6  March 2007 pp. 10.
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line with the constitutional provisions that uphold the presumption 
of innocence. 
The Amnesty Act
The role of the Amnesty Act in undermining the right to a fair hearing 
cannot be underestimated in the case of the PRA suspects.   The Act 
was enacted in 2000 with the objective of granting amnesty and 
releasing from detention persons captured or associated with rebellion. 
The law provided for admission of guilt to engaging in rebel activities 
as a precondition for the release of any applicant.  In effect all persons 
released under that law are guilty of treason or misprision of treason by 
admission.  Although President Museveni has continuously expressed 
discomfort about the release of PRA suspects on bail arguing that, 
“there is a strong likelihood that they will go back to engage in PRA 
activities” (implying that they are guilty and need no trial), he has not 
held this same reservation for those granted amnesty even when some 
of them rejoin their former rebel groups.78  For instance, former rebels 
like Sunday Otto and Richard Odongo though released under the 
Amnesty Act in 2003 rejoined LRA thereafter.79   
It is important to note that twenty-two PRA suspects were arrested 
in 2003, detained and “were never charged or tried in any court of 
law until President Museveni’s main opposition contestant during 
the 2001 presidential elections, Dr. Besigye, returned in late 2005.”80 
Though they were detained for at least two years and later granted 
bail, the PRA suspects were consequently charged with other offences 
and detained again.  It is against this background that some suspects 
“… in the treason trial chose, on their own free will, to apply to the 
Amnesty Commission for amnesty, under the Amnesty Act…” and 
were indeed “…granted amnesty under the law.”81 Despite their 
78  Ibid.
79  Henry Mukasa, Charles Ariko “No amnesty for two LRA defectors,” The New 
Vision December 2007 p 3.
80  Naluwairo, Ronald, (2006), “The Trials and Tribulations of Rtd. Col. Dr. Kiiza 
Besigye and 22 Others” HURIPEC Working Paper No.1.
81  Hon. Ruhakana Rugunda “Rugunda explains court siege” The Daily Monitor 9 
March 2007 pp. 4.
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release on bail, which had clearly been undermined by the subsequent 
charges, it seemed fruitless to further pursue any bail application. 
It may be said that the only available options were two, that is; 
either remaining in detention for an indefi nite time or applying for 
amnesty. Though the amnesty law generally provides incentives to 
rebels to move out of rebellion without the fear of prosecution, it 
may be argued that the incentives under the amnesty law are availed 
in circumstances which clearly undermine the right to a fair trial and 
particularly the presumption of innocence.  These suspects had been 
in detention without trial from 2003. Their release on bail had been 
intercepted and rejected without recourse to the appeal process by 
the military and the judiciary whose role is to dispense justice had 
effectively been rendered ineffective by the security forces and the 
army.   With the exception of a few “stubborn” PRA suspects, the 
only available option was clearly applying for amnesty, even when the 
circumstances were blatantly coercive. 
Furthermore, the Amnesty Act has been placed as a strong bargaining 
legislation to all persons accused of treason and international crimes.82 
Uganda having ratifi ed the Rome Statute in 2002, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) indicted fi ve top commanders of the LRA and 
indeed issued warrants of arrest against them.  In order to compel the 
LRA to engage in the ongoing peace talks and/or surrender to the 
government forces, the government on several occasions declared that 
it would not withdraw its referral of the northern Uganda situation to 
the ICC.   It has further argued that whoever surrenders to it under the 
Amnesty Act will not be prosecuted.83  In the same light, all persons 
accused of treason and are in detention have been ‘encouraged’ to 
apply for amnesty.  This encouragement has been done against the 
backdrop of persistent violation of court orders relating to bail by the 
authorities and/or preferring further charges to avoid the  release of 
suspects on bail.
82  Felix Osike, Cyprian Musoke “We won’t lift Kony arrest yet – Museveni” The New 
Vision, 21 July 2007 p 1.
83  Henry Mukasa “Defectors receive amnesty” The New Vision, 6 December 2007 p 
3.
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Granting Bail to Suspects at 5 p.m.
The constitutional provisions relating to bail affi rm the presumption 
of innocence of suspects within the criminal justice system. In 
compliance with the above, judges/ magistrates have the power to 
grant bail on such terms as they deem fi t.84 The year 2007 witnessed 
several instances when bail was granted under circumstances only 
intended to defeat its purpose.  Though the courts granted bail to 
some suspects, it usually did so at such a time and in such a manner as 
to render the satisfaction of the set conditions impossible.
In order to suffi ciently demonstrate this, it is important to briefl y 
highlight the practice in relation to bail.  Once a person has been 
released on a cash bail, they must deposit the bail money in a designated 
bank, return the receipts to the court registry and fi nally complete the 
bail form.  It must be emphasized that if the payment is not made 
(or cannot be made), the suspect cannot be released and indeed that 
person has to be handed over to the prison authorities. The practice 
in relation to perceived opposition members during 2007 was to grant 
bail between 4 – 5 p.m.  Granting bail at that time ensured that the 
bail money could not be deposited at the bank as banks generally close 
at 4 p.m.  This was done in the case of Democratic Party’s Publicist 
Betty Nambozo, Hon. Betty Anywar, Hon. Hussein Kyanjo, Hon. 
Elias Lukwago, and Hon. Odongo Otto among others. 
The above practice by the police and the courts of law undermined 
the constitution and the rights of the suspects on the one hand, and 
the judiciary on the other hand.   Article 126 (2) (e) of the constitution 
of Uganda states as a principle that “substantive justice shall be 
administered without undue regard to technicalities.”  Furthermore 
the Judiciary is obligated to administer justice in accordance with the 
“values, norms and aspirations of the people”.  The constitution is 
a clear depiction of the consensus of all Ugandans pertaining to the 
release of people on bail.  Therefore the police and courts of law should 
not be seen to use their powers/discretion in way that only defeats a 
mutually agreed upon position, that is the constitution.85 
84  Op cit. DPP v. Rtd. Col. Dr. Kiiza Besigye (Constitutional Court).
85   For a detailed discussion on a theory of justice see Rawls, John, (1999), A Theory 
of Justice Oxford University Press.
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The judges in such circumstances would rather release such persons 
on their own recognizance or even non-cash bail, which is provided 
for by law.  One can draw two conclusions from the above practice: 
that police, judges, magistrates have become partisan in the political 
arena and have indeed taken sides, or that Police, Judges, Magistrates 
are now willing to “impress” the Executive by prolonging the periods 
of detention of the various political actors, a situation that has adverse 
implications for the good governance of the country.
Independence of the Judiciary
Article 128 (2) of the Constitution of Uganda states that “No person 
or authority shall interfere with the courts or judicial offi cers in 
the exercise of their judicial functions.” Although the interference 
referred to by this provision mainly relates to the more direct method 
of “directing” the courts, it also relates to other aspects, which may 
be in the form of under resourcing the judiciary or severe, harsh 
and unwarranted criticism of Judges’ decisions.  Independence of 
the courts is comparable to the independence accorded to National 
Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) guided by the Paris Principles. 
The Paris Principles in relation to the NHRIs require that they 
“freely consider any questions” falling within their jurisdiction on any 
matter.86  The freedom of judicial offi cers though exercised within 
the provisions of the law should not be infl uenced by threats and 
demonstrations by the public. During the year in review, the judiciary 
came under persistent attacks, which threatened its independence in 
executing its tasks.  
Verbal attacks of Judicial Decisions
The exercise of the discretion to grant bail by judicial offi cers is 
enshrined in the Constitution under article 23 (6) (a).  However, the 
judiciary has persistently and most severely been criticized whenever 
the discretion is exercised to grant bail.  As already alluded to above, 
article 23 (6) (b) makes provision for mandatory bail for those 
86  Adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 
1993.  Cited at: http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/parisprinciples.htm accessed on 
20 November 2007.
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persons who have been in detention for more than 60 days without 
trial.  President Museveni, in 2007, was quoted as having stated that 
“the original mistake was for the court to release people on bail who were 
facing serious criminal charges.”87  The President was further quoted 
to have said that the recent tension between the Executive and the 
Judiciary was due to fi ve factors, “the fi rst being the erroneous ruling 
by Justice Edmond Ssempa Lugayizi saying that bail was an automatic 
constitutional right for even people accused of very serious crimes.”88  
This continuous attack of a judicial offi cer was only meant to 
intimidate Judges, thereby undermining their independence.  It will 
be recalled that Justice Lugayizi had earlier granted bail to 14 PRA 
suspects who were consequently re- arrested within the court premises. 
He thereafter declined to hear Dr. Besigye’s bail application forcing the 
Principal Judge to handle it.89  Later Justice Katutsi who subsequently 
took over the case also withdrew from hearing the treason case 
against Besigye. These actions from judicial offi cers were as a result 
of intensifi ed criticism against their decisions.  The Constitutional 
Court in ‘Director of Public Prosecutions v. Col Rtd Dr. Kiiza Besigye’ 
noted that a suspect is entitled to a right to apply for bail.  Article 23 
(6) (a) of the Constitution grants the presiding Judge the discretion to 
grant or deny bail.90   It must be emphasized that though some of the 
PRA suspects were arrested in March 2003, they were charged much 
later in November 2005 jointly with Dr. Besigye with treason and 
misprision of treason.
At the commencement of Kiiza Besigye’s trial on charges of rape, 
the Principal Judge did grant the accused “interim bail”.  However, 
when the president made reference to persons making “erroneous” 
judgments, he did not mention any other Judge’s name, but Justice 
Lugayizi as though to turn him into the focal point of the tension 
87  Yoweri Museveni “Museveni speaks out on High Court scuffl e” The New Vision, 6 
March 2007 p. 10.
88  Milton Olupot, Steven Candia “M7 meets lawyers” The New Vision, 19 March  
2007 p.1.
89  Solomon Muyita, “How govt violated court orders” The Monitor, 4 March 2007 
p.1.
90  Constitutional Court Constitutional Reference No. 20 of 2005.
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between the Executive and Judiciary. This statement further tried 
to demonstrate that all the happenings at the High Court, that is, 
the two time High Court is sieged by a questionable armed group, 
assaulting of lawyers and the continued detention of bailed suspects 
were a direct result of Justice Lugayizi’s “erroneous” ruling. As already 
demonstrated, however, the Executive and the president in particular, 
had already reached the conclusion that all PRA suspects were guilty 
of treason even before they could enter plea on the charges.  Though 
the government could have chosen to exercise its right of appeal 
against the above-cited rulings, it did not instead, it chose to engage 
in a verbal attack against the rulings as if to incite the public against 
the Judiciary.
Failure to implement Court decisions
On the 2nd March 2007, Judges held a crisis meeting and announced 
“ that judicial offi cers countrywide were laying down their tools with 
effect from March 5 until the Executive respects and stops infringing 
on the independence of the Judiciary.”91  Though the High Court had 
earlier made several orders pertaining to the PRA suspects, most of 
those orders had been violated with impunity. Dr. Besigye for instance, 
was granted bail and later re –arrested. Although the Constitutional 
Court had ruled as illegal the simultaneous trial of the PRA by both 
the High Court and the General Court Martial, the latter disregarded 
this ruling, on the 15th March 2006, Justice Kagaba’s order releasing 
the 14 suspects on bail was also ignored. Despite the fact that Judiciary 
‘insisted’ on granting the various orders during 2007, the government 
chose to defy them further as demonstrated by the table below:
91  Solomon Muyita “How govt violated court orders.” The Sunday Monitor 4 March 
2007 p. 2.
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Table 1: Chronological events leading up to the 2nd March 
Judicial strike
No Date Court Order Response 
1. 12/01/07 Constitutional Court
Immediate release of 14 
PRA suspects
3 suspects 
granted amnesty 
and the rest 
jailed further.
2. 17/01/07 High Court Bail granted again
Suspects jailed 
pending an 
interpretation 
of a court 
order from 
the Solicitor 
General.
3. 19/01/07 General Court Martial
Halts trial pending 
advice of the Attorney 
General
-
4.  25/01/07 High Court (Civil Division)
Solicitor General fi les 
an application seeking 
to revoke bail granted in 
2005
Matter fi xed 
for hearing on 
30/01/07 and 
defense lawyers 
walk out of 
court in protest.
5. 30/01/07 High Court
PRA suspects oppose 
hearing the Solicitor 
General’s application 
in the absence of their 
lawyers.
Suspects 
remanded until 
1/03/07
6. 1/03/07 High Court
Application heard in the 
presence of all lawyers, 
adjournment sought by 
Solicitor General and 
granted.
PRA suspects 
released again 
on bail, process 
interrupted by 
the military 
causing a scuffl e 
within the High 
Court premises. 
Suspects further 
detained.
7. 2/03/07 Judges resolve to strike.
Source:  The Sunday Monitor, 4 March 2007 p. 2.
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Ignoring court orders by agencies in charge of implementing them has 
persisted during the court appearances by PRA suspects leading to the 
inference that they are no longer presumed innocent and since they 
were “guilty” they must be detained in respect of the offences. It is 
evident from Table 1 above that government, instead of exercising its 
right of appeal, chose to ignore orders by both the Constitutional and 
High Court.  Article 129 (1) of the Constitution states that “Judicial 
power of Uganda shall be exercised by the courts of judicature.”  
The courts exercise judicial power in Uganda with the assistance 
(and not resistance) of all persons and government agencies therefore, 
it was illegal for the security agencies and the prison service to further 
detain persons granted bail on numerous occasions.  It is interesting 
to note that both the General Court Martial and the Uganda Prisons 
Services sought the advice of the Attorney General (a party to the court 
proceedings) pertaining to lawful court orders before they could abide 
by them as though to suggest that the Attorney General’s advice would 
override court decisions. Courts of law and other legally recognized 
institutions have the monopoly to adjudicate civil, criminal and 
constitutional matters.  The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs (and the Attorney General) has no constitutional mandate to 
administer justice at all.  The attempt therefore, to subject a court 
decision to the interpretation of one of the litigants in the proceedings 
is not only an attack on the independence of the judiciary but is also 
contemptuous.  It is in this respect that the Judges rightly resolved to 
strike. 
During the aforementioned Judges’ strike, legal practitioners too 
resolved to strike in protest against the above events and particularly 
about the persistent undermining of the Judiciary by the Executive.92 
This action by both judges and lawyers implied that all pending cases 
had to be adjourned, in turn affecting several persons’ freedoms.  At 
the beginning of 2007, Chief Justice Benjamin Odoki announced that 
courts were faced with a backlog of 82,517 cases; 35,740 of them of 
92  Harriet Onyalla, Hillary Nsambu, Apollo Mubiru “Law Society Blasts Chief 
Justice” The New Vision 7 March 2007 p.1.  The Judges strike lasted about 1 week 
whereas the lawyers’ lasted three days.  See also Solomon Muyita “Lawyers’ strike 
gets underway” The Daily Monitor 12 March 2007 p 1. 
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a civil nature while 46,777 were criminal.”93  The above strike further 
prolonged the various court hearings, suspects had to be detained 
longer and most of them arrested during that period could not be 
produced before court within the 48 hour constitutional limitation. 
Several people therefore, suffered human rights violations as a direct 
result of the above strikes.
A point worth noting is that during the aforementioned events 
at the High Court, the government relied upon hitherto unknown 
personnel to violate court orders arguing that they formed part of the 
police force. Article 212 of the Constitution states that the Uganda 
Police Force (UPF) has an obligation to preserve law and order in 
cooperation with the civilian authorities. This obligation requires 
the UPF to work together with the courts of law, especially in the 
implementation of the latter’s orders. Despite the several court orders 
releasing the aforementioned suspects on bail, the UPF actively 
participated in the violation of the very orders it is supposed to 
implement contrary to the constitutional provisions.
Democratic Participation
When the Local Governments Act was enacted in 1997, the main 
objective was to “ensure good governance, and democratic participation 
in, and control of, decision making by the people.”94   The system was 
to ensure that all people participated in their governance from the 
village level up to the national level.95  To achieve this, section 46 (1) 
provided that at the village level the council shall consist of all persons 
of eighteen years of age or above…” 
Although the Act could be commended for creating an all-inclusive 
system to encourage participation, it did not provide any options for 
persons who, though qualifi ed, were to be part of the council at the 
village level.  It was in this regard that the Constitutional Court in 
93  Hussein Bogere, Angello Izama, Solomon Muyita, “The Cost of Judges’ strike” 
The Daily Monitor, March 10th, 2007 p. 3.  See also Justice Law and Order Sector 
(2003) p 89.
94  Preamble to Local Governments Act Cap 243.
95  Oloka-Onyango, Joe, (2007), “Local Governance and Access to Justice in Post 
Movement Uganda” (Human Rights and Peace Center).
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Rubaramira Ruranga v. Electoral Commission, Attorney General ruled 
that “section 46 (1) of the Local Governments Act, section 6 (1) of the 
National Women’s Council Act, Section 6 (1) of the National Youth 
Council Act and Regulation 12 (1) …are inconsistent with articles 
29 (1) (e) and 1 (4) of the Constitution.”96  The Petitioner argued 
that the aforementioned provisions of the Local Governments Act, 
National Women’s Act and National Youth Council Act that provide 
for compulsory recruitment of  persons into them violated their 
“freedom to decide whether or not to join a particular association.”
Declaring the above provisions unconstitutional meant that they 
were void.  The petitioner’s prayers fell short of seeking a declaration 
that the actual structures set up by the Act are void. Despite the 
fact that the provisions of the law were declared void, court did not 
touch the structures created by the law nor did parliament amend the 
respective laws to refl ect the constitutional ruling. Although persons 
can no longer be conscripted into the Local Council system, these 
councils remain in place for the interested parties.   Which therefore 
means that “the current local council structures remain in place and 
continue carrying out their constitutional and statutory duties…”97 
In most places within the country, local council offi ces are still visible 
and are executing several tasks.  It is not uncommon for instance, 
for local councils to issue letters of introduction to persons who 
desire to open bank accounts, move from one village to another, or 
seek the assistance of lawyers.  Furthermore, local councils in several 
areas continue inviting persons to participate in the issues pertaining 
to their villages.  The constitutional court ruling in effect nullifi ed 
the compulsory membership of persons into local councils, women 
councils or youth councils. 
96  Constitutional Petition No. 21 of 2006 p. 22 of the Judgement (Dated 3 April 
2007).
97  Ministry of Local Governments Press Statement issued on 19 April 2007. Cited at 
http://www.molg.go.ug/news accessed on 27 August 2007.
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Freedom of Assembly and Expression
The government has taken various steps to attract investors into the 
country.  It has provided tax incentives, land and labor to particular 
foreign investors.98   It is under this arrangement to provide incentives 
that government allocated forestland in Namanve and Butamira 
to Coca Cola and BIDCO respectively.  In 2007, the government 
attempted to allocate an estimate 7900 hectares of a major forest in 
Uganda, that is Mabira, to the Mehta Group (a sugar manufacturing 
company) to increase sugar production from 50,000 tons to 100,000 
tons per year. The proposed allocation led to a protest (Peaceful 
demostration) by some MPs and the civil society.
During this process however, one person of Asian origin was beaten 
to death, whereas other people thought to be Asians were beaten and 
injured. The Hindu temple was smashed and cars were set ablaze 
among other incidents.  Some of the protestors carried placards reading 
“For one tree cut, fi ve Indians dead” and “Asians should go.”99  A total 
of 34 people including MPs, businesspersons and members of the 
opposition were thereafter arrested and charged with participating in 
a riot.100  This caused further unruly demonstrations.  During all these 
occasions the city center became impassable for non-demonstrating 
persons and all businesses in the affected areas were closed,Bata shoe 
shop was looted.101
In response to the above, Kampala Central Division Chairman 
Godfrey Nyakaana ‘banned’ all demonstrations in the Central 
Business District (CBD) arguing that “we cannot tolerate losing lives 
and property because of  having demonstrations in the city.”102  Indeed 
98 See Uganda Investment Authority “The incentive regime” www.ugandainvest.
com/incentives.htm accessed on 28 August 2007.
99 Gerald Tenywa, Conan Businge and Steven Candia “Asians attacked in Mabira 
Demo” The New Vision, 13 April 2007, pp 1, 2.
100 The Daily Monitor Team, “More chaos” The Daily Monitor, 18 April 2007, pp.1.   
See also Ruhakana Rugunda “Govt responds to Mabira demo” The New Vision, 
18 April 2007 pp 8.
101 Op cit., Ruhakana Rugunda.
102 Al-Mahdi Ssenkabirwa, Robert Mwanje “Can Nyakana ban demos in the city  
center.” The Daily Monitor, 26 April 2007, p. 14.
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thereafter “police dispersed FDC’s planned party card launch and the 
DP’s attempt to release the controversial report into the murder of 
former energy Minister, Andrew Kayiira.”103 
Article 29 (1) (d) of the constitution states that, “every person shall 
have the freedom to assemble and to demonstrate together with others 
peacefully and unarmed…” The right to assemble must be exercised 
peacefully and with due regard to all other interests. Although the 
activities of the demonstrators sent a message to the policy makers 
and consequently led to the interim withdrawal of the forest offer, the 
violent acts were unconstitutional.  The demonstrators ensured that 
the CBD was impassable and they looted as well as destroyed property. 
Should demonstrators have “demonstration parks/corridors” that 
guarantee both their freedoms and those of the non-demonstrating 
parties?  
The Police Act (Cap 303) confers powers upon the police to regulate 
demonstrations. 104  Section 35 of the Act confers powers upon the 
minister to designate particular areas in which it would be unlawful 
to demonstrate. The minister and not any other person has authority 
to exercise this power.  Almost similar requirements are provided for 
in the United Kingdom. Section 132 of the Serious Organized Crime 
and Police Act (2005) makes it an offence for any person to organize 
a demonstration in a designated area (near House of Parliament) 
without prior approval.  The organizers are by law required to give 
a six days written notice indicating the date, time, suggested place 
for the demonstration, the organizers’ names and addresses and the 
proposed duration of the demonstration.105 The objective of the above 
provisions are not to deter the proposed demonstrations, indeed the 
“commissioner must give authorization for the demonstration to 
which the notice relates.”106  The authorization may be given with 
the conditions as the commissioner thinks necessary to prevent public 
disorder, damage to property, security risk among others. 107
103  Op cit.
104  Sections 32 - 34.
105  Serious Organized Crime and Police Act (2005)., Section 133.
106  Op cit., s.134 (2).
107  Op cit., 134 (3).
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Though the Ugandan law seeks to provide instances when the 
minister/police may refuse persons to demonstrate, the law in the 
United Kingdom guarantees the right to demonstrate by providing a 
mandatory authorization with or without conditions.  These conditions 
are currently relevant in a world faced with severe terrorist threats. 
Furthermore, demonstrators in Uganda have particularly opted 
to always demonstrate within Kampala, a place that is increasingly 
becoming crowded and suffers from severe and prolonged traffi c 
congestions.  This option has its merits of at least attracting public 
attention thereby alerting all spectators to the “issues” or “problems” 
the demonstrators are agitating about for the CBD.  
 Demonstrations within the city inevitably cause unnecessary 
disturbances to several other non-demonstrating persons thereby 
disturbing the peace of such persons.  Rather than curtail such an 
important freedom, however, particular areas within the business 
district should be designated as “demonstration zones” e.g. Clock 
Tower grounds, Lugogo bypass football fi elds, Kololo Airstrip, Kibuli 
Police training school grounds, among others.  These places would 
suffi ciently cater for the demonstrations.  Processions should be held 
outside the CBD in such areas as would minimize public disturbances. 
Furthermore, organizers should be encouraged to demonstrate on 
Sundays and public holidays.
During the aforementioned protests, a member of the protesting 
group held a placard that read “For one tree cut, fi ve Indians dead”.108 
Indeed it was after such threats that the Asian Community opted to 
stay clear of all public places during the above protests.  The statements 
were clearly targeted at any person, Ugandan or not, of Asian origin, 
and were meant to incite the general public against all persons 
of Asian origin.  The statement had racial connotations and was a 
clear depiction of intolerance against a particular group of persons 
in Uganda.  The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) has 
defi ned xenophobia to mean “intolerance/hatred of people from 
different countries, ethnic groups, geographical locations, tribes, 
108  Op cit, Gerald Tenywa.
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religion…”109 The Constitution guarantees the right to equal treatment 
and freedom from discrimination to all persons notwithstanding their 
“…race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe…”110 The attempt to incite the 
public against any persons of Asian origin therefore, was and is racist 
contrary to the national and international human rights regime to 
which Uganda is bound.
The birth of “Kiboko squad” 
“Kiboko” may be translated to mean “whip”. During the demonstrations 
that followed the Mabira  Forest protests, a new ‘security’ organization 
was unveiled to particularly deal with the demonstrators.  The group, 
largely comprised of youthful male adults, emerged from the Uganda 
Police Force’s Central Police Station on 17 April 2007 armed with 
long and thick sticks.  In full view of the police, they beat up any 
person perceived to be engaged in the demonstration.111 Despite the 
public denial of any knowledge pertaining to this squad by the police, 
the President revealed that “those people are the community who 
organized themselves in a self defense group against these rioters”, 
clearly underlining support from the president for “self defense 
groups”.  One may therefore draw conclusions that this “whip squad” 
was prepared by the police to deal with the demonstrators.  The police 
(one of the most under-funded public bodies) allegedly bought or 
otherwise acquired sticks, armed the “whip squad” and unleashed it 
onto the public.
The Constitution of Uganda stipulates in article 212 that the 
functions of the police include preserving law and order.  There 
is no provision in both the constitution and the Police Act that 
provides for people “organizing themselves” into self-defense groups 
under any circumstances.  The explanation by the government that 
they were people who organized themselves cannot be supported 
by any constitutional provision. Furthermore, the group was not a 
spontaneous one in response to the demonstrators. It clearly emerged 
from the police station, was under the direction and control of the 
109  UHRC (2004) p 127.
110  Article 21 (2).
111  See picture on cover page of the Daily Monitor, 19 April  2007.
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police and one could rightly conclude that it was a police attempt to 
respond to the demonstrators on the streets through the use of force 
in utter violation of the constitution and the Police Act.
Peace Process in Northern Uganda
Several strides have been taken in a bid to bring the war between 
government and the LRA in northern Uganda to an end.  Since 
the commencement of the talks, the following agreements have 
been signed between the parties to the negotiations:  The Cessation 
of Hostilities Agreement (CHA), Agreement on Comprehensive 
Solutions to the Causes of War and the Agreement on Accountability 
and Reconciliation.112 These steps are quite important in a 
multidimensional way.  
The LRA has waged war since 1987, leading to massive human 
rights violations.113  Though there were various attempts to end 
the war through forceful means, these efforts were futile.  In 2003, 
for instance, the UHRC reported that between February 2003 and 
June 2003, there were 297 casualties of the LRA. 114  The cost is also 
immeasurable in respect to health, sanitation, education, poverty 
among others (the war has affected each and every sphere of the lives 
of the people living in northern Uganda).  By signing the CHA, 
therefore, both parties agreed to seize  the opportunity to achieve 
peace. Though all persons in northern Uganda are guaranteed their 
personal liberties by article 23 of the Constitution, their continuous 
stay in Internally Displaced Peoples Camps (IDPC) has curtailed 
these liberties.  The attempt to reach a comprehensive peace solution 
would go a long way in ensuring that people enjoy the rights accorded 
to them by both the constitution and the international covenants to 
which Uganda is a party.
The peace negotiation process gave attention to the need for 
accountability.  The agreement signed on 29 June 2007 recognized 
112  Henry Mukasa, “ Stay calm, peace is on the way.” Sunday Vision, 17 July 2007, 
p 14 (an interview with Hon. Ruhakana Rugunda, the Chief Government 
Negotiator with the LRA).
113  UHRC (2004), UHRC (2003).
114  Op. cit., 2003 p 53.
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the various human rights violations committed during the 20 years 
of war.  It further recognized the need to “…promote national legal 
arrangements, consisting of formal and non formal institutions and 
measures for ensuring justice and reconciliation with respect to the 
confl ict.”  Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development 
states that;” The right to development is an alienable right by virtue of 
which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate 
in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development…”115 
The proclamation of the right to development gave rise to the 
Human Rights Based Approach to Development.  This approach 
emphasizes the linkage of all processes to human rights observance, 
participation, accountability and empowerment of the people. 
This requires that all processes undertaken by both government 
and non-government actors must comply with all the above salient 
principles.  The Agreement  attempted to ensure that it abides by 
the aforementioned principles.  It stated in Paragraph 2.4 that at all 
stages of the implementation of the agreement, “…the widest possible 
consultations shall be promoted and undertaken in order to receive 
the views and concerns of all stakeholders…” it continues that “…
consultations shall extend to state institutions, civil society, academia, 
community leaders, traditional and religious leaders and victims…” 
The process was meant to ensure that all affected persons participated 
in the ongoing peace negotiations and their opinions/considerations 
were taken into account by both parties to the negotiations.  It is 
in this respect that LRA delegation visited parts of Uganda to seek 
opinions on the on going peace process in Southern Sudan.116
Due to the previous human rights violations, the agreement also 
made provision for accountability in respect to  gross human rights 
violations.  The 20-year-old war in northern Uganda has directly 
and indirectly led to the violation of political, civil rights, economic, 
115 Declaration proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution  
41/128 on 14 December 1986.
116 Grace Matsiko, “LRA visit brings hope to the north.” http://www.monitor.co.ug/
artman/publish/inside_politics/LRA_visit_brings_hope_to_the_North.shtml 
accessed 13 November 2007. 
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social and cultural rights with the several national, regional and 
international human rights instruments ratifi ed by Uganda.   Indeed 
the ICC has indicted the fi ve LRA commanders over committing 
international crimes.   The international criminal mechanism is one 
avenue of ensuring accountability for the crimes committed at least 
since 2002.117   Accountability in the context of the ICC, however, is 
likely to hamper the progress of the peace process due to the emphasis 
it places on prosecuting the perpetrators of international crimes with 
less emphasis on bringing the war to an end and also reconciling the 
people in the country.118 
Paragraph 2.2 of the agreement states that “The accountability 
process…shall relate to the period of the confl ict.  This clause, however, 
shall not prevent the consideration and analysis of any relevant matter 
before this period…”  The agreement therefore, considered the 
violations committed during the twenty years and the need to hold 
accountable all the persons responsible for such acts.  It also emphasized 
other avenues of promoting accountability and reconciliation within 
the affected communities.  It for instance, stated in paragraph 3.1 that 
“Traditional justice mechanisms, such as Culo Kwor, Mato Oput, Kayo 
Cuk, Ailuc and Tonu Ci Koka and others practiced in the communities 
affected by the confl ict shall be promoted…as a central part of the 
framework for accountability and reconciliation.”  The agreement 
further made provision for accountability through the formal criminal 
and civil justice measures for persons alleged to have committed 
serious human rights violations.  
117  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002).
118  Bakayana Isaac, Enforcing the amnesty act (2000) within the context of the 
Rome Statute, in East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights Vol. 13, No. 2, 
2007 at 321.
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Xenophobia, Ethnicity and Racism119
In the recent past, tribal clashes in Uganda have sprung from one 
area to another. Examples include,  the Bagungu against the Alur 
in Bunyoro, the Iteso against the Balaalo in Teso sub-region, the 
Bagungu against the Balaalo in Bulisa, and the attacks against all 
persons perceived to be of Asian origin. 120   The clashes took a tribal 
or racial tone resulting into members of one tribe or race injuring or 
killing members of a different tribe or race.121  The confl icts arose as a 
result of competition over resources, particularly land.  It is estimated 
that the population of Uganda is growing at an annual rate of 3% 
per annum.122   This means that the population increase is having 
an impact on the relations over land resulting in  inter-tribal clashes. 
The confl ict between the Bagungu and the Balaalo originated from 
government relocating (with compensation) the latter from a 60 sq km 
piece of land given to Mukwano Group.123  The Balaalo consequently 
acquired pieces of land (through sale or leases) from the Bagungu 
until 31 May 2007 when the area MP, Stephen Birahwa, convened a 
meeting to demarcate the boundaries between the two groups.124
The constitution guarantees the rights to personal liberty and 
property to all persons in articles 23 and 26 respectively. These 
provisions do not restrict any tribe to any particular part of the country. 
The provisions confer unto all Ugandans, the right to acquire property 
anywhere within Uganda.  As demonstrated above, it has increasingly 
become diffi cult, especially outside the central region for a member of 
a different tribe to acquire land in a different area in which he/she has 
no ancestors.  Indeed attempts to settle the Balaalo in Kiboga district 
within Buganda region met stiff resistance from Mengo (traditional 
119 Though there has been frequent use of the term “Balaalo” which I adopt herein, 
there is no such tribe amongst the tribes referred to by the Constitution, however, 
it is a term loosely used to refer to cattle keepers.
120 UHRC (2003) p 127.
121 Carol Natukunda “ MP Birahwa fanning tribal hatred ” The New Vision, July 12, 
2007 p 9.
122 Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2004/5 –2007/8).
123 Op cit., Carol Natukunda.
124 Ibid.
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seat for the Buganda administration). Attempts by the Balaalo to 
settle in Teso sub-region were also resisted.125  Hon. David Mpanga, 
the Minister in Charge of Research in the Buganda Government said 
the objection by the Buganda “…is about the non planned and ad 
hoc migration of the Balaalo.  Buganda wants to know: Who are these 
people? Where do they come from? How many are they?  Is Kiboga the 
best suitable place to take them? What resources are there to support 
them?”  He continued, “…What is going to happen if the herds (of 
the Balaalo) grow? Won’t there be a competition for resources?”126 
The debate over land also needs to be contextualised within the 
Land Act (1998) which creates bonafi de occupants for all persons having 
occupied a piece of land for 12 years unchallenged by the proprietor.127 
Buganda has been demanding the return of 9000 square miles of 
land which during the signing of the 1900 Buganda agreement was 
taken over by the colonial government from Buganda.  The move to 
settle the Balaalo within Buganda on the contested 9000 square miles 
therefore, would  permanently deprive Buganda of its claim over the 
aforementioned land.  The above has led to increasing tribal tensions, 
hatred, killing and maiming several people.128   The tensions that have 
developed as a result of scarcity of resources have degenerated into 
tribal confl ict which not only contravene the Constitution but also 
international treaties to which Uganda is a party.
Racial attacks against persons of Asian Origin
The attack on persons of Asian origin by some demonstrators during 
the protest against the allocation of part of Mabira Forest brought to 
the fore some underlying racial tensions between “Ugandans” on the 
one hand and “Asians” on the other.129   As has been demonstrated 
above, some of the demonstrators carried placards requiring Asians to 
125  Buganda is one of the regions within Uganda.
126  Edris Kiggundu “ Why Buganda objects to Balaalo in Kiboga” The Weekly 
Observer 12-18 July 2007 p 3.
127  Section 30.
128  John Sserwaniko, Ausi Balyejusa, Al Mahdi Ssenkabirwa, Stephen Kabindi, 
“Balaalo reject Kiboga” The Daily Monitor 10 July 2007 p 1-3.
129  Notwithstanding the fact that these are not only humans but also Ugandan 
citizens!
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go (leave Uganda), or that for every one tree cut some Indians should 
be killed.130  
Such statements were a clear demonstration of hostility against 
the Asian community in Uganda.  It is important to note that such 
hatred may be rooted in what is seen as the increasing leverage of 
this community in the services sector (hotels), trade (super markets, 
retail trade), manufacturing sector among others. Indeed, Kampala 
City Traders’ Association (KACITA) has voiced concern over what it 
views as government’s interest in assisting foreign investors (some of 
these being Asians) with tax incentives, land and in some instances 
funds while these same incentives are not extended to Ugandan 
businessmen.131  
KACITA further alleged that most of these Asian investors have, 
contrary to their earlier intentions ended up in similar trade as other 
Ugandan businesspersons with a better competitive advantage.132  It is 
against this background that when government announced its proposal 
to give away part of the natural forest to the sugar manufacturing 
company, the Mehta Group, run and managed by some individuals of 
Asian origin, that violent protests against people of Asian origin were 
sparked off. 
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination defi nes racial discrimination to mean “any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect 
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on 
an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any other fi eld of public life.” 
The attack of perceived persons of Asian origin and killing of one 
person therefore, was a clear racial attack in clear contravention of 
both the national and international human rights instruments. 
130  See p 44.
131  Legally all the said incentives are available to all investors.
132  These allegations have been made by KACITA’s spokesperson, Mr. Isa Sekitto, in 
both the print and electronic media.
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Conclusion
The Constitution is a manifestation of the agreement Ugandans 
have reached in relation to their governance.  The standard it creates 
provides the minimum test of governance within the country.  Indeed 
in the year 2007, one may rightly argue that some constitutional 
provisions were abided by e.g. those relating to participation (by–
elections, accountability (work by the Inspectorate of Government 
and the various Parliamentary committees) among others.  The year 
2007, however, witnessed the continued violation of constitutional 
provisions by  government departments and personnel.
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The State of Constitutionalism in 
Kenya – 2007
John Ambani Osogo
Introduction
In December 2007, Kenya held National Assembly and Presidential 
Elections after fi ve years of what was hailed in December 2002 as the 
beginning of a new era.133The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
was elected overwhelmingly in December 2002 ending forty years of 
the Kenya African National Union (KANU) rule on a platform of 
change and zero tolerance to corruption. 
The December 2002 general elections were a watershed in Kenya’s 
constitutional history. The elections were important to Kenya in 
not less than three critical respects. First, they were the fi rst after 
independence to be held without the direct participation of an 
incumbent president, President Daniel Moi’s  constitutional term was 
coming to an end.134 Second, unlike in previous elections, the 2002 
electoral process was invariably declared free and fair.135 Third, the 
elections were fought and worn on a reform platform by the NARC 
then led by President Mwai Kibaki. Indeed, there was little doubt that 
the NARC Government would champion far-reaching reforms given 
that the party brought together a galaxy of politicians with a record of 
133 The violent aftermath of the 2007 elections points, in many ways,  to the crisis 
of constitutionalism in Kenya that spans decades. This paper only assessed the 
constitutional developments that took place in Kenya in 2007 without going into 
a detailed history of Kenya’s constitutional history that made 2007 the year it 
turned out to be. 
134 President Moi’s open support for Uhuru Kenyatta of (KANU), however, meant 
that retired President Moi played a big  role in the elections.
135 See, for instance “When Kenyans Spoke, 2002 General Elections,” A report of the 
Kenya Domestic Observation Programme (K-DOP). 
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championing human rights, democracy, good governance, economic 
and environmental reforms. 
Thus, Kenyans began the year 2003 genuinely expectant. They 
expected a new constitutional dispensation upholding the rule of 
law, human rights, integrity and ethics in governance, sustainable 
development and a concerted war against corruption amongst other 
reforms. They expected a change in the way the country is governed. 
President Kibaki did little to diminish the high hopes. In his inaugural 
address to the nation, he stated:136
You have asked me to lead this nation out of the present 
wilderness and malaise onto the promised land. And I shall. I 
shall offer a responsive, transparent and innovative leadership. 
I am willing to put everything I have got into this job because 
I regard it as a sacred duty. 
The Head of State made further commitments:
l believe that government exists to serve the people and not 
the people to serve the government. I believe that government 
exists to chart a common path and create an enabling 
environment for its citizens and residents to fulfi ll themselves 
in life. Government is not supposed to be used to burden the 
people, it is not supposed to intrude on every aspect of life 
and it is not supposed to mount roadblocks in every direction 
we turn to in life. The true purpose of government is to 
make laws and policies for the general good of the people, 
maintain law and order, provide social services that can 
enhance quality of life, defend the country against internal 
and external aggression and generally ensure that peace and 
stability prevails.
At the dusk of President Kibaki’s fi rst term in 2007, pundits had 
entered a mostly mixed verdict regarding the performance of his 
Government.137 There was near consensus that certain gains had 
136 President Kibaki’s Inauguration Speech.  
137 See, for instance, “Human Rights in Kenya: The Post Moi Era (2003 - 2007,” 
Human Rights House Network. (2007); Kenya’s Democratisation: Gains or Loses, 
CLARIPRESS
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been made although lamentations were registered that the NARC 
administration had not realized the expectations of the Kenyan 
people.138 Perhaps the most notable shortcoming was the failure by 
the government to ensure the enactment of a new constitution as had 
been expected.139 Other criticisms leveled against the government 
include the failure to combat corruption, provide equal opportunities 
for all ethnic communities as well as the poor living standards for the 
majority of the people140. The current investigation assesses Kenya’s 
performance in the realm of ‘constitutionalism’ for the year 2007. 
Conceptual Framework
A traditional function of state constitutions is to distribute power. 
Constitutions have been written to limit the powers of state, in the 
process yielding civil and political liberties to the citizenry. Indeed, 
constitutions spring from a belief in limited government.141 Political 
philosophers, jurists and other scholars have over the centuries 
prescribed constitutional structures considered conducive for human 
freedom, liberty and pursuit of happiness. Montesquieu, for instance, 
prescribed that:142
Political liberty is to be found … only when there is no 
abuse of power. But constant experience shows us that every 
man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his 
authority as far as it will go… To prevent this abuse, it is 
necessary from the nature of things that one power should 
be a check on another… When the legislative and executive 
powers are united in the same person or body… there can be 
no liberty… Again, there is no liberty if the judicial power is 
138 Ibid
139 After negotiating a new constitution for a a decade plus, the country went to 
a referendum to ratify a Draft Constitution in November 2005 which was 
convincingly rejected by the people for various reasons. 
140 See List of Questions Submitted by the Kenya Civil Society Coalition on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.
141 Bradley A.W. & Ewing K. (eds.), (1993), Constitutional and Administrative Law, 
Longman,  p 8.
142 B de Montesquieu The Spirit of Laws, Trans  Nugent 1949 ,  p xi, 4.
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not separated from the legislative and the executive… There 
would be an end of everything if the same person or body, 
whether of the nobles or of the people, were to exercise all the 
three powers.  
Earlier, Locke had observed that143
It may be too great a temptation to humane frailty, apt to 
grasp at power, for the same persons who have the power of 
making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute 
them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience 
to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making 
and execution, to their private advantage. 
Traditionally therefore, the constitution of a state has had to distribute 
powers to at least three organs: the Executive, the Legislative, and the 
Judiciary instituting what has come to be known as the system of checks 
and balances. More recently, the ‘phenomenon’ of national human 
rights institutions’ has gained momentum and is fast becoming one 
more avenue of limiting state power and guaranteeing more liberties 
and rights to all. Indeed, the United Nations High Commission for 
Human Rights (UNHCHR) has reckoned that:144   
It has therefore become increasingly apparent that the effective 
enjoyment of human rights calls for the establishment of 
national infrastructures for their protection and promotion. 
Offi cial human rights institutions have been set up by many 
countries in recent years. 
Where these structures are properly erected, there is a chance to secure 
fundamental freedoms and rights. This constitutional set up where 
executive power is limited for the sake of human rights and liberties is, 
arguably, the essence of ‘constitutionalism’. De Smith agrees that:145 
143 Locke, John, (1690), Second Treatise of Civil Government, p 143.
144 National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fact Sheet 
No.19, para 7. 
145 De Smith S.A., (1964), The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions, London, 
Stevens, p 106.
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The idea of constitutionalism involves the proposition that 
the exercise of government power shall be bound by rules, 
rules prescribing the procedure according to which legislative 
and executive acts are to be performed and delimiting their 
permissible content – Constitutionalism becomes a living 
reality to the extent that these rules curb the arbitrariness of 
discretion and are in fact observed by the wielders of political 
power, and to the extent that within the forbidden zones upon 
which authority may not trespass there is signifi cant room for 
the enjoyment of individual liberty. 
This paper therefore takes constitutionalism to mean a constitution 
of state whereby legal and political powers, especially of the executive, 
are limited, there are internal checks and balances and human rights 
and fundamental liberties are given prominence. 
In theory, at least, Kenya’s legal and political context boasts 
of fi ve minimums of a constitutional state. The Constitution 
disperses state powers to the three conventional organs, namely, 
the Executive, headed by the President,146 Parliament, composed of 
National Assembly and the President,147 as well as the Judiciary.148 In 
addition, the Constitution embodies a Bill of Rights under Chapter 
V. Furthermore, periodic and regular presidential and parliamentary 
elections are constitutionally guaranteed. Recently, a national human 
rights institution, the Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights (KNCHR) was established.149 It is instructive that the Kenya 
Anti Corruption Commission (KACC)150 as well as the National 
Commission on Gender and Development151 have also been legislated 
to further check state power. 
The next section assesses the constitutional developments in the 
year 2007. Attempts are made to discuss how these developments have 
146 Section 23(1) Constitution of Kenya.
147 Section 30.
148 Section 60.
149 The KNCHR is established by The Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights Act, 2002.  
150 KACC is established by the Anti Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003.
151 The Gender Commission is established by Act No. 13 of 2003.
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contributed towards making government more accountable, more 
responsive to human rights and more respectful for the rule of law. 
Constitutionalism 2007: The Unequal Tripartite?
As noted earlier, there are certain developments in the fi ve years of the 
NARC administration that came to an end in 2007 that contributed 
to the development of constitutionalism in Kenya. Among these 
is the establishment of the KNCHR, the KACC and the National 
Commission on Gender and Development.
Despite these gains, Kenya’s governance structure as set out in the 
current constitution still carries provisions that continue to be the basis 
of constitutional practice that does not enhance constitutionalism. 
The legislature for example, lacks the requisite independence and 
power to successfully check the Executive. The power to commence 
the sessions of parliament continues  to lie with the president and not 
the Speaker or Members of Parliament.152 The power to prorogue153 
as well as dissolve154 the August House is vested in the president 
(Executive), a very disempowering scenario because parliament is  not 
able to determine it’s own calendar.
Although parliament can actually pass a vote of no confi dence in 
the president, such a verdict, if entered, also stands to terminate the 
life of parliament itself. 155 ‘Vote of no confi dence’ is thus a power 
that takes away as much as it gives. The net result has been that the 
Executive has been able to violate even fundamental liberties, in the 
full view of a disempowered legislature.This leads to a scenario where 
though in theory  parliament can pass a vote of no confi dence in 
government, they are not likely to do so because the law is such that 
the president would have to dissolve parliament and call a general 
election.  Not many legislatures want to face the electorate before their 
fi ve years are over. 
As for the Judiciary, its independence remains elusive both in law 
and practice. Indeed, one of the main shortcomings of the current 
constitution is its failure to expressly assert the independence of the 
152 Section 58. 
153 Section 59(1).
154 Section 59(2).
155 Section 59(3).
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judicial organ of state in the same way it has provided for the other two 
arms of government. Section 23(1) of the constitution stipulates that 
the executive authority of the state is vested in the president. Similarly, 
Section 30 provides that the legislative power is vested in parliament. 
The absence of a corresponding provision for the Judiciary inevitably 
means that the institutional independence of the Judiciary has not 
been properly addressed by constitutional provisions.156
The credibility of the Judiciary is further weakened by the fact 
that the government of President Mwai Kibaki has appointed an 
unprecedented high number of High Court and Court of Appeal 
judges, which singular appointments cast doubt  on the independence 
of this important organ of state. By December 2004, President Kibaki 
had appointed up to 29 new judges within a span of  two years 
of his reign in a Judiciary that hardly had a maximum capacity of 
60 judges.157 In 2007 alone, about 10 new judges were appointed. 
President Kibaki, it follows, has effectively appointed 40 judges in just 
fi ve years, a very disturbing scenario. 
Although the large number of appointments of judicial offi cers 
was necessitated by the ‘radical surgery’ in the Judiciary following a 
report of the Integrity and Anti Corruption Committee appointed by 
the Chief Justice, the fact that the president chose to name the new 
offi cers under the old regime and procedures has been a cause of worry. 
Having come to power on a reformist platform, it was widely expected 
that the Head of State would ensure a review of the constitution to 
guarantee that the mode of constituting the judicial branch conforms 
to conventional wisdom. This state of affairs makes the comprehensive 
review of Kenya’ constitution  a very urgent national assignment. 
The Draft Constitution of Kenya 2004, for instance, which the 
president was widely expected to implement requires that judicial 
offi cers be appointed through a vetting process in which relevant actors 
participate. There is no evidence that the Head of State consulted other 
actors in making these appointments. Kenya may have to live with the 
156 See Mitullah Winnie, Odhiambo Morris & Ambani Osogo (eds.), (2005), Kenya’s 
Democratisation: Gains or Loses, Claripress, Nairobi, p 37.
157 See, Gazette Notices No 3630 and 3631 of 22 May 2003; No 9935 of 10 
December 2004; No 9933 and 9934 of 2004.
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fact that the tenure of two thirds of the Judiciary was determined by 
one individual. 
In addition, there is a worrying situation in which the ancient 
Commissioner of Assize Act158 still has the force of law in Kenya. This 
legislation provides for a scheme where temporary judges may be 
appointed by the president. Such judicial offi cers enjoy no security of 
tenure and are therefore susceptible to manipulation by the appointing 
authority.
It is little wonder that following the political and governance 
impasse caused by the disputed 2007 general elections’ results,159 few 
had confi dence in the Judiciary as a neutral arbiter. When announcing 
the 2007 presidential results, for example, the Electoral Commission 
of Kenya (ECK) Chairperson, Mr Samuel Kivuitu advised that the 
Orange Democratic Movement’s (ODM) Party objections were 
a matter for the courts, a piece of advice that was variously defi ed. 
ODM’s leader Raila Odinga immediately rejected the court option 
to resolve the dispute,160 citing his lack of confi dence in the Judiciary. 
This is why the Crisis Group Africa has recommended that the 
forthcoming constitution reform should ‘include rebalancing power 
between the three branches of government and address the issue of 
devolution.’161
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
The Bill of Rights (2007)
As stated in the introductory section of this paper, the concept of 
constitutionalism denotes a constitutional dispensation that delineates 
specifi c entitlements as well as liberties for the human person. 
In Kenya’s constitutional context, it is the Bill of Rights that was 
158 Chapter 102, Laws of Kenya.
159 The 2007 general elections were marred with irregularities that led to violence and 
anarchy across the country.  
160 ‘Breaking Kenya’s Impasse: Chaos or Courts?’ Africa Policy Brief, Africa Policy 
Institute. P 3.
161 ‘Kenya in Crisis’ Africa Report, 21 February 2008. International Crisis Group. P 
26.
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envisaged to carry these important provisions. The adequacy of this 
critical component of the Constitution (and the constitutionalism 
doctrine) is discussed below.
 Kenya has ratifi ed the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), which treaty articulates a wide range of fi rst generation 
rights: The right to self determination; the right not to be discriminated 
against; the right to equal treatment; the right to life; the right not to be 
subjected to torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment; the right 
not to be held in slavery or servitude; the right to liberty and security of 
person; the right to dignity for persons deprived of freedom; the right 
to movement; the right to fair trial; the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; the right to freedom of expression; the right to 
peaceful assembly; the right to freedom of association and the rights of 
minorities.162 Kenya is also a party to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights which provides for similar human rights.
Chapter V of the Constitution protects most of these human rights 
but fails to provide for nascent entitlements such as women rights, 
children rights, rights of persons with disabilities, social economic rights 
as well as other rights belonging to minorities.163 Indeed, a commentator 
has described Kenya’s Bill of Rights as falling below the prevailing 
international threshold noting that:164
The current constitution is not exactly ‘human rights friendly’. 
Since 1963, Kenya has ratifi ed or acceded to a number of 
international and regional human rights instruments which 
have increased the range of human rights standards designed 
to benefi t the people. There are now specifi c protections of 
women’s rights for example, as well as those of children in 
international declarations, which are not captured in the post 
colonial Constitution of Kenya. However, in practice, the 
Bill, far from refl ecting the interests of the ordinary Kenyans, 
represents the parochial interests of the ruling class. 
162  Human Rights in Kenya: opcit fn, 137
163  It is instructive that Parliament has consequently enacted legislations meant to 
cover for the areas left out in the Bill of Rights. These include, inter alia: Children 
Act (2001); Persons with Disabilities Act (2003); and the HIV and AIDS 
Prevention and Control Act (2006).
164  Hansungule, Michelo, “Kenya’s Unsteady March Towards the Lane of 
Constitutionalism,” University of Nairobi Law Journal, Vol. 1, 2003, p 43. 
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Another limitation inherent in the Bill of Rights is to be seen in the fact 
that the defi nition for discrimination is narrow.165 The constitution 
prohibits discrimination only on the grounds of race, tribe, and place 
of origin, political connection, colour, creed or sex.166 This stipulation 
has two notable shortcomings. To begin with, the Bill of Rights 
permits discrimination, for example, in matters of personal law such 
as adoption, marriage, divorce, burial and devolution of property 
on death.167 Furthermore, the grounds upon which discrimination 
is prohibited are not exhaustive. These grounds clearly exclude 
distinctions on the basis of disability, HIV/AIDS status, property 
et cetera. However, legislations such as the Children Act (sec 5), the 
Persons with Disabilities Act (sec 11), and the National Commission 
on Gender and Development Act (sec 6(2)(d)) have broadened the 
scope of defi nition of discrimination, thus, endeavoring to enhance 
the course of human rights. 
Despite the presence of the Bill of Rights in Kenya’s constitutional 
dispensation, the enjoyment of even civil and political rights is 
limited by the fact that the constitution is, itself, littered with claw-
back clauses which often defeat the very essence of protecting human 
rights. The Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION) 
has lamented that:168
Even though the constitution guaranteed a raft of rights, claw 
back clauses ensured a rather fl uid interpretation of those 
rights.  
Under the pretences of internal limitations as well as the general 
limitation clauses entailing that rights may be restricted for greater 
interests, for example, of public safety, security and health, the 
Executive has tended to limit rather than guarantee human rights. 
And the Judiciary has not helped matters. It has in the past taken 
a very retrogressive stand with regard to the interpretation of the 
constitution, often in the interest of the Executive. In Republic v 
165 Human Rights in Kenya: opcit, p 7.  
166 Section 82(1) and (3).
167 Section 82(4)(b).
168 Op cit,  note 19 p 2.
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Elman169, for example, the High Court took the position that the 
constitution is to be taken as any other piece of legislation and should 
be interpreted in a strict, rigid, legalistic and conservative manner. 
That position, however, seemed to be reviewed in 2004 when the 
High Court asserted that:
The constitution is not an Act of Parliament and is not to be 
interpreted as one. It is the supreme law of the land; it is a 
living instrument with a soul and consciousness; it embodies 
certain fundamental values and principles and must be 
construed broadly, liberally and purposely or teleologically to 
give effect to those values and principles. 
Even as late as 2007, however, the Judiciary had yet to evolve a 
predictable philosophy to guide in the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights, and the realization of rights remains a coincidence rather that 
a guarantee.170 This is more so in the prevailing context where the 
Executive is superior to the other organs of State. A commentator 
correctly observes:171
That the issue of the proper approach to constitutional 
interpretation has haunted Kenyan courts for as long as we 
have been independent… the courts adopted an unprincipled, 
eclectic, vague, pedantic, inconsistent and conservative 
approach to constitutional interpretation.
State of Civil and Political Liberties (2007): An Overview
A constitution premised on the constitutionalism doctrine ought to 
eventually confer, at least, civil and political liberties to the citizenry. 
But this was not always the case in Kenya during the period under 
review.
169  [1969] E.A. 357.
170  Human Rights in Kenya: opcit p 6.
171  Thiankolu, Muthomi, Landmarks from El Mann to the Saitoti ruling; Searching 
a philosophy of constitutional interpretation in Kenya, p 7. Cited at www.
kenyalaw.org, accessed on 20 May 2007. See, also, Muigai, Githu, (2004), 
Political Jurisprudence or Neutral Principles: Another Look at the Problem of 
Constitutional Interpretation, East African Law Journal, at 1.
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Right to self determination 
The right to self determination is part of the menu of human 
entitlements meant to accrue to all peoples of the world. The Kenya 
government’s understanding of internal self determination includes 
the decentralization of governance through the local authorities and 
its elected leaders. Other initiatives aimed at decentralizing power 
include: the Constituencies Development Fund, the Constituency 
HIV/AIDs Funds, Constituency Bursary Funds, among others. 
The performance of the government in realizing the right to self 
determination, however, has, at best, been dismal. The government has, 
for instance, failed to devolve state powers from the Central Government 
to hinter authorities in the required proportions. Although a number 
of decentralization schemes have been instituted such as the Local 
Government Act, the Local Authorities Transfer Fund Act, the Roads 
Maintenance Levy Fund (RMLF), the Constituency HIV/AIDS Fund, 
and the Constituencies Development Fund Act, these are fairly weak 
in formulation and do not fully represent the desired decentralization 
setup. 
Appropriate decentralization should have necessitated a formidable 
devolution structure with the capacity to cede political power to the 
devolved units of governance to the extent of ceding both autonomy and 
income generation powers to such outfi ts.172 Both the aforementioned 
attempted decentralization structures fail to meet this threshold.173
Protection of Civil and Political Rights without distinctions 
of any kind
The government ought to ensure the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights to all without distinctions of any kind such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.174  The current constitution prohibits 
distinctions on the grounds of race, tribe, and place of origin, political 
172 Oyugi, Walter, “Search for an appropriate decentralization design in Kenya: 
Historical and comparative perspectives in Kindiki,” Kithure & Ambani, 
Osogo, (eds), (2005), The Anatomy of Bomas: Selected Analyses of The 2004 Draft 
Constitution of Kenya, Claripress, Nairobi, at 2005.
173 Odhiambo, Morris, Akivaga, Kichamu, Chweya Ludeki & Mitullah Winnie, 
(2006), Gender Dimensions in Management of Decentralized Resources in Kenya, 
Claripress, Nairobi, p 3.
174 Article 2(1), ICCPR.
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connection, colour, creed or sex.175 As noted above, this constitutional 
standard is below the prevailing international threshold. Furthermore, 
distinctions in Kenya are even sanctioned constitutionally. A clear case 
of discrimination in Kenya’s legal system is to be found in section 91 of 
the constitution which allows Kenyan husbands to confer citizenship 
unto their alien wives while the same is not permissible for Kenya 
women marrying foreign husbands. This discriminative position 
stands even as late as December 2007.
Right to Freedom of Expression/Media
States are obligated to guarantee free fl ow of information in whatever 
medium, be it oral, print or any other form of art.176 Human rights 
standards, however, permit that in certain instances, this right may 
be limited, for instance, to protect the reputation of others. Such 
restrictions should not, however, negate the very essence of the 
freedom.
During the year under review, the right to access public information 
continued to be near impossible to achieve. The overbearing legislative 
framework of the Offi cial Secrets Act177 jealously guards against divulging 
of information in the custody of the State to otherwise worthy recipients of 
such information. This is not withstanding the fact that this condition of 
secrecy has in the past, been conducive  to the perpetration of corruption 
and other economic crimes.  
Moreover, the Government still demonstrated propensity  to limit 
the freedom of expression. On 30 December 2007, for instance, amidst 
protests against fl awed presidential elections, the government muzzled 
press freedom, directing that no live broadcasts could be aired by any 
media house. According to an observer report:178
On the announcement of the fi nal results for the presidential 
election on 30 December 2007 at the Kenyatta International 
Conference Center (KICC), journalists were ejected from 
175 Section 82(1) and (3).
176 General Comment No. 10: Freedom of expression (Art 19). Human Rights 
Committee, Para 2.
177  Cap 187, Laws of Kenya.
178  Doubts about the Credibility of the Presidential Results Hamper Kenya’s 
Democratic Progress. Preliminary Statement of the European Union Observation 
Mission, 1 January 2008, Nairobi.
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the building. Immediately following the announcement, 
a  directive from the Internal Security Minister ordered 
broadcasters to suspend all live broadcasts, seriously 
infringing the right of the media to report without undue 
state interference.
Another form of violation in this regard was the biased coverage by 
the public broadcaster, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, during the 
electioneering year. It has been noted that:179
A number of monitored media outlets failed to provide 
equitable coverage for candidates and parties. The Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation, in particular, failed to fulfi ll even 
its minimal legal obligations as a public service broadcaster set 
out in the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Act, its coverage 
demonstrating a high degree of bias in favour of the Party of 
National Unity (PNU) coalition.  
On the legislation front, during the reporting period, two important 
Bills were introduced in parliament seeking to regulate certain aspects 
of the freedom of expression. These are the Freedom of Information 
Bill and the Media Bill. The Statistics Act, legislated in late 2006, 
also stood to have enormous implications during the period under 
review.
Freedom of Information Bill, 2007
The Freedom of Information Bill, 2007, seeks to enable members 
of the public to access information in possession by government 
authorities. It also seeks to put in place structures and processes to 
promote proactive publication and dissemination of such information. 
The preamble to this Bill, most importantly, alludes to international 
human rights standards such as common article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the (ICCPR). This 
forward-looking preamble could anchor the legislation on high moral 
ground, if enacted.
The Bill provides for the right of every person to access information 
held by government authorities and also that held by private authorities 
179  Ibid.
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but which may impact on the realization of rights.180 Although the right 
is not absolute, the limitations placed on it are only the most essential 
ones, which are clearly spelt out in the Bill.181 A further positive aspect 
of  the proposed law is that it provides for proactive disclosure of certain 
information by all government institutions.182 The Bill further provides 
for the employment of information offi cers to assist in the realization 
of the right. There is, however, apparent lack of commitment by the 
government to enact this law, owing to the fact that the Bill has rarely been 
substantively discussed since 15 May 2005 when it went through the fi rst 
reading. Attempts by CSOS, especially the International Commission of 
Jurists – Kenya Section, to have this Bill enacted into law during the year 
under review bore little fruit.
The Media Act, 2007
This new legislation, among other things, establishes the Media 
Council of Kenya; establishes the Media Advisory Board, provides for 
the conduct and discipline of the media; and facilitates self regulation 
of the media. 
The law had initially been passed with a provision entailing that 
journalists could in certain instances be compelled to name the sources of 
their information. The Bill was passed by the Legislature in August 2007, 
but was not assented to by the president due to pressure from journalists, 
media owners as well as civil society organizations. Indeed, the proposed 
legislation would have violated fundamental rights of journalists, for 
instance, the right not to name the sources of their information. 
Statistics Act, 2006
Although enacted in 2006, the Statistics Act stood to impact strongly 
on the right to freedom of expression in 2007 and even later. On a 
positive note, the Statistics Act183 provides for the establishment of the 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, for the collection, compilation 
and dissemination of statistics, and for the coordination of the 
180  Section 4.
181  Section 5.
182  Section 6.
183  Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 61 (Acts No 4), Nairobi, 1 September 2006.
66 Annual State of Constitutionalism in East Africa
national statistical system, amongst other items.184 Sections 18 (1) 
and (2) of the Act stipulate that any agency other than the Bureau 
wishing to conduct a census or survey at national or local level has to 
seek the approval of the Board by submitting its plans to the Board 
three months prior to the intended survey. The Board has powers, 
under the Act, to approve or disapprove such plans. The Act further 
provides for the conduct of Housing and Population Census every 
ten years185 as well the maintenance of a comprehensive and reliable 
national socio-economic database.186 This law is important because 
statistics of this nature  are critical not only for development planning, 
but also human rights analysis. 
On a negative note, however, this law could violate freedom of 
information in two cardinal ways. First, both the conductors and users 
of surveys may be hindered to disseminate or receive information within 
the required time since such statistics have, under this law, to be approved 
by the Board. Second, the Act may be instrumental in curtailing the 
freedom of information since the Board retains the power to approve or 
disapprove a survey. This is done without any clear benchmarks regarding 
the application and approval process, thus, leaving room for the offi cer 
concerned to act with impunity.187  The legislation violates human rights 
in that surveys in most cases need to be disseminated hastily to meet 
their objectives. Media houses, for instance, conduct quick and needed 
opinion polls, which may be threatened by the mandatory three-month 
rule. The required three months notice may either serve to delay otherwise 
very urgent statistics or make it stale by the time of dissemination. 
Moreover, section 20 of this legislation violates the doctrine of 
human rights in that it authorizes certain offi cers of the Board to enter 
any premises without a warrant. There is no requirement that such a step 
be fi rst sanctioned by another offi ce acting judicially. It is thus meant 
that this law gives certain government offi cers unlimited power to enter 
ones premises, private abode, privacy (the inner sanctum) at will so long 
184  Aringo, O.,  “Legislating against free access to information,” Centre for Law and 
Research International (CLARION). A paper presented during a NASCON/
CLARION workshop at Panafric Hotel, 12 October 2006. P 2. 
185  Section 4(2)(d).
186  Section 4(2)(e).
187  Aringo, opcit p 2.
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as such persons can justify such entry to be for the purposes of collection 
of information under the Act. It follows that the Statistics Act is a most 
offensive Act ever enacted by the government of President Kibaki, and 
fl ies in the face of democratic values. 
Right to Freedoms of Assembly and Association
The related rights of peaceful assembly188 and association189 continued 
to suffer violations in 2007. On 21 September 2007, for example, Hon 
William Ruto and Hon Omingo Magara were violently prevented 
by armed youth allied to the then Cabinet Minister, Hon Simeon 
Nyachae, from attending a fundraising meeting in Hon Magara’s 
own constituency.190 Police and provincial administrators looked 
on as armed youth attacked the two legislators. No action has been 
taken and there is little evidence such a measure is planned  to be 
taken. Ironically, on 25 September 2007, fi ve university students were 
charged in court for demonstrating against this brutal attack.
The State of Autochthonous Oversight Bodies 
The doctrine of constitutionalism anticipates the establishment of 
autonomous oversight bodies to not only put government to check 
but also manage core government functions such as elections, human 
rights promotion and protection, anti-corruption, among others. In 
Kenya, the constitutional and legal order establishes a number of 
institutions, for instance, an Electoral Management Body (EMB), 
the ECK, a National Human Rights Institution, the KNCHR, the 
KACC, the National Commission on Gender and Development, 
among others. The fi rst three are particularly pertinent to the 
constitutionalism discourse hereunder.
The Electoral Commission of Kenya 
The constitution envisages the ECK191 charged with the registration 
of voters and maintenance of voter registers; direction and supervision 
188 Article 21 ICCPR; See, section 80 of the Constitution.
189 Article 22 ICCPR; See, section 80 of the Constitution.
190 See, “Orange team ejected from Nyachae rally,” Saturday Nation, 22 September  
2007.
191 Section 41 and 42A.
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of elections; promotion of free and fair elections; and the promotion 
of voter education.  The ECK is required to be under the charge of 
the chairperson, vice chairperson and between four and twenty one 
other commissioners, all appointed by the President. It is recognized 
universally that EMBs ought to have independence and autonomy, 
and must act with impartiality. Independence is often enhanced by 
consultative hiring of the members (commissioners) as well as their 
security of tenure. Financial security is equally critical. To be an 
impartial arbiter of elections, members of the EMBs are required to 
act with neutrality in matters considered political. These ideals are 
expected of the ECK.  
A major constraint experienced by the ECK has been its perceived 
lack of independence and autonomy owing to the fact that its 
commissioners are now appointed single-handedly by the president, 
himself, a participant in elections. In 2007 alone, for example, the 
president appointed 19 new commissioners to the ECK, a move that 
was seen as compromising the elections in which he himself was a 
party.  In so doing, the President violated an earlier agreement, the Inter 
Parliamentary Parties Group (IPPG) principles, and tradition where 
political parties, according to their parliamentary strength, nominated 
commissioners to the EMB. Lack of consultations in the appointment 
of commissioners undermined the confi dence of election stakeholders 
and led to a majority of commissioners being inexperienced.192 
This perceived lack of independence could have contributed to the 
perception that the 2007 presidential elections were irregular and 
hence the unprecedented violence experienced soon after the election 
results were announced. Indeed, the elections possibly ‘were marred 
by a lack of transparency in the processing and tallying of presidential 
results, which raised concerns about the accuracy of the fi nal result of 
this election’.193  
The ECK itself has on many occasions complained that it lacks 
suffi cient resources to carry out its mandates such as voter education 
192  Doubts about the Credibility of the Presidential Results Hamper Kenya’s 
Democratic Progress, opcit.
193  Ibid.
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as well as continuous voter registration.194 The EMB even lacks 
suffi cient capacity to punish political parties and candidates that take 
part in electoral violence. In this regard, the Institute of Education in 
Democracy has proposed that:
The ECK should have suffi cient statutory powers to 
investigate, arrest and prosecute party offi cials, candidates 
and voters who incite violence or disrupt campaign rallies of 
other candidates …
In addition, there have been attempts to place the ECK at the whim 
of the Executive by suggesting that it be under the umbrella of the 
Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs,195 an attempt that has 
been vigorously resisted. With the advantage of hindsight, suggestions 
for reform have been advanced, the keys to which is:196
To strengthen the ECK’s budgetary and administrative 
independence, including detailed, apolitical procedures 
for appointment of its commissioners and to empower the 
judiciary to become a credible arbitrator of electoral disputes, 
including by reforming the process for appointing judges.   
Without these reforms, free and fair elections may continue to be 
impossible in Kenya’s context.
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
Another important oversight body with potential to enhance 
constitutionalism in Kenya is the KNCHR. The Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights Act, 2002, establishes the KNCHR 
as an independent institution not ‘subject to the direction or 
control of any other person or authority’, a clear mark of autonomy 
and independence. In 2003, the Law Society of Kenya lauded the 
establishment of the KNCHR stating that for the fi rst time; ‘there is in 
place a permanent statutory institution specifi cally for the purposes of 
194 See, the ECK 2002 General Elections Report.
195 See, Presidential Circular No. 1/2003.
196 ‘Kenya in Crisis’ Africa Report, opcit p 27.
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championing human rights’.197 Indeed, under the enabling legislation, 
the KNCHR is charged with the following responsibilities:
• Investigating complaints of human rights violations;
• Visiting prisons and places of detention or related facilities;
• Informing and educating the public on human rights;
• Recommending to parliament effective measures to promote 
human rights;
• Implementing programmes aimed at inculcating civic awareness 
and responsibilities in the citizens;
• Ensuring government’s compliance with international human 
rights obligations; and
• Investigating complaints of human rights violations.    
To be able to fulfi ll this mandate, the law makers entrusted the human 
rights bastion with tremendous powers. These include: the power to 
issue summons or orders requiring the attendance of any person before 
it or the production of any document relevant to its investigations;198 
the power to question any person with respect to any subject matter 
under investigation199 as well as the power to require the disclosure 
by any person of any information within such person’s knowledge 
relevant to any investigation.200  Moreover, the law gives this citadel of 
human rights the power to enforce the fi ndings of its investigations. 
The KNCHR can, for instance, recommend prosecution of human 
rights violators on its own, commence proceedings to enforce the 
Bill of Rights201 order lawful compensation or payment to victims of 
human rights violations202 and the power to send quarterly human 
rights reports to the president.203   
Since its inception, the KNCHR has taken its mandate in stride, 
visiting detention facilities, investigating complaints of human rights, 
197 See, Human Rights Report, 2003, Law Society of Kenya.
198 Section 19(1)(a).
199 Section 19(1)(b).
200 Section 19(1)(c).
201 Section 25(c).
202 Section 19(2)(b).
203 Section 25(f ).
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persuading the government to accede to international human rights 
instruments, partnering with non governmental institutions to 
promote human rights education, getting involved in anti corruption 
campaigns, et cetera.
 In 2007, however, as in preceding years, the independence of the 
human rights institution continued to be questioned due to lack of 
fi nancial independence. The KNCHR receives its annual funding 
through the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and this 
has had the tendency to limit its autonomy. Its activities have had to 
tally with the budget approved by the Executive hence tampering with 
its independence. The challenges faced by this noble institution have 
been thus stated:204
The Commission has faced a number of challenges, including 
inadequate human and fi nancial resources, limited support 
from government departments and the concern that human 
rights are not a major priority for the Government as a whole 
(including the President).
Moreover, offi cials of the national human rights institution 
have continued to face harassment by the Executive through its 
agencies,  hence tampering with the realization of human rights. 
Non-governmental organizations have, for example, accused the 
government of using the KACC and Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) 
to intimidate its critics. A case in point is where the chairperson of 
the KNCHR was summoned by the KACC for an investigation into 
allegations of abuse of offi ce, considered by human rights defenders 
as amounting to fabrications.205 It is illustrative that Maina Kiai and 
other commissioners have recently been subjects of threats by illegal 
militia groups for taking positions perceived to be unfriendly to the 
government. 
Functionally, also, this bastion of human rights continues to face 
criticism. Although the KNCHR has established a human rights tribunal 
for instance, as envisioned by the enabling Act, the tribunal has not been 
properly seized to check executive excesses. The KNCHR has also shied 
204 Human Rights in Kenya, opcit, p 82.  
205 Amnesty International Report 2007, p 158.
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away from ordinary human rights tasks such as instituting actions to 
reinforce human rights, further casting doubt  on  its ability to  protect 
human rights and check the Executive.
Kenya Anti Corruption Commission
A potential check on Executive power is the KACC which is 
established pursuant to the Anti Corruption and Economic Crimes 
Act (ACECA)206 as a body corporate capable of suing and being sued 
in its own name.207 The Act generously establishes KACC giving 
it ‘all the powers necessary or expedient for the performance of its 
functions’.208 KACC was envisioned to perform the following main 
functions:209 
• To investigate any matter which raises suspicion either of 
conduct constituting corruption or economic crime210 or 
conduct liable to allow, encourage or cause conduct constituting 
corruption or economic crime;211
• To investigate personal conduct that is conducive for 
corruption;212
• To assist any law enforcement agency of Kenya in the 
investigation of corruption or economic crime;213
• At the request of any person, to advise any person on the ways 
of eliminating corrupt practices;214
• To examine the practices and procedures of public bodies in 
order to facilitate the discovery of corrupt practices and to 
secure the revision of methods of work or procedures that may 
be conducive to corrupt practices;215
206 Section 6(1).
207 Section 6(3).
208 Section 6(2).
209 Section 7(1).
210 Section 7(1)(a)(i).
211 Section 7(1)(a)(ii).
212 Section 7(b).
213 Section 7(c).
214 Section 7(d).
215 Section 7(e).
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• To advise public heads on how to exercise power in a manner 
that is a hindrance to corruption;216
• To educate the public on the dangers of corruption and 
economic crimes as well as foster public support in combating 
corruption and economic crimes;217
• To investigate the extent of liability for the loss of any public 
property with a view to instituting proceedings to recover such 
property;218
These mandates have been attempted with varying degrees of 
success.219 There is little doubt that since inception, KACC has taken 
its mandate in stride.220 Each quarterly report published, pursuant 
to section 36 of the ACECA, shows that, indeed, KACC has been a 
beehive of activity.221 
Concerns have been raised, however, that KACC lacks the capacity 
to prosecute, especially senior Government offi cials - the ‘big fi sh’. In 
the process, it has failed in its anticipated task of being a formidable 
check on especially the Executive function. In fact, save for  the 
most exceptional circumstances, KACC’s quarterly reports continue 
to indicate a growing tendency of the institution to investigate only 
the most junior public offi cers not necessarily at the heart of the 
Executive. KACC’s constant casualties are employees of Nairobi City 
Council, traffi c policemen, police offi cers below the rank of inspector, 
administrative offi cers below the rank of District Offi cer (DO) and 
other public offi cers of low ranks.222
There are doubts as to whether KACC has been an effective 
check on the government, especially on the anti corruption front. 
Such aspersions fi nd credence in the fact, for instance, that it failed 
216 Section 7(f ).
217 Section 7(g).
218 Section 7(h).
219 See, Kenya State of Corruption Report, Centre for Law and Research 
International, 2006.
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
222 See, the Kenya Anti Corruption Commission’s quarterly reports published 
through www.kacc.go.ke. Also, Kenya State of Corruption Report, opcit
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to prosecute and tame certain politicians who were keen on using 
public vehicles and resources during the 2007 general elections. Of 
the 2007 General Elections, the Kenya Human Rights Commission 
has documented that:223
Reports indicated the misappropriation of publicly owned 
resources and also the presence of public offi cers at campaign 
events. There were 30 such incidences in Eastern province.
This position is corroborated by the European Union Election 
Observation Mission which observed that ‘use of state resources was 
reported for campaign purposes by some incumbents and the state 
owned media’s coverage was biased’. There is little evidence that 
KACC will rise to the occasion and prosecute those implicated in 
these scandals. Failure to prosecute key Cabinet Ministers implicated 
in, particularly Anglo-Leasing, corruption further vindicates the 
doubts on the effi cacy of KACC as an oversight body. 
In Lieu of a Conclusion
Although Kenya has attempted to establish structures usually found 
in constitutional states such as the Judiciary, Legislature and other 
oversight bodies, the state is yet to attain the constitutionalism 
threshold. Human rights are still violated, the Executive has overbearing 
authority over the other institutions and the oversight mechanisms are 
still fairly weak.  The year under review, 2007 only served to accentuate 
the major weaknesses is in the emerging dispensation, and the general 
elections particularly tested state institutions. There is need for an 
overhaul of the constitution to entrench the Bill of Rights protecting 
all human rights, establishment of autonomous and effective oversight 
institutions as well as the subjection of the Executive to checks and 
balances.
223 Violating the Vote: A Report of the 2007 General Elections, 27 February 2008.
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One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards:
The State of Constitutionalism 
in Zanzibar – 2007
Abdul Sheriff and Ismail Jussa
Introduction
This paper examines the constitutional development of Zanzibar 
in the year 2007 concentrating on those issues that touch on major 
constitutional, legal and human rights affairs. The major issues that 
dominated the year included the formal launching of the long awaited 
fresh dialogue between the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) 
party and the Civic United Front (CUF) that were aimed at fi nding 
a lasting solution to the simmering political crisis between the two 
antagonistic parties; the debate over the status of Zanzibar as a semi-
autonomous state in the EAC and the region’s envisaged political 
federation and the never ending issue of the Union between Zanzibar 
and Tanganyika. 
Other constitutional development issues in the year included 
the question whether the death penalty should be abolished; the 
controversial enactment of a new rights, privileges and immunities 
of the Members of House of Representatives Act, 2007 especially 
with regard to the provisions that are seen as undermining freedom 
of information in the Islands; the publication of the fi rst-ever local 
human rights report on Zanzibar; the report of the Zanzibar Electoral 
Commission (ZEC), on its activities during its fi ve-year tenure (2002 
– 2007); and fi nally the  malady of corruption in the justice system. 
The Fresh Dialogue between CCM and CUF
In his inauguration speech to the Parliament of the United Republic 
of Tanzania on 30 December 2005, President Jakaya Kikwete spoke 
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of what he termed as a ‘political divide’ in Zanzibar, and asked for 
support from political leaders of the two wrangling parties  for  his 
endeavour to realize a lasting solution to the uneasy political situation 
in the islands.224 After one year of ‘informal contacts’ between some 
of the top leaders and offi cials of CCM and CUF, the much awaited 
dialogue was offi cially launched on 17 January 2007 in Zanzibar. 
Initially smaller CCM and CUF delegations met to agree on the 
agenda and the modus operandi, and then formal talks were launched 
on 1 February 2007 in Dodoma before moving to Bagamoyo.
Five items of the agenda were agreed. These were:
1. The General Elections of 30 October 2005 in Zanzibar, and 
their consequences;
2. Equality and fairness in conducting political activities in 
Zanzibar;
3. Issues of governance in the Revolutionary Government of 
Zanzibar;
4. Means and ways of promoting reconciliation, and the conduct 
of free and fair elections; and, 
5. Methods and programmes of implementation of the issues that 
will be agreed upon in the talks.
The talks were reported to be proceeding smoothly during the earlier 
stages, with both the CCM and CUF Secretaries General assuring 
their members and the public at large in April 2007 that it would not 
take long before the outcome would be announced.225 Among other 
issues, the package in the draft agreement226 contained the following 
items:
224 For an interesting comparative analysis of the Kenya – Zanzibar electoral crisis, see 
‘Panacea to post-election skirmishes’, The Sunday Standard (Nairobi), 6 January  
2008, p. 27.
225 ‘CCM, CUF talks slated to end soon’, The African (Dar es Salaam), 7 April 2007, 
p. 1; ‘Matokeo ya Muafaka Zanzibar kutangazwa mwezi huu’ [Outcome of the 
Zanzibar Accord to be announced this month], Mwananchi (Dar es Salaam), 7 
April 2007, p. 1.
226 ‘NEC-CCM yaubariki mwafaka’ [NEC-CCM endorses the Accord], Mwananchi, 
17 May 2007, p. 1.
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1. Further reform of the ZEC, including its Secretariat, to 
strengthen its competence and its independence in law and in 
practice, to be able to conduct elections that are free, fair and 
credible;
2. Complete verifi cation of the Permanent Voters’ Register that 
was established in 2004/5, which will involve photographic 
images, fi ngerprints and signatures to ensure that all those 
who do not qualify or have been registered more than once are 
removed from the register, and those who were either denied 
their constitutional right to be registered or who have attained 
the age of voting have their names entered in the voter register;
3. Complete review of the recruitment laws and regulations as well 
as codes of conduct governing the defence and security forces to 
ensure that they are non-partisan and refrain from indulging in 
politics;
4. Defence and security forces to stop interfering with the election 
campaigns of political parties;
5. Political parties to abstain from advocating the use of violence, 
threats and/or intimidation in pursuance of their political 
objectives;
6. Political parties and the government of the day to ensure that 
a conducive atmosphere exists for the conduct of free political 
activity within the law;
7. Review of the residence requirement for a person to be eligible 
to register as a voter;
8. Reform of the publicly owned media to ensure equitable 
coverage for all political parties in the country;
9. Provision of assistance to victims of the 26-27 January 2001 
violence when more than forty (40) people were killed by the 
police, and more than 2,000 sought refuge in neighbouring 
Kenya;
10. Corrective measures to be taken to provide redress to victims of 
human rights violations and destruction of property;
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11. Establishment of a Fund for Reconciliation and Reconstruction;
12. Measures to be taken to rectify imbalances between Unguja and 
Pemba in the composition of the Revolutionary Government 
of Zanzibar and its institutions, and in the allocation of budget 
resources for development purposes.
But such positive news was short-lived. In May 2007, the two parties 
started trading accusations and counter accusations, blaming each 
other for undermining the spirit of the talks.227 The saga began with 
a visit to Pemba by the Secretary General of CCM, Yussuf Makamba, 
who was quoted by the local print and broadcast media as ruling out 
a re-run of the Zanzibar general elections or a possible power-sharing 
arrangement between his party and CUF, and referring to those who 
alleged that there were imbalances between Unguja and Pemba as ‘mad 
people’.228 CUF protested against those remarks, and its rank and fi le 
urged their leadership to withdraw from the talks, accusing CCM of 
taking their party for a ride in a well calculated tactic.229 CCM on its 
part denied having any hidden agenda in the talks, and accused CUF 
of exerting undue pressure to force its demands.230
By the end of July 2007, it was an open secret that things were not 
normal, and in fact the bi-partisan talks were stalled for all intents and 
purposes. On 7 August 2007, the Chairman of CUF, Prof. Ibrahim 
227 ‘CCM, CUF Muafaka on verge of collapse’, Sunday Citizen (Dar es Salaam), 20 
May 2007, p. 1.
228 ‘Makamba: Uchaguzi Zanzibar hadi 2010’ [Makamba: No Elections in Zanzibar 
until 2010], Uhuru (Dar es Salaam), 23 May 2007, p. 1; ‘Makamba aigeuka CUF’ 
[Makamba turns against CUF], Tanzania Daima, 24 May 2007, p. 1; ‘CCM lacks 
political will – CUF’, The African, 10 June 2007, p. 1.
229 ‘Makamba kavuruga mambo Z’bar – CUF’ [Makamba has spoiled the matter 
in Z’bar – CUF], Tanzania Daima (Dar es Salaam), 12 June 2007, p. 1; ‘We are 
sticking to Muafaka talks – CUF’, Sunday Citizen (Dar es Salaam), 17 June 2007, 
p. 1; ‘CUF Council supports Muafaka’, Sunday News (Dar es Salaam), 17 June 
2007, p. 1; ‘Chama cha CUF chamlaani Makamba’ [CUF condemns Makamba], 
Mwananchi (Dar es Salaam), 17 June 2007, p. 1
230 ‘CCM refutes ditching Muafaka’, Daily News (Dar es Salaam), 8 August 2007, 
p. 1; ‘Makamba: CUF haisemi kweli kuhusu mwafaka’ [Makamba: CUF is not 
telling the truth about the Accord], Uhuru (Dar es Salaam), 8 August 2007, p. 
1; ‘CCM, CUF warushana’ [CCM, CUF blame each other], Tanzania Daima, 8 
August 2007, p. 1.
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Lipumba, held a press conference in Dar es Salaam, declaring that the 
two parties had reached a deadlock, while the ‘agreed timeframe for 
the conclusion of the talks’, which was said to be 15 August, 2007, was 
only one week away.231 He called upon the international community 
to intervene to rescue the talks. Finally, the saga was brought to an 
end through a public statement by President Jakaya Kikwete on 14 
August, 2007, in which he urged CUF to go back to the negotiating 
table, promising his personal supervision of the process to ensure its 
successful conclusion.232 CUF heeded the president’s call, and on 18 
August, 2007, its Secretary General, Seif Sharif Hamad, announced 
that the party had agreed in principle to continue with the negotiations, 
provided that a timeframe for their conclusion is agreed by the two 
parties, and that the president will keep to his word to personally 
supervise them.233 
The rest of the year witnessed the two parties quietly continuing 
with the negotiations with reports234 suggesting that they were in 
their fi nal round and that a deal in the form of a memorandum of 
understanding will be made public anytime in January 2008. Though 
the deadline has again passed, no deal has been announced by the two 
parties yet. 
A major constitutional development expected to come out from 
the talks was a power-sharing scheme between CCM and CUF, which 
would entail a major amendment of the Constitution of Zanzibar. 
There had been speculation that such an arrangement would make 
it obligatory for any winning party to incorporate other political 
parties that will meet certain constitutional and legal requirements in 
the formation of a government of national unity. This would mean 
231 ‘CUF calls for international mediators in Zanzibar impasse’, The Citizen, 8 August 
2007 p.1.
232 ‘Taarifa ya Rais Kikwete kuhusu Mazungumzo ya Muafaka kati ya CUF na CCM’ 
[President Kikwete’s Statement about the Talks on the Accord between CUF and 
CCM], Tanzania Daima (Dar es Salaam), 15 August 2007, p. 3.
233 ‘CUF: We take JK’s word on Muafaka’, Sunday News (Dar es Salaam), 19 August 
2007, p. 1; ‘Mwafaka Talks: Kikwete faces strict conditions from CUF’, The 
African on Sunday (Dar es Salaam), 19 August 2007, p. 1.
234 ‘CUF optimistic on Muafaka’, Sunday News (Dar es Salaam), 18 November 2007, 
p. 1.
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a departure from the current winner-takes-all system to that of an 
inclusive one in the formation of a government. 
There seems to have been some confusion about the power-
sharing scheme, with some mistakenly referring to it as a coalition 
government, while others calling it a government of national unity. 
The former entails a situation where, in a parliamentary system, no 
single party wins a clear majority to warrant it to form a government 
on its own, and hence is obliged to look for partners to form a 
coalition. The latter refers to a case where, even with a clear-cut 
winner of the elections capable of forming a government on its own, 
internal or external circumstances, such as political polarisation, war, 
or transition to democracy, oblige  it to incorporate all other segments 
of the society into the government in a ‘grand coalition’.
A requirement for an all-inclusive government for Zanzibar had 
formed part of the Muafaka (Accord) of 2001235 under which the 
winning party was to provide the President, while the runner up, 
having won at least 30% of the popular vote, was to provide the 
Chief Minister, and cabinet posts were to be shared proportionately. 
The Accord called for dialogue on the matter to be completed in 
2003 following the by-elections in 17 Pemba constituencies, and 
a mechanism to be put in place for it to take off in the post-2005 
elections period.236 Lack of political will and a third controversial 
election however, prevented the implementation of the arrangement. 
It is not clear whether it will be implemented this time round. 
235  Muafaka wa Kisiasa baina ya Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) na Chama Cha 
Wananchi (CUF) wa Kumaliza Mgogoro wa Kisiasa Zanzibar, 2001 [Political 
Accord between Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front 
(CUF) on Ending the Political Crisis in Zanzibar, 2001], Clause 5. 
236  Tume ya Rais ya Pamoja ya Usimamizi (2004), Mustakbali wa Siasa na 
Demokrasia Zanzibar: Hoja ya Serikali ya Pamoja, [Joint Presidential Supervisory 
Commission (2004), The Future of Politics and Democracy in Zanzibar: A Case for 
a Joint Government] (unpublished)
The State of Constitutionalism in Zanzibar in 2007 81
Many analysts and commentators237 have put forward the view 
that a power-sharing agreement is the only way out of the present 
political quagmire in Zanzibar. It is seen as a win-win situation to 
ensure all citizens of Zanzibar equally enjoy their constitutional right 
to participate in the governance of their country, and will also put an 
end to  ‘life and death’ approach to politics and electioneering.
Among the issues that will require constitutional amendments 
for such an arrangement to work are those provisions that relate to 
succession, formation of the cabinet (Revolutionary Council in the 
case of Zanzibar), the structure of the House  of Representatives 
(which is adversarial in its present structure), and the inclusion of new 
provisions to cover areas such as a threshold for the incorporation  of a 
party into the government, a formula for the distribution of positions 
in government, dispute resolution mechanism, and drawing up of a 
political programme that will guide government policy.
The draft memorandum of understanding agreed between the 
CCM and CUF by January 2008238, that was supposed to be endorsed 
by the two parties’ decision-making bodies, put the basic framework 
of the power sharing arrangement in the following terms:
1. Any political party that attains 5% or more of the presidential 
vote will qualify to be included in the government.
2. Cabinet portfolios will be proportionately distributed 
between political parties in accordance with the percentage of 
presidential votes they attain.
3. Election manifesto of the majority party will provide the basis 
of government policy, but a minimum programme will be 
237  ‘Serikali ya mseto ni ufumbuzi Zanzibar’ [Coalition government is the solution 
for Zanzibar], Habari Leo (Dar es Salaam), 9 August 2007, p. 1. ‘Zanzibar 
needs coalition government – US envoy’, The Guardian  (Dar es Salaam), 10 
August 2007, p. 1; Balozi Karume ataka Serikali ya Umoja wa Kitaifa Zanzibar’ 
[Ambassador Karume wants a Government of National Unity in Zanzibar], 
Mwananchi (Dar es Salaam), 28 January 2008, p. 1.
238  Rasimu ya Makubaliano kati ya Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) na Chama Cha 
Wananchi (CUF) katika Kuupatia Ufumbuzi wa Kudumu Mpasuko wa Kisiasa 
Zanzibar  [The Draft Agreement between Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and 
the Civic United Front (CUF) to fi nd a Lasting Solution to the Political Divide in 
Zanzibar] p. 9 – 13.
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drawn up by all participating parties that will cover important 
areas of governance.
4. There will be an executive president assisted by two Vice-
Presidents; the offi ce of the Chief Minister was to be abolished.
5. The leading candidate in the presidential election will be the 
President, who will be the Executive President.
6. The fi rst runner-up in the presidential election will be the First 
Vice-President, and he will be the principal assistant and adviser 
to the President. He will also be consulted by the President in 
the formation of the cabinet.
7. The second Vice-President will be appointed by the President 
from his own party in the House of Representatives, and he 
will be the leader of government business in the House. He will 
automatically assume the presidency if the president becomes 
incapacitated.
8. There will be a Reconciliation Council made up of two 
representatives from each participating party which shall have 
powers to hear any complaint from either the president or the 
First Vice-President, or both, on the conduct of government 
business, and adjudicate accordingly. The decision of the 
Reconciliation Council will be binding and fi nal.
Another important aspect of such an arrangement is how it will 
affect the Union Constitution which still (erroneously) incorporates 
sections and provisions governing the structure and administration of 
the Zanzibar government over purely Zanzibari affairs that are non-
Union matters.239 
Besides the power-sharing scheme, implementation of many of 
the items listed as forming part of the Accord to be announced require 
either enactment of new legislation or amendment of the existing 
239 Shivji, I. G. (1990) Tanzania: the Legal Foundations of the Union, Dar es 
Salaam; Dar es Salaam University Press, 1990, p. 80. See also Shivji, I.G. (2006) 
‘Sovereignty and Statehood in Zanzibar in the Union’, in C. M. Peter and H. 
Othman, (2006) Zanzibar and the Union Question, Zanzibar: Zanzibar Legal 
Services Centre Publication Series, No. 4, pp. 184-5.
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ones to give effect to the desired changes that aim at strengthening 
the democratic dispensation in the Islands. With only a partial success 
of the Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission (JPSC), a statutory 
body established to supervise the implementation of the Muafaka 
Accord of 2001,240 it remains to be seen how a different body will 
be structured to differentiate itself from that record of performance, 
and earn the confi dence and respect of the electorate in terms of its 
capability to ensure full, or at least satisfactory implementation of the 
new Accord. This is crucial if Zanzibar is to avoid another chaotic 
election come 2010.241 
The Debate on Fast-Tracking the East African Federation and 
the Status of Zanzibar
As was the case in other East African countries, the year 2007 saw the 
government soliciting the views of Tanzanians on fast-tracking the 
East African Federation. It was Tanzania’s idea, endorsed by Kenya 
and Uganda, to seek opinion on whether citizens of the three countries 
backed the political leaders’ decision to speed up the formation of 
a regional super-state from the earlier target of 2013, by moving it 
forward to 2010. The roadmap contained in a protocol signed by the 
three Heads of State provided for a gradual formation of the Federation 
in fi ve stages:
2005 – Customs Union
2007 – Common Market
2008 – Common Passport (for international traveling)
2009 – Monetary Union (Single Currency)
2013 – Formation of the East African Federation involving direct 
election of the President and Parliament of the Federation
In fact, it is believed by many that the Tanzanian government was not 
ready for the Federation, and knowing full well Tanzanians’ lukewarm 
240 The Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission Act of 2001.
241 Unfortunately, as of April, 2008, the Accord appeared to be fl oundering once 
again as the CCM National Executive Committee has refused to endorse the 
agreement, although it was accepted by CUF. This will have to be covered in next 
year’s report.
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approach to the whole concept, it was politically convenient to use the 
public to drive to a desired conclusion. But the debate that ensued, 
while giving the authorities what they wanted in putting the brakes 
on fast-tracking the East African Political Federation, re-opened the 
debate in Zanzibar on the issue of interpretation of the Articles of 
Union and the Union Constitution. The Presidential Commission, 
also known as the Wangwe Commission, that was formed to collect 
the peoples’ views, met a hostile audience everywhere it went in 
Zanzibar. Its response was to pack and leave the islands after only two 
days of the initial round of meetings. 
Zanzibaris, who had gathered to give their opinion, ignored the 
whole issue of fast-tracking, and instead used the occasion to demand 
explanation on the status of Zanzibar in the current EAC and in the 
envisaged Federation. Questions raised included the status of the 
President of Zanzibar in the regional Heads of States Summit; the 
representation of Zanzibar in areas that are non-Union matters; how 
the Customs Union will protect Zanzibar’s economy, which depends 
heavily on the transit trade, and is already depressed due to harmonised 
tariffs with Tanzania Mainland; Zanzibar’s status in Union institutions 
that were created using capital that came partly from Zanzibar’s 
dividends paid from the defunct East African Currency Board and 
EAC; and Zanzibar’s representation in the regional institutions, such 
as the EALA. 
The biggest constitutional issue, however, remained that of 
interpretation of the Articles of Union on the jurisdiction of the Union 
government over non-Union matters when it comes to representing 
Zanzibar as part of the Union in international bodies.242 The issue 
becomes more relevant when one considers the fact that only four 
areas covered by the EAC Treaty fall under the Union’s ambit. They 
are:
242 Anil Kija ‘Union Anniversary and East African Federation’, This Day, 26 April 
2007, pp. 16 – 17. See also Ani Jozeni, ‘How the Union impinges on EA 
Federation fast tracking’, The Guardian (Dar es Salaam), 26 April 2007, (Special 
Supplement: Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar), p. 4.
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• Monetary and Financial Co-operation;
• Free Movement of Persons, Labour Services, Right of 
Establishment and Residence; 
• Relations with other Regional and International Organisations 
and Development Partners;
• Cooperation in Political Matters.
The remaining 13 out of the 17 areas covered by the Treaty for the 
establishment of the EAC, which will later be transferred to the 
Federation, are non-Union matters.243 These include:
1. Cooperation in Trade Liberalisation and Development;
2. Cooperation in Investment and Industrial Development;
3. Cooperation in Standardisation, Quality Assurance, 
Meteorology and Testing;
4. Cooperation in Infrastructure and Services;
5. Cooperation in the Development of Human Resources, Science 
and Technology;
6. Agriculture and Food Security;
7. Cooperation in Environment and Natural Resources 
Management;
8. Cooperation in Tourism and Wildlife Management;
9. Health, Social and Cultural Activities;
10. Enhancing the Role of Women in Socio-Economic 
Development;
11. Legal and Judicial Affairs;
12. The Private Sector and the Civil Society;
13. Cooperation in other Fields.
All these matters fall squarely under the jurisdiction of the Zanzibar 
government in accordance with Article 102 (1) of the Union 
Constitution which provides, in its offi cial Kiswahili version, that:
243 Chapter 12 to Chapter 27 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community (1999).
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Kutakuwa na Serikali ya Zanzibar itakayojulikana kama 
“Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar” ambayo itakuwa na 
mamlaka katika Zanzibar juu ya mambo yote yasiyo mambo 
ya Muungano kwa mujibu wa masharti ya Katiba hii. [There 
shall be a government for Zanzibar which shall be known as 
“The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar” which shall 
have exclusive authority over Zanzibar in all matters other 
than the Union matters in accordance with the provisions of 
this Constitution. (unoffi cial translation).] 
The said constitutional provision correctly translates Article (iii) 
(a) of the Articles of Union that provides for “a separate legislature 
and executive in and for Zanzibar from time to time constituted in 
accordance with the existing law of Zanzibar and having exclusive 
authority within Zanzibar for matters other than those reserved to the 
Parliament and Executive of the United Republic.”
A question that was raised repeatedly by the people of Zanzibar 
during the Wangwe Commission public hearings was one that related 
to the fact that the Union government had assumed powers that 
are exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Zanzibar government. 
Zanzibar has its own ministries dealing with fi nance and economic 
planning, investment, trade and tourism, employment and labour, 
education, health, communications and transport, water, construction, 
energy and lands, information, culture and sports, and constitutional 
affairs and good governance. These matters are administered by the 
Zanzibar government through these ministries, which therefore are 
the only competent organs to represent Zanzibar’s interests if they are 
to be administered by a pan-territorial body such as the Community 
or the envisaged Federation.244 This was the premise that Zanzibaris 
used to campaign openly for their country to be admitted either as an 
independent or at least as an associate member of the Community or 
Federation.
Given the importance which Zanzibaris across the political divide 
attach to any matter that touches on their autonomy and identity, it 
244 Bilal, Said Gharib (2007) ‘Nafasi ya Zanzibar katika Jumuiya ya Afrika Mashariki’, 
Position of Zanzibar in the East African Community, a paper presented to a 
Training Workshop on The Constitution Law and Development in Zanzibar (30 
– 31 May, 2007) organised by the Zanzibar Legal Service Centre (ZLSC), at p. 3.
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was not surprising that one of the features of the debate was a rare 
common position by political adversaries in the islands. The opposition 
CUF Secretary General and former Chief Minister, Seif Sharif 
Hamad, in his written submission to the Wangwe Commission,245 
rejected outright any fast-tracking of the Federation, citing major 
issues that each country needed to address before embarking on 
the ambitious programme to create a super-state; and in the case of 
Tanzania, underlining the importance of resolving the Union problems 
between Zanzibar and Tanganyika and the political impasse between 
CCM and CUF. As soon as the Wangwe Commission announced 
the results of their work, in which it was reported that three quarters 
of Tanzanians opposed fast-tracking,246 President Amani Karume of 
Zanzibar cautioned that any further integration of the East African 
countries must take into consideration public opinion in individual 
countries.247 
While the fi nal outcome of the exercise was a rejection of fast-
tracking, something that the authorities might be happy with because 
it at least postpones the debate over complaints from the islands with 
regard to their representation in international bodies when it comes to 
non-Union affairs, the concerns and queries raised by Zanzibaris will 
still beleaguer future development of regional integration. It remains 
a challenge for the three East African governments to look into the 
possibility of making a special arrangement for accommodating Zanzibar 
within the institutional and legal framework of the Community and 
of the Federation, if such a project is to be successful. Perhaps there is 
245 Hamad, Seif Sharif (2007) ‘Maoni juu ya Kuharakisha Uundwaji wa Shirikisho 
la Afrika Mashariki’ [Views on Fast-tracking the Formation of the East African 
Federation] presented to the Wangwe Commission in Zanzibar. (unpublished).
246 ‘Ripoti ya Tume ya Wangwe: Wananchi robo tatu hawataki Shirikisho’ [Report 
of the Wangwe Commission: Three Quarters of the Citizens do not want 
Federation], Tanzania Daima (Dar es Salaam), 14 July 2007, p 1; ‘Watanzania 
walikataa Shirikisho Afrika Mashariki’ [Tanzanians rejected East African 
Federation], Mwananchi (Dar es Salaam), 14 July 2007, p. 1. For initial reaction 
to the debate, see ‘Tanzanians say No to EA Federation’, Sunday Citizen (Dar es 
Salaam), 15 April 2007, p 1; ‘Referendum to decide EA Federation – Wangwe’, 
Sunday Citizen (Dar es Salaam), 22 April 2007, p 1.
247 ‘Karume naye awashukia madikteta Afrika Mashariki’ [Karume also condemns 
dictators in East Africa], Tanzania Daima (Dar es Salaam), 15 March 2207, p 3.
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a need to consult the special arrangement that Finland has in relation 
to Aaland Island, and Denmark to Faroe Islands and Greenland, when 
it comes to membership of international organisations such as the 
European Union.
The Union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika
Controversies continued to surround the administration of the 
Union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika in 2007.248 During the 
commemoration of the Union Day on 26 April, and the budget 
session in Parliament, the Union government, through its Minister 
of State in the Vice President’s Offi ce (Union Affairs), Dr. Hussein 
Mwinyi, announced what he termed as successes in resolving a 
number of obstacles that haunt the smooth functioning of the Union. 
He announced that consensus had been reached between the Union 
and Zanzibar governments on a number of issues, including the 
hiring of a consultant to advise the two governments on the sharing 
of revenue emanating from the potential discovery of petroleum and 
natural gas,249 amendment of the law that establishes the Human 
Rights and Good Governance Commission so as to recognise the 
Zanzibar Minister responsible for Good Governance, and hence allow 
the Commission to start operating in Zanzibar,250 and an agreement 
over a formulae for sharing revenue accruing from deep sea fi shing 
to pave the way for a single licensing authority for the whole of the 
United Republic.251 
248 ‘Miaka 43 ya Tanzania: Muungano kidonda’ [Forty Three Years of Tanzania: 
Festering Union], Tanzania Daima, 26 April 2007, p 1; ‘Mzimu OIC wafufuka’ 
[The OIC ghost rises again], Tanzania Daima, 1 December 2007 p 1; Nizar 
Visram, ‘Kuvurugwa kwa Hati ya Muungano ndicho chanzo cha kero za 
Muungano’ [Breaching of the Articles of Union is the source of the problems 
of the Union], Mwananchi, 26 April 2007, p. 12; ‘Seif Sharif: Kilichofanyika ni 
kiini macho Zanzibar’ [Seif Sharif: What was done was to blindfold Zanzibar], 
Mwananchi, 26 April 26 2007, p 13.
249 ‘Lowassa, Nahodha waja na suluhu kero za Muungano’ [Lowassa, Nahodha 
come with solutions of the Union problems], Mtanzania, 27 April 2007, p. 1; 
‘Ugunduzi wa Petroli: Muungano majaribuni’ [Discovery of oil: A tesf for the 
Union], Tanzania Daima (Dar es Salaam), 5 July 2007, p 1.
250 ‘Kero za Muungano zaendelea kufanyiwa kazi – Dk. Mwinyi’ [Union problems 
being attended to – Dr. Mwinyi], Zanzibar Leo Jumapili, 22 April 2007, p 1; ‘Dk. 
Mwinyi: Mafanikio ya Muungano ni makubwa’ [Dr. Mwinyi: The successes of the 
Union are major], Uhuru, 26 April 2007, p 12.
251 ‘Mainland, Islands squabble over revenues from EU fi shing deal’, The East African 
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On the other hand, the Offi cial Opposition, led by CUF both in 
the Union Parliament and in the Zanzibar House of Representatives, 
objected to the method of closed door sessions between the Union 
Prime Minister and Zanzibar Chief Minister, or setting up of numerous 
committees252 in dealing with the Union problems, and instead called 
for a more participatory approach involving the wider citizenry.253 
(Nairobi), 8-14 October 2007, p 1.
252 ‘No need for commission on Union matters – Opposition’, The African (Dar es 
Salaam), 5 July 2007, p. 1. Altogether nineteen Committees or Commissions 
have been set up to examine Union problems. Twelve of them are from Zanzibar 
which include Kamati ya Baraza la Mapinduzi (Kamati ya Amina) ya 1992 
[Committee of the Revolutionary Council (Amina Committee) of 1992]; Kamati 
ya Rais ya Kupambana na Kasoro za Muungano (Kamati ya Shamhuna)  ya 1997 
[Presidential Committee to deal with the shortcomings of the Union (Shamhuna 
Committee) of 1997]; Kamati ya Rais Kuchambua Ripoti ya Jaji Kisanga (Kamati 
ya Salim Juma Othman) [Presidential Committee to analayse the Report of 
Justice Kisanga (Committee of Salim Juma Othman)]; Kamati ya Kuandaa 
Mapendekezo ya Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar juu ya Kero za Muungano 
(Kamati ya Ramia) ya 2000 [Committee to prepare the Recommendations of 
the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar on the Union Problems (Ramia 
Committee) of  2000]; Kamati ya Baraza la Mapinduzi juu ya Sera ya Mambo 
ya Nje [Committee of the Revolutionary Council on Foreign Policy]; Kamati ya 
Rais ya Wataalamu juu ya Kero za Muungano ya 2001 [Presidential Committee 
of Experts on the Union Problems of 2001]; Kamati ya Baraza la Mapinduzi ya 
Jumuiya ya Afrika Mashariki [Committee of the Revolutionary Council on the 
East African Community]; Kamati ya Mafuta [Committee on Oil]; Kamati ya 
Madeni baina ya Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar na Serikali ya Muungano 
wa Tanzania [Committee on Debts between the Revolutionary Government 
of Zanzibar and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania]; Kamati 
ya Suala la Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) [Committee on the Question of 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); Kamati ya Masuala ya Fedha na Benki Kuu 
[Committee on Fiscal Matters and the Central Bank]; Kamati ya Rais ya Masuala 
ya Simu (1996 –1999) [Presidential Committee on Telecommunication matters 
(1996-1999)].  In addition, seven Committees have been formed by the Union 
government, and these are Kamati ya Mtei [Mtei Committee]; Tume ya Nyalali 
[Nyalali Commission]; Kamati ya Shellukindo [Shellukindo Committee]; Kamati 
ya Bomani [Bomani Committee]; Kamati ya Shellukindo 2 ya kuandaa Muafaka 
juu ya Mambo ya Muungano baina ya SMZ na SMT [Shellukindo Committee 
2 to reach an accord on Union Matters between the Revolutionary Government 
of Zanzibar and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania]; Kamati 
ya ”Harmonization” [”Harmonization” Committee] ; Kamati ya Masuala ya 
Simu (Kamati ya Kusila) [Committee on the Telecommunication Matters (Kusila 
Committee)].
253 ‘Long way to go to resolve Union problems’, The Citizen (Dar es Salaam), 11 July  
2007, p. 14 – 15.
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The opposition further highlighted the more serious problems 
that needed attention, including the complaint from the people of 
Tanzania Mainland that Zanzibaris are over-represented in Union 
institutions, such as the Parliament, and enjoy undeserved privileges of 
holding positions even in non-Union institutions. From the Zanzibar 
side, complaints revolve around issues like unfair fi scal and monetary 
arrangements that kill Zanzibar’s economy which is island-based. Such 
matters include harmonisation of tariffs between the Mainland and 
Zanzibar with complete disregard of the vulnerability of Zanzibar’s 
economy which depends heavily on the transit trade; double taxation 
of goods entering Tanzania Mainland from the Islands; inclusion of 
petroleum and natural gas into Union matters while other minerals 
such as gold, diamond and tanzanite found on the Mainland are not 
Union matters; a continuing blocking of Zanzibar Football Association 
from joining Federation for International Football Association (FIFA), 
since sports is not a Union matter; and many others.
Above all, the opposition argued that the biggest problem of the 
Union emanates from the continuing breach of the Articles of Union 
between the Republic of Tanganyika and the People’s Republic of 
Zanzibar which is the grundnorm of the Union. The removal of the 
President of Zanzibar as an automatic Vice President of the United 
Republic is one such serious breach, denying the Head of the Executive 
of Zanzibar (being the only person enjoying full mandate of his people), 
to directly represent his country’s interests in the Union government. 
The opposition further called for the renegotiation of the Articles of 
Union to pave the way for a review of the structure of the Union from 
the current two-governments system to a full-fl edged federation with 
three governments, one for Zanzibar and one for Tanganyika to cater 
for non-Union matters, and a third Union government to deal with 
Union affairs throughout the United Republic.
Another interesting development with regard to the Union debate 
was the exercise of powers by Union institutions over Zanzibar 
which they do not have constitutionally. The leader of the offi cial 
opposition in the Union Parliament, Hamad Rashid Mohammed, 
took to task the Union government over a 1965 piece of legislation, 
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the Exchange Control Act254 that was passed by the Union Parliament 
and contained a provision that repealed a Zanzibar law (the Exchange 
Control Decree). The Union Parliament has no jurisdiction to repeal 
Zanzibar laws. 
These complaints were repeated by citizens from both sides of the 
channel during debates organised by the print and electronic media 
when the nation was marking 43 years of the Union. The government, 
however, still seems not to be prepared to go into uncharted waters 
by agreeing to a review of the Articles of Union and writing of a new 
constitution that will address these serious problems. Not surprisingly 
then that a group of 10 Zanzibaris attempted to settle the matter 
through the courts. 
Rashid Salim Adiy and nine others fi led a suit255 at the High Court 
of Zanzibar demanding that the Union be declared null and void and 
a restoration of Zanzibar’s sovereignty. This move followed an earlier 
suit fi led in 2005 by the same group praying to the court to instruct 
the Attorney General of Zanzibar to produce the original copy of 
the Articles of Union with signatures of President Julius Nyerere of 
Tanganyika and President Abeid Karume of Zanzibar. The High Court 
of Zanzibar ruled that despite the failure of the Attorney General’s 
chambers to produce the original copy of the Articles of Union, the 
Union cannot be declared null and void.
One of President Jakaya Kikwete’s pledges in his speech to 
Parliament on 30 December 2005 was to engage in a more constructive 
and serious effort to address the Union problems. He might have 
re-launched the Prime Minister – Chief Minister joint meetings to 
discuss such problems, but evidence on the ground suggests that, 
through almost half his term, his government is still far behind in 
settling the issue. 
254  Exchange Control Ordinance (Amendment) Act, No. 22 of 1965.
255  Rashid Salum Adiy & 9 Others vs. Attorney General of the Revolutionary 
Government Zanzibar & 4 Others (No. 20 of 2006), High Court of Zanzibar 
(unreported)
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The Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
The Controversial Enactment of the new Rights, Privileges and 
Immunities of the Members of House of Representatives Act, 
2007 
The April 2007 session of the House of Representatives attracted a 
lot of attention when the Zanzibar government tabled a bill to repeal 
the Rights, Privileges and Immunities of the Members of House of 
Representatives Act, 1990, and to enact new legislation to the same 
effect.256 Concerns were raised by the media in Zanzibar and Tanzania 
Mainland, human rights organisations and the opposition legislators 
with regard to the proposed new law, especially provisions that are 
seen as undermining freedom of information in the Islands. 
Section 28 (d) when read together with section 10 of the Bill bars 
journalists from entering the House premises without prior approval 
of, and issuance of a permit by the Speaker, and makes it an offence 
liable to a fi ne of up to Shs. 50,000 and imprisonment of not less than 
a month and up to six months, for any person who will be found in 
the said premises without the Speaker’s authorisation. 
Section 32 (1) of the Bill makes it an offence liable to a fi ne of up 
to Shs. 300,000 and imprisonment of up to three years for any person 
who, among other things, publishes, without prior permission of the 
House, any report of the business of the House or of its committees, if 
such business is not public; publishes without prior permission of the 
House any document or report that has been prepared for submission 
to the House, if such document or report has not yet been tabled in 
256 Mswada wa Sheria ya kufuta Sheria ya Baraza la Wawakilishi (Kinga, Uwezo 
na Fursa) Nam. 3 ya 1990 na kutunga Sheria mpya kuhusu Kinga, Uwezo na 
Fursa za Wajumbe wa Baraza la Wawakilishi katika kutekeleza Majukumu yao na 
mambo mengine yanayohusiana nayo, Gazeti Rasmi la Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya 
Zanzibar, Sehemu ya CXV Nam. 6197, 16 Machi, 2007, p. 24.
[A Bill for an Act to Repeal The House of Representatives (Immunities, Rights 
and Privileges) Act No. 3 of  1990 and to enact a new Legislation on Immunities, 
Rights and Privileges of the members of the House of Representatives in 
Execution of their Responsibilities and other relevant matters. Offi cial Gazette of 
the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, Section CXV No.6197, 16 March, 
2007, p. 24.    
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the House; and also publishes any scandal that relates to behaviour or 
conduct of a member of the House of Representatives.
These two provisions are unconstitutional, since they contravene 
Article 18 of the Constitution of Zanzibar which guarantees the right 
to freedom of information and speech.
Despite objections by journalists257 and attempts by the opposition 
legislators to seek their removal, the bill was passed into legislation. It 
remains to be seen whether journalists’ associations or human rights 
organisations will challenge the provisions of this law through the 
courts, a culture that is seriously lacking in Zanzibar.
The Death Penalty
Zanzibar, as part of the United Republic of Tanzania, found itself 
engaged in a debate on whether the death penalty should be abolished 
following the decision to seek public opinion over the matter by the 
Union government. The general view among those consulted was to 
retain the death penalty. Religious leaders overwhelmingly upheld the 
view, citing holy books as a justifi cation for maintaining ‘a divine form 
of punishment’258 for big offences.
 However, State Attorney working in the Attorney General’s 
Chambers, Ali Hassan, came out openly to denounce the punishment 
as ‘inhuman, cruel and degrading.’259 While there seems to be 
a Union government’s desire to abolish the death penalty, with its 
former Foreign Minister and now United Nations (UN) Deputy 
Secretary General, Dr. Asha Rose-Migiro, taking the campaign to 
international heights, in Zanzibar it seems to lack popular support. 
Fear of antagonising the predominant conservative elements of the 
society will continue to suppress the campaign to do away with this 
inhuman form of punishment.
257 Editorial comment: ‘Wanted: Clear discussion on Islands House privileges bill’, 
This Day (Dar es Salaam), 2 April 2007, p 1.
258 ‘Zanzibar state lawyer against death penalty’, The Guardian (Dar es Salaam), 22 
October 2007, p 1.
259 ‘Mwanasheria wa SMZ apinga adhabu ya kifo’ [State Attorney opposes death 
penalty], Nipashe (Dar es Salaam), 22 October 2007, p 1.
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The release of the Report of the Zanzibar Electoral 
Commission
In November 2007, marking the end of the term for the serving 
Commissioners, the ZEC published a report of its activities during 
the previous fi ve years. To the surprise of many, the report admitted 
that ZEC had no control over the supervision and organisation of the 
elections, with the Zanzibar Special Forces interfering in their work 
and even hijacking the electoral process. ZEC also complained of the 
interference by government authorities, notably the Shehas (village 
headmen), in the registration of voters. It admitted its lack of control 
over the Shehas who are supposed to be ZEC agents by law during the 
elections, but they would only take instructions from the Regional 
and District Commissioners.
 The Commission further complained about interference by 
some political parties in the registration of voters who were not 
qualifi ed to vote, especially those under the age of 18. It stated that 
it resisted attempts by the donor community to get certain measures 
implemented, although it does not state that these included verifi cation 
of the Permanent Electoral Registers.260 With the appointment of a 
new ZEC in January 2008, it remains to be seen how it would tackle 
such interference by the local authorities which undermines its very 
independence and compromises the conduct of free and fair elections. 
This has the consequence of disenfranchising the people of Zanzibar 
and is a violation of their right to have a government of their choice 
and to participate in the public life of their nation. 
Other Human Rights Issues
2007 was a historic year in the area of human rights in the islands 
following the publication of the fi rst ever annual human rights report 
by a locally-based organisation. The Zanzibar Legal Service Centre 
260 Tume ya Uchaguzi ya Zanzibar (2007) Ripoti ya Shughuli za Tume ya Uchaguzi ya 
Zanzibar kwa kipindi cha Miaka Mitano kuanzia tarehe 3 Oktoba 2002 hadi tarehe 
2 Oktoba 2007 , Zanzibar  [Zanzibar Electoral Commission (2007), A Report of 
the Activities of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission for the period of Five Years 
starting 3 October 2002 and ending on 2 October 2007, Zanzibar], pp 40-41.
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(ZLSC) commissioned, authored and published Zanzibar Human 
Rights Report 2006 jointly with Tanzania Human Rights Report 2006 
of the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) based in Dar es 
Salaam.261 
The report highlights serious human rights violations which 
sometimes go unreported. With regard to civil and political rights, 
the report covers areas such as right to life, extra-judicial killings, mob 
violence, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, of association and 
of assembly, the right to participate in governance, and equality before 
the law. Under economic and social rights, cases covered include those 
that violate labour rights, right to own property, to health, education, 
and the right of accessibility to health services for people living with 
HIV/AIDS. The report also provides a comprehensive analysis of 
the rights of vulnerable groups, such as persons with disabilities, 
children, women and the elderly. It also has separate chapters covering 
corruption, collective rights (including social inequality, right to 
development and right to a clean environment), and Zanzibar Special 
Forces.
Human rights activists and citizens at large welcomed and lauded 
the publication of this report, calling it a step in the right direction in 
the history of human rights development in Zanzibar. The authorities, 
on the other hand, criticised the report as being biased and lacking 
information from the government side. ZLSC responded by citing 
lack of cooperation from state offi cials.
Of particular interest, two serious cases were mentioned in the 
report. The fi rst one is with regard to the right to participate in 
governance guaranteed under Article 21 (2) of the Constitution of 
Zanzibar. The report states:
The crisis of governance in Zanzibar emanates not only 
from the fact that a section of the population questions the 
legitimacy of the government in power, but from the fact also 
261 Zanzibar Legal Services Centre (2007) Zanzibar Human Rights Report 2006 , 
published jointly in Legal and Human Rights Centre (2007), Tanzania Human 
Rights Report 2006 (With a Zanzibar Chapter). See also ‘Uvunjaji haki za 
binadamu wakithiri Zanzibar’ [Human Rights Violations Increase in Zanzibar], 
Familia (Dar es Salaam), 7-13 March 2007, p 1.
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that the government practices politics of exclusion … people  
who are perceived to be sympathetic to opposition parties 
or originate from Pemba are rarely given senior government 
posts. There are also claims that Zanzibaris of Arab, Indian 
and Comorian origins are not recruited into the Zanzibar 
Government Special Forces (SMZ) Special Departments.262 
The second issue is that of regular and persistent violations of human 
rights by the Special Departments. The report cites specifi c cases of 
extra-judicial killings committed by members of these forces, notably 
the Anti-Smuggling Squad (KMKM) and the Economy Building 
Brigade (JKU),263 and goes on to explain the gravity of the situation 
and the uncontrolled behaviour of the forces in general:
Serious accusations have recently been levelled against 
these fi ve special departments. They include allegations of 
indiscriminate beatings of innocent people, especially before 
and after the elections.
It is very common nowadays to see members of KMKM, 
which is charged with a duty to curb smuggling, doing police 
work such as arresting people, searching people and places 
and even regulating traffi c on the roads. The same applies to 
members of the Fire Brigade, JKU and Volunteer Forces. As 
these forces are not trained to carry out police work, such as 
mob control and defi nitely not trained on human rights, it is 
very common for members of these forces to act in violation 
of basic human rights.264 
What is worse is the air of impunity the Zanzibar Special Forces have. 
When its offi cers were summoned by the Tanzania Human Rights 
and Good Governance Commission to discuss the rising number of 
complaints fi led against the forces, they refused to appear.265 
262 The names Special Departments and Special Forces are used interchangeably to 
refer to the Zanzibar government-owned security forces. Zanzibar Legal Services 
Centre 2007:166.
263 Zanzibar Legal Services Centre (2007), Op. cit., at pp 160-161.
264 Op. cit., at p 190.
265 ‘Tume ya Jaji Kisanga yaahidi mambo safi  visiwani Zenji’ [Justice Kisanga 
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Corruption
Although the Zanzibar government generally shies away from 
discussing the issue of corruption, the end of 2007 witnessed a bold 
move by the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Constitutional 
Affairs and Good Governance, Mr. Mahadhi Juma Mahadhi. He 
conceded that corruption was rampant in public offi ces, and that it 
has led to denial of justice to many citizens.266 The statement, however, 
did not go further to suggest actions that the government intends to 
take to curb the menace. It is known for example that a White Paper 
was prepared for the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Authority 
and a Leadership Ethics Code in Zanzibar, but the Zanzibar Cabinet 
refused to endorse it.267 The opposition has criticised this move by the 
Cabinet saying that the bill would impact negatively on their corrupt 
activities and malpractices.268 There has been no mention ever since of 
any effort to revive the initiative to have an anti-corruption legislation 
for Zanzibar.
Conclusion
The year ended on a slightly more optimistic note albeit with 
considerable uncertainty as to whether, this time, the Third Accord 
will be fully implemented, unlike the previous ones which ended with 
tragic consequences. In case the Zanzibar experience of the killings 
of 2001 were not instructive enough, it was hoped that the turmoil 
that accompanied the elections in Kenya at the end of the year, would 
teach Zanzibar authorities an important lesson about the consequences 
of another botched electoral process. Rather belatedly, the ZEC was 
forced to confess its shortcomings which were similar to those of its 
Commission promises good things in Zanzibar] , Alasiri (Dar es Salaam), 31 
August, 2007.
266 ‘Rushwa imewashinda viongozi SMZ’ [Corruption has defeated Zanzibar 
government leaders] , Tanzania Daima (Dar es Salaam), 16 December 2007, p 1.
267 Zanzibar government also refused to endorse the Union Anti-Corruption 
legislation in April 2007 on the ground that it is not a Union matter. See 
‘Zanzibar waikataa Sheria ya Rushwa’ [Zanzibar rejects Anti-Corruption 
Legislation], Tanzania Daima, 18 April 2007, p 1.
268 The Guardian (Dar es Salaam), 2 January 2007, p 3.
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counterpart in neighbouring Kenya. Whether this means that the 
newly appointed ZEC will fare any better, is anybody’s guess. 
At the same time, the saga of the attempt to fast-track the East 
African Federation showed that the people of Zanzibar were not 
prepared to be taken down another garden path into yet another 
grandiose project without their consent. They were  able to broaden the 
debate, and revive old issues by questioning even the Tanzanian Union 
itself.  The publication of the fi rst Zanzibar Human Rights Report by 
a Zanzibar-based NGO may be another sign of the maturation of the 
political awareness and determination of the people of Zanzibar not 
to be silenced by old fears. 
The fact, however, is that we are not yet out of the woods as 
regards one-party mentality and suppression of basic rights when the 
ruling authorities can still get away with it. The successful attempt 
to muzzle the press in reporting what it deems fi t with respect to 
the affairs of the House of Representatives, is a glaring case in point. 
Another is the failure to establish an Anti-Corruption Authority and a 
Leadership Code, even after a respected senior offi cial of the Zanzibar 
Government had conceded that corruption leads to denial of justice. 
The purported fl oundering of the latest Accord, if it is not 
reversed quickly, exposes these Islands to another prolonged period 
of uncertainty and potential breakdown of law and order. It is to be 
hoped that the contradictory behaviour of the ruling authorities will 
warn the populace that it was too soon to let down their guard in the 
struggle for democracy and the rule of law. 
99
6
The State of Constitutionalism in 
Rwanda – 2007
Felix Zigirinshuti
Introduction
Having been promulgated in 2003269, the Rwandan Constitution is 
now four years old. It is noteworthy that Rwanda’s law comprises of 
written laws with the constitution being the supreme law of the land. All 
other laws, including international agreements, are subordinate to the 
constitution. Rwanda is committed to the promotion and enforcement 
of constitutionalism, as evidenced by six core constitutional principles 
namely:
a)  The fi ght against genocide ideology;
b)  Power sharing;
c)  Rule of law;
d)  Democratic government;
e)  Equality and non-discrimination; and, 
f )  The constant quest for solutions through dialogue and 
consensus.270 
In 2007, a lot was achieved in terms of enforcing the above fundamental 
principles especially by the government. 
This paper will focus on constitutionalism in Rwanda during 
2007, within the meaning attributed to it by Stanford that “the 
government can and should be legally limited in its powers and that 
its authority depends on its observing these limitations.”271 The paper 
269 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, OFFICIAL GAZETTE  special, 4 June 
2003 p 119.
270 Article 9 of the Rwandan Constitution.
271 Constitutionalism, First published 10 January 2001; substantive revision 20 
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assesses the progress that has been made in trying cases related to 
the 1994 genocide through the Gacaca and the ordinary courts.  In 
addition, the paper discusses measures that have been taken to prevent 
a recurrence of genocide in Rwanda. 
In 2007, political parties in Rwanda gained more freedom as 
demonstrated by the fact that they were able to establish representative 
units in local areas. The paper also examines the observance of the 
rule of law and human rights in 2007, with specifi c focus on media 
freedom in Rwanda. Lastly, the paper devotes attention to decisions 
delivered through various dispute resolution mechanisms, including 
court decisions as well as to other forms of mediation such as dialogue 
and consensus that may have in one way or another, impacted on 
constitutionalism in Rwanda in 2007.
Advancing the Cause of Justice:  Gacaca Trials and 
The Fight against Genocide Ideology
Gacaca courts are specialised courts established within the Rwanda legal 
system. They are based on the traditional system of confl ict resolution. 
The establishment of the  Gacaca courts was a recommendation by 
Rwandans during the consultative meeting organised by the President 
from May 1998 to March 1999. The Gacaca courts were introduced 
after the genocide, mainly to speed up genocide trials, assist in 
eradicating the culture of impunity, strengthen reconciliation and 
unity among Rwandans and to improve the capacity of the Rwandan 
society to solve its own problems. In other words, through  Gacaca 
courts, Rwandans hoped to restore  peace and unity among Rwandans 
that would propel the country’s development. 
By way of background, more than a million Rwandans died 
and more than three million people fl ed to neighbouring countries 
during the 1994 Rwanda genocide. In addition, the catastrophe 
February, 2007, cited at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism, 
accessed on 19 August, 2007; see also C.M. Zoethout & P.J. Boon, “Defi ning 
constitutionalism and democracy: an introduction”, in Zoethout (ed.), 
Constitutionalism in Africa, A Quest for Autochthonous, Gouda Quit, Sanders 
Institute, 1996, p 1.
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resulted in a big number of orphans and widows. All the country’s 
key sectors, including the judiciary, economy, health and education, 
were destroyed.  There arose disunity among Rwandans and the image 
of the country was tarnished. Although there was no law punishing 
genocide in 1994, after the genocide, about 120, 000 people were 
arrested for commission of crimes of genocide. 
It was not until 30 August 1996 that an organic law establishing 
the organisation and prosecution of offences constituting 
the crime of genocide or other crimes against humanity was 
passed. This organic law established specialised chambers for 
genocide crimes in the civil and military courts, provided 
procedures for confessions; guilty pleas for genocide suspects 
and the categorisation of genocide defendants.272 
The conventional court system, however, did not meet the people’s 
expectations because after approximately fi ve years, only 6,000 out 
of the 120, 000 detainees had been tried. At this pace, it would take 
more than a century to try all the detainees. Furthermore, the suspects 
who were still in the community and in exile could not be arrested due 
to lack of  space in the existing prisons and prosecution facilities. The 
solution was to look for another alternative. As a result, the Gacaca 
Court System was introduced taking its origin from the Rwandan 
culture where people used to sit together in Gacaca (grassland) and 
solve disputes. 
In 2003, a law defi ning the guiding principles of  Gacaca courts was 
enacted,273 providing for the participation of the whole population in 
the proceedings. It also provided for confession, guilty plea, repentance 
and apology procedures for genocide suspects. The jurisdiction of 
Gacaca courts was to collect all information about genocide crimes, 
categorise all suspects and conduct trials of the second and third 
category.274  The ordinary courts addressed fi rst category cases. In 
272 Summary report of the year 2007, National Service for  Gacaca Courts.
273 Law 33bis/2003 of 06/09/2003 repressing the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes (as amended to date), Offi cial Gazette 21, 1 November 
2003.
274 Suspects of genocide crimes are classifi ed into three categories: The First Category 
consists of the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and those who 
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total, 9013 Gacaca courts at cell level and 1545  Gacaca courts of 
appeal at sector of district level275 were created.276 
Initially, the establishment of the Gacaca courts attracted 
considerable criticism from, among others, Rwandan refugees as well 
as foreign countries who did not understand the functioning and 
importance of the courts. It was found necessary by the government 
to take into account strategic measures to enable Gacaca courts to 
perform their duties with transparency and within the shortest time 
possible compared to ordinary courts. Collection of information was 
speeded up mostly in the early 2006 and was concluded in May 2006. 
This collection of information was the responsibility of Gacaca courts 
at the cell  level assisted by the general assembly attended by at least 
100 persons.277
Gacaca Courts committed to wind up trials by 2007
The Gacaca courts were committed to wind up genocide-related trials 
before the end of the year 2007. In order to accomplish this goal, the 
workplan for 2007 was based on the case fi les that had been gathered 
in the year 2006, in which 814,564 fi les had been investigated. These 
fi les were classifi ed into three major categories being (a) the First 
category which consisted of 77,269 suspects representing 9.4 % of the 
total number of suspects implicated in crimes of genocide; (b) Second 
category which consisted of 432,557 suspects representing 51.8 % of 
the total number of suspects implicated in crimes of genocide; and 
(c) Third Category which consisted of 308,738 suspects representing 
committed acts of rape and torture and their accomplices. The Second Category 
consists of the persons accused of having killed or injured with an intention 
to kill. The Third Category consists of persons who committed crimes against 
property. 
275 The Republic of Rwanda is divided into the following administrative entities: 
1° Provinces and the City of Kigali; 2° Districts; 3° Sectors; 4° Cells; 5° Villages 
(art. 2 of Organic Law nº 29/2005 of 23/12/2005 determining the administrative 
entities of the Republic of Rwanda, Offi cial Gazette  Special Number, December 
23, 2005).
276  National Service for  Gacaca Courts, Documentation Department.
277  Ibid.
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38.8 % of the total number of suspects implicated in crimes of 
genocide.278
According to the Executive Secretary of the National Service for 
Gacaca courts279 D. Mukantaganzwa, the process of speeding up 
trials faced several challenges and therefore a big number of suspects 
could not be accorded a speedy trial within a minimum period 
leading to increased criticism. Some major suspects from the southern 
region began to fl ee to Burundi.280 This was a great challenge to the 
government of Rwanda for which a solution had to be found quickly. 
It was on this basis that the government of Rwanda strategically took 
measures to fi nalise all the judgements by the year 2007. The fi rst 
strategy was to increase the number of Gacaca courts at the cell and 
district level with the intent of speeding up the process. The second 
strategy was to solve the transportation problem for the detainees from 
all across the country to the sites where the crimes were committed. 
The government also established transit sites where the suspects would 
temporarily be kept or hosted during the trial process. 
Additionally, the big number of suspects appeared to constitute 
another major challenge to the government. They were too many 
to be accommodated within the limited space of existing prisons. 
Considering that only 15% of the 432,557 Second Category suspects 
would be set free and approximately 300,000 would be sentenced to 
imprisonment, there was need for more prisons. To reduce the number 
of detainees, the government of Rwanda established a community 
service system (Travaux d´intérêt général-TIG)281 for those who 
voluntarily confessed and repented. 
The last challenge emerged from the testimony and plea of 
guilty procedure, which while useful in revealing all facts and acts, 
278 Ibid.
279 Interview with D. Mukantaganzwa, the Executive Secretary of the National 
Service for Gacaca Courts, conducted on 30  January 2008.
280 P. Bakomere, “Mu karere ka Rusizi abagera kuri 50 bahunze  Gacaca Gacaca”, 
Umuseso, 20-26, July 2007, p 11.
281 For those sentenced to prison, if they pleaded guilty and repented, half of the 
sentence is to be converted into community service (TIG) consisting in using 
them for some works of public good while staying in their ordinary homes instead 
of keeping them fi rmly jailed. 
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it disclosed a number of suspects that were not identifi ed during the 
year 2006. Going by the progress made in 2006, the Gacaca courts 
were committed to winding up genocide trials during the year 2007 
but were outnumbered by the suspects, thus forcing a few Gacaca 
courts to continue to try cases well into the early months of 2008. By 
the end of 2007, there were a total of 1,127,706 suspects, of which 
1,059,298 (93.9%) had been tried while 68,408 (6.1%) cases were 
still pending before Gacaca Courts.282 
Though the bulk of the cases in 2007 were tried through Gacaca 
courts, few cases of the fi rst category were prosecuted before ordinary 
courts. Of these cases, media attention was drawn to the Munyakazi 
case. General Munyakazi was a member of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army, reintegrated from the defeated army.  Gacaca Courts in the city 
of Kigali categorized him under the fi rst category and by virtue of his 
rank, had to be tried before the Military High Court.283 In its ruling 
of 27 April 2007, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment and 
he was stripped of his military ranks and was also denied some basic 
human rights on the ground that during the genocide in 1994, he 
supervised killings while serving as the Commanding Offi cer in the 
city of Kigali.284 An appeal was lodged in the Supreme Court and is 
still awaiting determination.
D. Mukantaganzwa strongly commends the work of Gacaca courts 
because their goal of  fi nishing trials by 2007 was nearly achieved. 
The courts not only solved the numerous problems that genocide 
trials faced before their establishment but also served in saving 
time without regular adjournment of cases as is the case in ordinary 
courts.  In addition, the Gacaca trial process reduced opportunities for 
corruption in comparison to the trials in ordinary courts.  Under   the 
Gacaca system citizens are able to identify corrupt individuals. 
282  National Service for  Gacaca Courts, Documentation Department.
283  Art. 138, par. 2 of Organic Law 07/2004 empowers military courts to try 
Military personnel accused of the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity 
committed in Rwanda between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994, 
which place them in the fi rst category irrespective of their ranks (Organic Law 
n° 07/2004 of 25/04/2004 determining the organisation, functioning and 
jurisdiction of courts as amended to date, Offi cial Gazette nº 14, 15 July 2004). 
284 Maj. Gen. Munyakazi vs. Military Prosecution, Military High Court, Genocide 
Case RPA/GEN 0001/07/HCM of 27/04/2007.
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Nevertheless, Mukantaganzwa pointed out that some work 
remains to be done in the year 2008, including among other things 
the termination of trials before Gacaca courts and trials of the fi rst 
category before ordinary courts. As regards the latter category, the 
government strategy is to leave ordinary courts with the competence 
to try top planners of genocide which form only 8% of the total 
number of the suspects detained cases of rape and others crimes of 
that category to Gacaca Courts. The government also intended to 
terminate all genocide cases by the end of 2008. 
In 2007 there was  an unexpected and abrupt increase in the number 
of suspects who were supposed to appear before courts thus delaying 
further completion of genocide related trials. The trial process was also 
characterized by the violation of the rights of witnesses and victims 
including harassment such as destruction of their property, injuries 
and killing. The responsible security organs adequately responded to 
the challenges and dealt with the threats fi rmly.
Overall, despite the  fact that the Gacaca  courts were not able 
to complete genocide related trials by the end and if the planned 
period, the primary objective of solving justice problems related to 
the genocide were achieved. The process of unifi cation of Rwandans 
is now deeper, on a fi rmer footing and is advancing successfully.285 
Gacaca courts have benefi ted the country in several ways. First, 
Rwandans were able to reveal the truth about what happened from 
the perpetrators, witnesses and victims.  Second, Gacaca courts have 
helped in reducing the levels of animosity  among the Rwandan 
people. They have also contributed to deconstructing  the genocide 
ideology among the youth while simultaneously providing a lesson to 
whoever still harbors such thinking.286
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda challenged
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) based in 
Arusha is expected to close its work  at the end of 2008 and it is 
believed that some cases will not have been tried. Meanwhile, the 
Rwanda Government is working on transfering the suspects to 
285  Op.cit. note 279.
286  Ibid.
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Rwanda.287 The only problem left will be the suspects still at large 
in so many countries all around the world making it necessary for 
Rwanda to work in collaboration with the international community 
to have them arrested and brought to Rwanda for trial. 
Although the ICTR was criticised for having tried very few cases 
compared to the big number of suspects, its role, according to D. 
Mukantaganzwa should not be understated because the existence 
of the Arusha court signifi es the recognition of Rwanda genocide. 
Taking this into consideration, judgments in terms of quantities 
mean nothing vis-à-vis the sentencing of top organisers of genocide 
like Kambanda and Bagosora.288 The existence of ICTR provides 
international recognition and confi rmation that there was genocide of 
Tutsis in Rwanda. It is also signifi cant that the court tried the criminals 
who planned the genocide, a point that underscores its central role.  
The National Commission for the fi ght against genocide
In 2007, there was an outcry from so many people that genocide 
ideology was being spread across the country, more particularly in 
some secondary schools. The situation prompted parliament to create 
an ad hoc commission comprising of deputies and members of the 
lower chamber, to inquire about the  extent of the spread of the 
ideology. In a report of the ad hoc commission it was revealed that 
some schools were  propagating aspects  of genocide ideology through 
teachers and pupils.289 
Following that parliamentary inquiry, the Minister of Education 
together with the Minister of State appeared before the lower chamber 
of parliament to explain the reasons as to why they had been unable 
to address and contain the problem.290 The Rwandan Constitution 
under article 128 provides for oral questions which empowers the 
287 Law 11/2007 of 16/03/2007 concerning transfer of cases of the Republic of 
Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and from other 
States, Offi cial Gazette special, 19 March 2007.
288 Op.cit. note 11.
289 E. Mwesigye & J. Kimanuka. “Three teachers accused of spreading genocide 
ideology”,  The New Times 9 June 2007, at 4.
290 J. Buyinza, “MPs grill education ministers”, The New Times, 19 December 2007, 
at 1-2.
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chamber of deputies to hear and quiz any government Minister for 
failure to address a given problem. 
Moreover, the inquiry persuaded the government to rethink  the 
role of the National Commission for the fi ght against genocide which 
was set up by law in 2007,291  but which was not yet working effectively. 
The Commission is a national, independent and permanent institution, 
having the mission of putting in place a permanent framework for the 
exchange of ideas on genocide, its consequences and the strategies for 
its prevention and eradication. It is also responsible for initiating the 
creation of a national research and documentation centre on genocide; 
advocating for the cause of genocide survivors both within the 
country and abroad; planning and coordinating all activities aimed at 
commemorating the 1994 genocide; elaborating and putting in place 
strategies that are meant for fi ghting genocide and its ideology and 
for fi ghting revisionism, negationism and trivialization. In addition, 
it is supposed to seek for assistance for genocide survivors and pursue 
advocacy on the issue of compensation; rehabilitation and putting in 
place strategies to resolve problems that were a consequence of the 
genocide such as trauma and other related illnesses; and cooperating 
with other national or international organs with a similar mission.292
The Commission, which shall submit its activity report each year 
to parliament, has also been mandated to devise recommendations to 
stop the propagation of genocide ideology and to offer more protection 
to survivors of genocide.
National Security and the Security of the People
Negative Forces No longer a serious threat
With the experience of genocide and its aftermath in Rwanda, security 
and the rights of people especially the right to life, are of paramount 
importance. According to J. Rutaremara, the army spokesman; save 
for the activities of the negative forces (usually known as Forces 
291 Law 09/2007 on the attributions, organization and functioning of the National 
Commission for the fi ght against genocide, OFFICIAL GAZETTE special, 19 
March 2007.  
292 Art. 4 of Law 09/2007 cited above.
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Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda) – the residue of the interahamwe) [FDLR], 
operating in the neighbouring DRC, Rwanda’s internal security is 
stable.  After the Rwandan government forces pulled out of the DRC, 
however, the interahamwe question in the east of the DRC, is now the 
responsibility of the UN.293 Nonetheless, the Rwandan government 
continues to keep a watchful eye over events in the area while 
simultaneously pursuing the path of dialogue to resolve the problems 
between the different parties that are involved in the situation in the 
DRC.294 
The army spokesman reiterated that the negative forces are no 
longer a serious threat given that the Rwandan army is ready to face 
any threat that may come from FDLR. Furthermore, among the 
major achievements of the year 2007 in this respect was the approval 
of a regional non-aggression pact by the lower chamber of Parliament 
(the Pact on Security, Stability, and Development in the Great Lakes 
region, signed in Nairobi, Kenya on 15 December 2006) that binds 
countries in the Great Lakes region against posing security threats 
to their neighbours.295 This pact developed from a call by African 
countries and was transformed into  a treaty signed in Abuja, Nigeria 
on 31 January 2005.296 It was immediately followed up by a plan of 
action to disarm FDLR in Congo.297  
293 The United Nations sent peacekeepers to the Eastern region of DRC, under the 
acronym of MONUC, to help DRC in reestablishing peace in the KIVU region. 
294 Interview with J. Rutaremara, army spokesman, conducted on 17 July 2007.
295 Law 47/2007 of 11/09/2007 authorising the ratifi cation of the pact on security, 
stability, and development in the great lakes region, signed in Nairobi, Kenya on 
15 December 2006, Offi cial Gazette nº 21, 1 November 2007; see also J. 
Buyinza, “Lawmakers approve regional non-aggression pact”, The New 
Times, 28 June 2007 at 3.
296 Law 48/2007 of 11/09/2007 authorising  ratifi cation of the African Union non-
aggression and common defence pact, adopted in Abuja, Nigeria on 31 January 
2005, Offi cial Gazette nº 21, 1 November 2007.
297 J. Munyaneza, “Rwanda, Congo agree to FDLR disarmament plan”, The New 
Times, 12 November 2007 at 1-2.
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Subordination of military to civilian authority
The army spokesman stated that the Constitution governs the 
relationships between civilians and the army. Article 1 of the Rwandan 
Constitution states that the Rwandan State is an independent, 
sovereign, democratic, social and secular Republic and that the 
principle governing the Republic is “government of the people, by 
the people and for the people”. This means that Rwanda is a country 
which is governed and run along the principles of democracy, based 
on the wider ideals of the entire society, not  those of the army. In 
other words, the military should be subordinate to civilian authority. 
That is, Rwanda will be governed by a civilian authority with the help 
of the military in matters concerning the security and sovereignty of 
the nation.298
The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
Protection of human rights is one of the cornerstones of 
constitutionalism.  In Rwanda this role is mainly played by the 
National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) in collaboration 
with other stakeholders. 
The Role of the NCHR
Under the Rwandan Constitution, the ´NCHR´ is responsible for 
ensuring observance of human rights.299 The president300 of the 
commission in an interview indicated that in 2007 there were a few 
threats to human rights in Rwanda. The central achievements of 2007 
in the context of human rights protection at the international level 
298 Op.cit. note 294.
299 The National Commission for Human Rights is a constitutional commission, 
empowered under the provisions of article 177 to not only examine the violations 
of human rights committed on Rwandan territory by State organs, public offi cials 
using their duties as cover, by organizations and by individuals but also to carry 
out investigations of human rights abuses in Rwanda and fi ling complaints in 
respect thereof with the competent courts.
300 Interview with Zayinabu Kayitesi, Executive Secretary of the National 
Commission for Human Rights, conducted on 6 February 2008.
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centered on the ratifi cation of the international conventions relating 
to the fi ght against torture and inhumane treatment, the abolition of 
death penalty, the fi ght against women´s discrimination, the treaty on 
anti-doping in sport, the fi ght against weapons of mass destruction, and 
the fi ght against child traffi cking through inter-country adoption.301
In spite of press reports questioning the relevance of the annual 
reports of the commission, the president of the commission stressed 
that overall, Rwanda is a country that observes the rule of law302 and 
one that has interest in the protection of the rights of vulnerable 
groups and those that have been historically marginalized. Although 
this interest is not adequately  grounded in the social, economic and 
political empowerment strategy of the country.303 
The Supervisory Role of the Ombudsman
In Rwanda there is a new infl uential offi ce, the Ombudsman’s Offi ce, 
which is an independent institution which makes it possible for 
citizens to petition and obtain redress from government in cases of 
maladministration. It acts as a link between citizens and institutions, 
both public and private.  It’s mandate includes: 
(i) The prevention  and fi ght against injustice, corruption and 
other related offences in public and private administration; 
(ii) The receipt and examination of complaints from individuals 
and independent associations against the acts of public offi cials 
or organs, and private institutions.304 
According to A. Nzindukiyimana, through investigations and 
complaints conducted during the year 2007, Rwanda is evolving as 
a country governed on the basis of the rule of law and respect for 
the rights of individuals. The mandate of the Ombudsman limits the 
abuse of powers by government. The Ombudsman is considerably 
301 See also Summary report of the year 2007, National Commission for Human 
Rights.
302 C. Kabonero, “Ni ryari raporo za Zayinabu na Kamagaju zizagira akamaro?”, 
Umuseso,13-19 July 2007 at 6.
303 For example, women are given a constitutional chance to have a 30% minimum 
representation in Parliament (Art. 76 & 82 of the Rwandan Constitution).
304 Art. 182 of Rwandan Constitution.
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accessible because citizens are capable of reaching envoys sent by the 
Ombudsman to the different districts in the country. In addition the 
offi ce of the Ombudsman set up toll free telephone numbers to ease 
public accessibility to the offi ce on matters of human rights. The offi ce 
will be able to work more effectively if well resourced.305
Women and Children´s Rights
Like other citizens aged 16 years and above, there was a census of 
street children to enable them obtain identity cards.306 Usually, 
street children have no specifi c address. The Secretary General in 
the Ministry of Local Administration confi rmed that a street child 
like everyone else, who has attained the age of 16 has the right to 
an identity card. This demostrates a commitment to respect rights of 
vulnerable children and also a sign of commitment by the government 
of Rwanda to execute the provisions of article 16 of the Constitution 
which provides that all human beings are equal before the law and are 
entitled to equal protection under the law.307 
In relation to female sex–workers, the Rwandan State in trying to 
get them off the streets and has initiated an anti-prostitute campaign. 
According to The New Times, one of the measures that may be used, 
besides dissuasion that failed to operate,308 is to look for alternative 
solutions such as arresting men who are used by the sex-workers.309 
The Executive Secretary of Haguruka ASBL is of the opinion that 
criminal sanctions are not enough to force sex–workers off the streets 
but rather counselling strategies combined with skills enhancement 
would help them earn a livelihood elsewhere.310
305 Interview with A. Nzindukiyimana, Deputy Ombudsman, conducted on 26 July 
2007.
306 C. Manzi, “Abana bo mu mihanda ntibibagiranye”, Izuba, 18-20 September 2007 
at 2.
307 Article 16 of the Rwandan Constitution.
308 The Criminal Law, under the provisions of article 363-373, penalizes prostitution, 
but this law did not ever dissuade prostitutes to continue their job.
309 M. Mazimpaka, “Will prostitution disappear with legislation”, The New Times, 29 
June 2007 p 13.
310 Interview with Christine Tuyisenge, Executive Secretary of Haguruka asbl (an 
association for defense and protection of women and children´s rights), conducted 
on 11 February 2008.
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Economic Rights: The Case of Land Ownership
Another serious threat to human rights exists in the category of 
economic rights of citizens. While the Rwandan policy has been 
decentralisation, press reports indicate that much of the administrative 
and economic powers still remain centralised thereby continuing the 
concentration of economic wealth and corruption at the centre. 
In addition to press reports disclosing that some high government 
offi cials have monopolised authority over plots of lands in some 
districts, others disclosing that about 4 billion francs were unaccounted 
for in the last two years.311 It is obvious that the distribution of wealth, 
in some instances remains in the hands of those who are in charge of 
its distribution. For instance, evidence relating to land distribution 
patterns in the Eastern Province indicates that some of the leaders own 
big plots of land while ordinary farmers own considerably less.312 
On the basis of the fi ndings and proposals of the commission 
that was instituted to handle the problem, the issue attracted the 
intervention of the Rwandan President Paul Kagame who promised 
that he would expeditiously solve the problem himself. The Joint 
Commission which includes military, police and offi cials from the 
Land Ministry has stepped up efforts to address any land wrangles 
especially in the Eastern Province and has among other solutions, 
proposed equitable redistribution of the land.313 
As a measure of fi ghting corruption, the Offi ce of the Auditor 
General (AG) which is in charge of supervising use of government’s 
wealth prepares and submits a report to Parliament every year.314 
According to the Legal adviser of the Chamber of Deputies, 
Parliament exercises its oversight role by receiving oral and written 
311 C. Kabonero, “Ni ryari raporo za Zayinabu na Kamagaju zizagira akamaro?”, 
Umuseso, 13-19 July 2007 p 6. 
312 C. Kabonero, “RDF generals, ministers grab land at expenses of peasants”, 
Newsline, 18-24 July 2007 p 1 & 6-7. 
313 E. Musoni, “Military, police team probe land ownership”, The New Times, 28 June 
2007, p 3.
314 Art. 184 Constitution provides that “… the Offi ce of the Auditor General for 
State Finances shall submit each year to each Chamber of Parliament, prior to the 
commencement of the session devoted to the examination of the budget of the 
following year, a complete report on the balance sheet of the State budget of the 
previous year…”
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submissions as well as other methods provided for under article 128 
of the constitution. Again, the AG is of the opinion that in addition 
to punitive measures such as prosecution of suspects, other measures 
such as massive civic education to prevent acts of corruption and 
obligating state offi cials to perform their duties should also be used.315 
The President of the Political Commission of the lower chamber of 
Parliament is also of the opinion that every state offi cial should strive 
for transparency and accountability to make every individual vigilant 
and fi scally responsible.316
Equality before the Law: Top offi cials compelled to face 
justice
Corruption is not only about money, but sometimes infl uence peddling 
by top offi cials and in whatever format, it amounts to  abuse of offi ce. 
One of the cases that the press reported during 2007 was the case 
of Generals S. Kanyemera and F. Rusagara, who were charged with 
trying to assist a big personality in the business arena, A. Rwigara, to 
escape justice by not appearing in court. Rwigara had been prosecuted 
for negligence which had caused the death of workers on his building 
which was under construction. This begs the question; should there 
be anyone who should not be subjected to court’s jurisdiction? The 
answer is found in the Constitution, which provides for equality of all 
citizens before the law.317 
Turning back to the case, the focus should not only be to ensure 
that all perpetrators of crime are prosecuted but that an opportunity 
to defend themselves in the right manner is availed. Not only 
should suspects enjoy the right to appear before the court within 
the stipulated time in order to reduce the amount of time it takes to 
try and determine cases, – Justice delayed is justice denied. Another 
characteristic of the law is the right to bail which the prosecution 
315 Interview with B. Bashoga, Legal Advisor of the Chamber of Deputies, conducted 
on 24 July 2007.
316 Interview with B. Kanzayire & D. Mukabalisa, respectively President and Vice 
President of the Political Commission, Chamber of Deputies, conducted on 24 
July 2007.
317 Article 16 of the Rwandan Constitution.
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was asked to grant the two accused while awaiting trial.318 Bail is a 
new procedural requirement provided for under article 101 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code,319 which states that “in all offences, an 
accused person or his or her counsel can at any time apply for bail 
to the public prosecutor charged with the preparation of the case or 
to a Judge or Magistrate depending on the stage of investigation.” 
The case of the two generals ended up in the Military Court, which 
quashed the allegations against the two for lack of evidence.320
Abolition of the Death Penalty
The death penalty provided one of the major challenges that faced 
the Rwandan government in terms of striking the balance between 
punishment and forgiveness. Any post-transition government is 
obliged to make decisions that may sometimes go against the ordinary 
structural constructions of law and state, including the penal system. 
Among the important decisions made in 2007 in the human rights 
arena was the abolition of the death penalty. This is the most valuable 
contribution of the Rwandan government towards respect for the right 
to life. Of course the decision stems, not only from an international 
legal requirement, but mostly from a political analysis. According to 
J. Mutsinzi, political life itself regulates or makes functional the legal 
rules political facts justify amendments of legal rules.321 
The year 2007 begun with discussions about the abolition of the 
death penalty and a draft law was sent to parliament for adoption. 
Parliament voted for the abolition of the death penalty and a new law 
was gazetted on 25 July 2007.322 By implication, the 1,365 convicts 
sentenced to death between 1998 and 2006 have a chance to survive 
death which was automatically commuted into life imprisonment 
318 F. Kimenyi & G. Agaba, “Generals Kaka, Rusagara get bail”, The New Times, 18 
August 2007, p 1.
319 Law 13/2004 of 17/5/2004 relating to the Code of Criminal Procedure (as 
amended up to date), Offi cial Gazette special, 30 July 2004.
320 Military Prosecution v Brig. Gen. S. Kanyemera & Brig. Gen. F. Rusagara, 
Military Court, Criminal case RP 0172/07/TM, 17 August 2007.
321 Interview with J. Mutsinzi, Judge of Supreme Court, conducted on 11 July 2007.
322 Organic Law 31/2007 of 25 July 2007 relating to the abolition of death penalty, 
Offi cial Gazette special number, 25 July 2007.
The State of Constitutionalism in Rwanda, 2007 115
with or without special provisions. This decision consolidates the 
Rwandan government’s will to abide by international law which 
requires the abolition of the death penalty. It also heightens the 
chances of transferring genocide suspects prosecuted by the ICTR or 
foreign countries which have not abolished the death penalty.323 
Freedom of the Press in Rwanda 
The Rwandan Constitution under article 34, provides that “freedom 
of the press and freedom of information are recognized and guaranteed 
by the State.” The same article, however, sets the limits of the exercise 
of such freedom by stating  that “freedom of speech and freedom of 
information shall not prejudice public order and good morals, the 
right of every citizen to honour, good reputation and the privacy of 
personal and family life.” Freedom of the press and information “is 
also guaranteed so long as it does not prejudice the protection of the 
youth and minors.”
In Rwanda, the challenge has been to fi nd a balance between 
freedom of the press and public policy. On the one hand, we have to 
acknowledge that the press not only provides the public with a wide 
range of information on the other in most cases it condemns and 
denounces the violation of human rights and corruption within public 
and private institutions and bad governance. A vivid example is a story 
in which the media made public diselogure of maladministration in 
a private bank, the Bank of Commerce, Development and Industry 
(BCDI) which collapsed under the weight of bad corporate governance 
hurting its customers and other stakeholders. Thanks to the media, 
the police was able to bring  legal proceedings against the manager 
of the bank.324 While the case is still pending in court, the bank was 
unable to continue operating and sold out to ECOBANK. 
On the other hand, in many African countries including Rwanda, 
cases of violation of press freedom have been recorded. Many journalists 
are prosecuted for defamation, others are locked up, and newspapers 
323 F. Mutesi, “Death row: Over 1300 survive gallows”, The New Times, 27 August 
2007, p 3.
324 Prosecution v Kalisa case is still pending before the High Court of the Republic. 
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suspended, banned325 or censored. A well  known example in Rwanda 
is the “Umuseso Newspaper” case which, due to its publications, 
was branded by the government ‘a vehicle of public disorder’. This 
newspaper had to suspend its publications for a while. The vital lesson 
for both journalists and government offi cials to learn  is to question 
not just public policy but also press law and ethics. If the government 
of Rwanda wants a balance between freedom of the press and public 
order in general, combined with the protection of the right to privacy 
needed by the citizens, then threatening public policy or private rights 
should be sanctioned. 
According to P. Mulama, if the rule is that the media needs much 
more freedom to exercise its duties, it is important to consider the 
fact that the press may be a threat to the civil and political liberties 
of citizens that may lead to defamation which is prohibited under 
Rwandan law.  This means that freedom goes hand in hand with legal 
restrictions, and censorship or penalization becomes less applicable 
whenever journalists are well trained in the fi eld of journalism and 
when media ethics are well rooted. This is not yet the case for the 
Rwandan press.326 By and large, the way media performs depends 
on the level of training and consciousness and  the ethics that the 
journalist himself or herself has with regard to security matters and 
public policy.
The media is therefore generally free to publish what it likes but 
may be sued for doing so, particularly for defamation.327 Defamation 
means to attack through the press the good reputation of somebody. 
Three principles underlie this defi nition: the statement alleged to be 
defamatory must be published, it may expose the claimant to hatred 
or ridicule, and it may cause the claimant to be shunned or avoided.328 
In Rwanda, cases of defamation have become common with members 
325 For example, the contentious problem in relation to media law was the suspension 
of the Weekly Post Newspaper by the Ministry of Information.
326 Interview with P. Mulama, the Executive Secretary of the High Council of the 
Press, conducted on 7 February 2008. 
327 Art. 84, par. 1 of Law 18/2002 of 11/05/2002 governing the press, Offi cial 
Gazette,  13/2002 1 July 2002. 
328 P. Carey (1996), Media Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell p 36.
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of the public bringing cases against journalists who wrongly defame 
or expose the public, ordinary people and authorities to disrespect. 
It is in this regard that the director of publications of the Umuseso 
newspaper has been brought before court to answer defamation 
charges the fi rst trial of a journalist from Umuseso who was prosecuted 
for defaming a state authority in Kabonero versus Hon. D. Polisi, a 
Member of Parliament in the Chamber of Deputies. Kabonero was 
given a suspended prison sentence of one year and was required to pay 
damages equivalent to one million Rwandan francs (almost 2000 US 
dollars).329 In 2007, the same journalist was again sued for defaming 
a Rwandan tycoon named Rujugiro. The latter case is still pending 
before court.   
The government needs to walk a tight rope in order to avoid a 
situation where defamation cases result in the gagging of the press.         
Political Parties’ Grass-roots Elections
With regard to multiparty democracy as a way or a means to power 
sharing,  media attention was mainly directed to two political parties; 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as the ruling political party, and 
the Liberal Party (PL) because of  its overall confl icts relating to the 
election of its organisational structure. 
There was no direct action for power sharing witnessed in 2007, 
but one cannot fail to talk about the preparations for the parliamentary 
elections scheduled for 2008. As part of the preparations, all political 
parties had in 2007  started searching for representatives at all levels 
beginning from the local level in the sectors of districts to the highest 
administrative level of the party. This followed a recently enacted 
law,330 which for the fi rst time since 1994, granted all legal political 
parties’ freedom to conduct their affairs down  to the grass roots level, 
329 Polisi v Kabonero, High Court of Kigali, Defamation case RPAA 0001/05/HC/
Kigali, 02/08/2006.
330 Organic Law 19/2007 of 04/05/2007 modifying and complementing Organic 
Law 16/2003 of 27/06/2003 governing political organizations and politicians, 
Offi cial Gazette  11 bis, 1 June 2007 gives a right to the leadership organs 
of political organizations to also have offi ces at the level of all the country’s 
administrative entities in the country. 
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including election of their representatives down to local level. RPF as 
a powerful party, was the fi rst to undertake this action by putting up 
structures or levels in the whole country starting with the sector of the 
district level.331
Other political parties followed suit, but the party which attracted 
most media attention was the PL. After initiating the grassroots level 
structures, PL’s administrative committee experienced confl icts arising 
from power/leadership sharing. After a long fi ght through sanctions 
and dialogue332, the situation was fi nally settled.333
The Rule of Law and the Independence of the  
Judiciary 
Three principle aspects attracted the attention of lawyers and the 
press, with regard to the judicial process during 2007. First, were 
the constitutional petitions about non-coformity to it by people in 
public offi ces, second was the granting of presidential clemency to 
former Rwandan president P. Bizimungu, and third, was Rwanda’s 
integration into the EAC. 
Constitutional Petitions for Non Conformity  
As a cardinal rule, the constitution is the highest law of the land and 
any decision based on provisions of other laws that may be inconsistent 
with any provision of the constitution is null and void to the extent 
of that inconsistency. 
In E. Mbonimpaye’s case, there was an appeal to the Supreme 
Court against the decision of the High Court of Kigali on the grounds 
of non-conformity with the provisions of the constitution. The case 
was in regard to adultery committed by a husband and desertion 
of the nuclear family. The Court of Higher Instance, and the High 
Court, with  reference to the Criminal Code under the provisions of 
331 C. Kabonero, “Fear and ignorance defi ne RPF elections”, Umuseso, 18-24 July 
2007 p 8.
332 The Rwandan Constitution sets the principle of dialoque and consensus as the 
preferable way of solving confl icts (art. 9 of the Constitution).
333 J. Sesonga, “Ibibazo by´ishyaka PL bikomeje gushakirwa umuti”, Imvaho Nshya, 
30 July 2007 at 6.
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articles 393-396 (in relation to punishing adultery) and article 380 (in 
relation to punishing desertion of family),334 sentenced the accused 
person to a  term of  six months imprisonment.
The lawyer representing E. Mbonimpaye stated that the sentence 
was contrary to the constitution, since the case in its substance was of 
a civil nature and not a criminal one, and for that reason, the decision 
of the High Court contravened article 18 of the constitution which 
states that “no one shall be subjected to prosecution, arrest, detention 
or punishment on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a crime under the law in force at the time it was committed.” 
The appeal was rejected, not on the basis of non-conformity with the 
constitution, but on grounds that the procedure adopted in lodging 
the appeal was wrong.335 The substance of the case is that laws that 
are inconsistent with the constitution should be revised to conform 
to it. Accordingly, it would be prudent to revise the criminal code 
to reconcile its provisions with those of the constitution regarding 
private matters that may arise under criminal law. 
Another constitutional petition was in relation to the repeal of article 
121, paragraph. 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code,336 on the ground 
that it contravened article 121, paragraph. 2 of the constitution which 
states: “Where the court fi nds out that the prosecution is not willing 
to prosecute such persons it may summon them to appear before the 
court and be tried.” The Supreme Court repealed the provision on 
the grounds that it contravened articles 160-161 of the constitution 
which gave the sole powers of prosecution to the National Prosecution 
Service as well as those of equitable decision, which required checks 
and balances of powers between the Judiciary, the Executive and the 
Legislature as provided for under the provisions of article 60 and other 
provisions relating to the separation and complementarity of the three 
powers.337
334 Decree Law 21/77 relating to Criminal Code, Offi cial Gazette 13 bis, 1978 p 1.
335 E. Mbonimpaye, Supreme Court, Constitutional Petition RS/Inconst.10001/06/CS, 
May 10, 2007.
336 Law  13/2004 of 17/5/2004 relating to the Code of Criminal Procedure, Offi cial 
Gazette special, 30 July 2004.
337 A. Mutebwa, Supreme Court, Constitutional Petition  RS/Inconst/Pén.0001/07/
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Presidential Pardon of Former President Pasteur Bizimungu
P. Bizimungu (Ex-President of the Republic), who in 2006 was 
sentenced to a term of fi fteen years in prison by the Supreme Court 
got presidential pardon on 6  April, 2007.338 According to the Supreme 
Court ruling, the reasons that led to such a big sentence were the 
dissemination of a divisive ideology and instituting a criminal 
organization disguised  as a political party. The Supreme Court relying 
on the provisions of articles 166, 281 and 282 of the Criminal Code 
sentenced him to a term of fi fteen years imprisonment.339  It is however 
important to analyze the pardon granted to Mr.  Bizimungu. 
Legally speaking, the decision of the President to pardon is 
constitutional and is based on article 111 of the constitution which 
gives the Head of State power to exercise the prerogative of mercy.340 
The other reason that may have  prompted the presidential pardon 
may have been Mr. Bizimungu’s appeal  for forgiveness.
The important lesson that can be drawn from this pardon is not so 
much its grounds, though important, but the political will to change 
the country’s history.  Historically in Rwanda, before a succeeding 
king or president was sworn in, it was a rule to directly or indirectly 
cause the death of the former king or president. By granting the 
former president pardon, the old rule has now been changed. Well 
organized political education and great vigilance or wisdom of the 
former and current leaders at different levels, however, is still required 
to change societal attitudes to enable the citizens appreciate this new 
change. What remains to be  determined is whether P. Bizimungu falls 
within the ambit of article 87 of the constitution, which provides that 
“… former Heads of State become members of the Senate upon their 
request to the Supreme Court but must have honorably completed 
CS, 11 January 2008.
338 C. Kabonero, “Bizimungu: Ni imbabazi, igitsure cyangwa ni umugambi wa 
politiki?”, Umuseso, 19-26 April 2007, at 12.
339 P. Bizimungu v Prosecution, Supreme Court, Criminal case nº RPA 0158/05/CS, 
17 February 2006. 
340 Article 111, par. 1 of the Constitution of Rwanda states: “The President of the 
Republic has authority to exercise the prerogative of mercy in accordance with 
the procedure determined by law and after consulting the Supreme Court on the 
matter”.
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their terms or voluntarily resigned from offi ce”. In our understanding, 
there is room for him to become a senator, upon his request.
International Relations: Rwanda and Burundi join the East 
African Community
The year 2007 was characterized by another big stride in regional co-
operation when Rwanda341 and Burundi were accepted into the EAC 
on 18 June 2007.342 This calls for a modifi cation of the laws of Rwanda 
starting with the constitution to comply with the requirements of the 
EAC. Such compliance requires revision of laws and of the judicial 
system to adapt to the EAC rules and regulations, particularly so since 
Rwanda like other Partner States would be required to have members 
in EALA and judges in the EACJ. 
Conclusion
In concluding this chapter it is important to note that the paper 
provides an analysis of the most crucial challenges that Rwanda faced 
regarding implementation of the provisions of the constitution. In 
general this  portrayed Rwanda as a country governed by the rule of 
law.   We have  explained the different problems that characterized the 
year 2007 in safeguarding the constitution. 
Top on the list of these challenges is the big problem concerning 
fi nalising genocide cases through  Gacaca Courts. There has been 
considerable progress in processing and clearing genocide cases 
but more still needs to be done. Another important issue concerns 
respecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of people. The media 
profi led a big problem of land grabbing by highly placed offi cials. 
Although a commission was appointed to come up with strategies of 
equitably sharing the land in the Eastern province, the problem had 
not been solved by the end of the year. 
341 Law 29/2007 of 27/06/2007 authorising the  Treaty of accession of the Republic 
of Rwanda to the East African Community, signed in Kampala, in Uganda, on 18 
June 2007, Offi cial Gazette special, 28 June 2007.
342 C. Kazooba, “Finally Rwanda, Burundi become full EAC members”, The New 
Times, 18 June 2007, pp 1-2.
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 Furthermore, the paper  addresses the confl ict between two 
important constitutional principles; freedom of expression and public 
policy. It was stressed that the government still has a long way to go in 
terms of training journalists to respect the needs of maintaining public 
order and people´s privacy instead of being heavy handed in dealing 
with the journalists, thus risking an encroachment  on the freedom of 
expression. Lastly, since Rwanda has joined the EAC, it is imperative 
that she starts studying ways of amending her  different laws so as to 
make them compliant  with those of the EAC.   This should be a key 
step to be taken in the year 2008.
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